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Dissertation directed by Professor Yuko Munakata 
 
Response inhibition is thought to be central to the function of the frontal lobes and intimately 
related to all higher cognitive functions.  The effortful and controlled component to response 
inhibition is often assumed to be the act of motoric stopping per se, such that motoric stopping 
can be strategically directed either at all actions (thus taking a global form) or only a subset (thus 
taking a more selective form).  Here we challenge these core assumptions, first by offering a 
more viable alternative to dominant accounts of global stopping, and second by raising both 
empirical and computational dilemmas for dominant accounts of selective stopping.  Using 
behavioral, neuroimaging, electroencephalographic and computational approaches, we 
demonstrate that the global stopping of responses does not require control mechanisms beyond 
those involved in detecting contexts in which old behaviors are inappropriate – in other words, 
the ability to monitor context in the service of goals.  A computational model is used to 
demonstrate that these context-monitoring processes may underlie the behavioral, neuroimaging, 
and pharmacological phenomena of global stopping in the absence of any controlled stopping 
mechanisms.  This work also challenges claims that more strategically selective forms of 
stopping are enabled by the controlled use of a slower but more response-specific stopping 
mechanism.  We find a developmental double dissociation between the speed of stopping and its 
specificity, indicating that they cannot unambiguously be taken to reflect the use of a single 
neural mechanism.  A computational model raises further challenges for extant theories of 
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selective stopping, raising the possibility that the control mechanisms supporting this ability are 
not actually directed at specific responses.  Together these results challenge dominant accounts 
of both global and selective inhibitory control, and clarify emerging debates on the frontal 
substrates of response inhibition, while raising novel questions about the substrates and 
processes that support selective stopping.  More broadly, this work provides a coherent account 
of prefrontal cortex function across inhibitory domains, which may in turn enable both a more 
precise characterization of frontal disinhibitory syndromes as well as enable more targeted 
diagnosis and treatment of pathologies associated with response inhibition deficits. 
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CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT MONITORING AND RIGHT VENTROLATERAL PREFRONTAL 
CORTEX 
 
Abstract 
Response inhibition is widely considered to be a critical executive function deployed in 
the service of cognitive control, and is thought to crucially rely on the integrity of the right 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rVLPFC).  However, the paradigms thought to assess response 
inhibition typically involve both the actual stopping of responses and the requirement to detect 
and interpret behaviorally significant stimuli.  Thus, experimental tasks which measure response 
inhibition may also assess those context-monitoring processes which enable the detection of 
stimuli that may demand changes in behavior given contextual factors.  Here we provide an 
integrative review of the literatures on response inhibition and rVLPFC by contrasting two 
competing accounts.  Dominant “motoric stopping” accounts posit that responses are inhibited 
via stopping-specific processes localized to the rVLPFC, while context-monitoring accounts 
posit that responses are inhibited via more domain-general processes in the rVLPFC.  We 
evaluate these competing accounts in the context of a broad range of relevant 
electrophysiological, hemodynamic, and neuropsychological data.  On the basis of our critical 
review, we conclude that context-monitoring theories are viable accounts of phenomena widely 
assumed to reflect stopping in the response inhibition literature, and in some cases are more 
consistent with available data.  However, neither account can explain all existing phenomena, 
potentially pointing the way to a more integrative and comprehensive account of rVLPFC 
function. 
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Introduction 
The ability to stop certain unwanted thoughts or actions is a widely recognized cognitive 
capacity, with numerous subtypes and with theoretical importance to a number of domains (Aron 
et al., 2007).  Dysfunction in such inhibitory abilities has been invoked to explain a number of 
neuropsychological disorders, including attention deficit disorder, borderline personality 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Barkley, 1997; 
Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2008; Falconer et al., 2008; Groman, James, & Jentsch, 2008; 
Hertel, 2007; Rentrop et al., 2008).   Similarly, different inhibitory subprocesses have been used 
to characterize the functions of disparate regions of the prefrontal cortex (Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2004; Diamond, 1990; Roberts & Wallis, 2000) and to be the principal set of capacities 
enabled by maturation of the prefrontal lobes (Dempster, 1992).  It is hard to exaggerate the 
influence that these constructs have had on cognitive theorizing. 
A wealth of evidence has been interpreted to reflect an overarching role for response 
inhibition in daily life.  In healthy adults, factor analyses of individual differences indicate the 
variance shared by tasks requiring response inhibition fully overlaps with that shared among all 
tasks requiring the control of thought and behavior (Friedman et al., 2008).  In agreement with 
this view, the neural circuitry thought to support response inhibition is intricately linked to the 
loops between prefrontal cortex, thalamus and basal ganglia that are involved in higher-level 
cognition (Aron, 2007).  While some theorists have questioned the existence of resource-
demanding and cognitively-controlled inhibition at the cognitive and conceptual levels 
(Munakata, 2001), the inhibition of physical responses has sometimes been specifically 
exempted from these criticisms (MacLeod et al., 2003).  This exemption, in turn, has grounded 
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continued theorizing that the mechanisms of response inhibition may somehow apply more 
widely (Aron, 2007).   
Process Impurity in Measures of Response Inhibition 
Response inhibition is a difficult construct to measure – in part, because successful 
response inhibition will often lead to no measurable response at all.  Such difficulties can be 
circumvented by the use of the Stop Signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984) in which subjects must 
simply respond to an imperative stimulus unless it is followed by a “stop signal.”  The stop 
signal indicates that subjects must not execute any response on that trial.  By using subject 
performance to adapt the delay between the imperative stimulus and the stop signal that 
occasionally follows it, one can experimentally determine the delay at which any given subject is 
just as likely to successfully inhibit a response as to erroneously commit a response (i.e., 50% 
accuracy).  According to the canonical “race model” of this task (Logan & Cowan, 1984), 50% 
accuracy reflects the case where a “stop process,” initiated by the onset of the stop signal, is 
finishing on average just as quickly as the “go process” initiated by the onset of the preceding 
imperative stimulus.  The duration of this otherwise-unobservable “stop” process can thus be 
estimated utilizing straightforward subtractive logic.  The resulting measure is termed the “Stop 
Signal Reaction Time” (SSRT). 
The race model of the stop signal task has been incredibly useful for deriving this 
quantitative estimate of the efficiency of response inhibition.  However, it is important to note 
that SSRT includes both the efficiency of motoric stopping and the efficiency and reliability of 
triggering that motoric stopping process in the first place (Figure 1A and B illustrate this 
phenomenon).  For example, one might be exceptionally good at cancelling ongoing or planned 
responses, but exceptionally poor at noticing or acting upon the brief or rare stop signals.  In that 
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case, SSRT might be interpreted to reflect poor response inhibition, but for the wrong reason – 
the impairment lies in noticing and processing the stop signal, not in the cancellation of a 
response per se.  Thus, good inhibitory performance requires not only the ability to stop the 
planned or ongoing response, but also the ability to detect and interpret the infrequent but task-
relevant stop signal itself.  These capacities are inherently intermingled in the use of SSRT. 
 
Figure 1.  Processing and detecting the stop signal can explain the variability in stopping success 
with signal delay as illustrated above.  A. When stop signals are provided early, the detection of 
the stop signal is more likely to complete before the response is committed, enabling successful 
inhibition.  B. Conversely, the primary task response is more likely to have occurred by the time 
later stop signals are fully processed, yelding less successful inhibition. 
A 
B 
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While this point might at first glance seem to be a kind of “storm in a teacup,” it could in 
fact have substantial theoretical and applied implications.  For example, groups that demonstrate 
prolonged SSRT relative to healthy adult controls are often interpreted to have poor response 
inhibition abilities – when their deficits might have nothing more to do with response inhibition 
than they have to do with response commission.  Such these difficulties might instead lay in 
effectively detecting or interpreting the stop signals.  Likewise, areas of the brain whose function 
is correlated with SSRT (most notably, the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; rVLPFC) have 
often been interpreted to instantiate the act of motoric stopping itself, when their function might 
possibly have rather little to do with motor stopping and much more to do with effective 
detection and interpretation of the infrequent, but behaviorally-relevant stop signals.  
Dissociating between motoric stopping and these more attentional processes is thus not only 
important for the basic mission of cognitive neuroscience, but could be highly informative for 
the diagnosis and treatment of psychopathologies that are currently characterized by deficits in 
response inhibition. 
In this article, we review computational, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological evidence 
which suggests that the widely used Stop task and the closely related Go/NoGo task may 
primarily reflect what we term context monitoring processes – processes which enable the 
detection of stimuli that might indicate the need for a change in behavior given the current 
context, regardless of whether those stimuli demand motoric stopping per se (Mars, Piekema, 
Coles, Hulstijn, & Toni, 2007; Ray, Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006; Stuss & Alexander, 2007; 
Sharp et al., 2010; Hampshire et al., 2010; Dodds et al, 2011; Cai & Leung et al, 2011; 
Verbruggen et al., 2010; Chatham et al., submitted).  We describe how this hypothesis can 
explain the contributions of rVLPFC to a variety of tasks thought to measure response inhibition.  
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Finally, we summarize the conceptual contributions and novel empirical measures proposed by 
this view, along with the novel theoretical and empirical insights it offers. 
Our Proposal: The Context Monitoring Hypothesis 
We will use the term context monitoring to refer to the cognitive capacity to detect, attend 
to, and interpret behaviorally-significant stimuli, particularly those that are contextually-
infrequent (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003) or otherwise unexpected (e.g., Horstmann, 2006). We 
propose that such context-monitoring is the critical executive function tapped in putative 
measures of response inhibition, and that it rather than motoric stopping is more consistent with 
psychopathological deficits in response inhibition tasks as well as the changes in inhibitory 
control that are effected by psychopharmacological manipulations.  We review five types of 
evidence in support of this context-monitoring hypothesis: 
1. Formal modeling work that indicates the central importance of context-
monitoring in the way SSRT is measured, and in the way that response inhibition 
phenomena may emerge from underlying neuronal computations; 
2. Emerging empirical work which indicates the importance of behavioral-relevance 
to the processes subserved by rVLPFC, irrespective of motoric stopping demands 
3. Empirical work which indicates the importance of contextual-frequency to the 
processes subserved by rVLPFC, irrespective of motoric stopping demands 
4. Evidence from psychopathological disorders and neural insult which demonstrates 
that apparent changes in response inhibition are uniformly paralleled by the 
electrophysiological changes predicted by our hypothesis; 
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5. Evidence from pharmacological manipulations which demonstrate that apparent 
changes in response inhibition are uniformly paralleled by changes in context-
monitoring. 
We conclude with a discussion of the evidence that is sometimes thought to argue against 
this hypothesis, with special attention to the subset which does in fact pose a challenge.  Because 
this evidence also goes uniformly unexplained by extant motoric stopping accounts, we conclude 
with a careful evaluation of these unexplained findings as a direction for future work on rVLPFC 
and the cognitive neuroscience of response inhibition. 
Context-Monitoring In Models of Response Inhibition 
There are numerous computational reasons to believe that context-monitoring, and not 
motoric stopping per se, could be central to the measurement of response inhibition in the Stop 
task.  For example, extensive monte-carlo simulations of the race model (Band et al., 2003) 
included the possibility that subjects may categorically fail to trigger a stop process on a small 
proportion of signal trials (with a probability of less than or equal to 25%), as might occur 
through failures to detect the Stop Signal.  Even these conservative estimates of the likelihood of 
“triggering failures” nonlinearly inflated estimates of SSRT.  
Failures to detect the Stop signal might be understood as a kind of goal neglect, in which 
subjects fail to maintain vigilance for the stop signal.  Goal neglect, and its conceptual converse, 
vigilance or goal maintenance, are central to current theories of the structure of executive 
functions (e.g. Friedman et al, 2009) and explain numerous phenomena that might otherwise be 
ascribed to various forms of inhibition (De Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999; Kane & Engle, 
2003; Munakata, 2001; J. R. Reynolds, Braver, Brown, & Van der Stigchel, 2006; Towse, Lewis, 
& Knowles, 2007), even in the Stop task (e.g.., the increased activation of “default mode” 
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regions prior to failed stop trials, among other effects; Li, Yan, Bergquist, & Sinha, 2007; Logan, 
1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986; Verbruggen & Logan 2009; Bissett & Logan, 2010).  However, If 
the goal to detect the stop signal is instantiated not in an all-or-none, but rather in a graded 
fashion (Munakata, 2001), then it may be inappropriate to view such goal neglect as a 
completely categorical phenomenon.   
Instead, one might expect that detection of the signal itself would involve a goal-driven 
process that unfolds gradually across time, such that detection of the signal must first cross some 
threshold before “stopping” per se can occur.  Ironically, stopping – not triggering – may be the 
more discrete and temporally delimited process, such that a relatively automatic and rapid 
“circuit breaker” mechanism is engaged whenever contextual changes indicate a need for 
behavioral control.  The idea that motoric stopping per se is a rapid, global, and automatic 
operation is supported by the substantial response interference observed when only one of two 
responses must be stopped, and even when subjects are forewarned which of those responses will 
need to be stopped (Aron & Verbruggen, 2009; Coxon, Stinear, & Byblow, 2007). Thus it is 
possible that motoric stopping is not engaged in a very selective or controlled fashion, but rather 
is automatically engaged even when such subjects know that such global inhibition will be 
inappropriate1. 
Further support for the importance of stop signal monitoring and detection comes from a 
two-unit neural network implementation of the race model (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 
2007).  This model indicates that the “stimulus encoding” of the stop signal can take twice as 
long as the other components of stopping (“interruption itself” and “release from inhibition”), 
and that the duration of these latter components (22ms) approaches the latency of synaptic 
integration time.  Thus the actual stopping of go processes once stop signal processing has 
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completed “can be considered effectively instantaneous” (Boucher et al., 2007, p391)  It is 
questionable whether such duration-limited processes related to stopping per se (independent of 
stimulus detection and encoding) could drive the large individual differences in SSRT, which are 
regularly around 200ms in magnitude.  Instead, differences in the rate of stimulus detection and 
encoding processes may drive these individual differences. 
A Bayesian diffusion model implementation of the classical race model similarly points 
to an important role for processes like context monitoring (Shenoy & Yu, 2011).  In this model, a 
monitoring process continually assesses the accumulation of sensory information about the 
stimuli present on any given trial with respect to prior beliefs about the prevalence of Go and 
Stop signals, to estimate a posterior probability that the current trial is a Stop trial.  This 
monitoring process is complemented by a second (and Bayes optimal) process which selects 
among possible actions: either it chooses to respond, or it chooses to wait longer in case a Stop 
signal may appear.  The only model parameters which are explicitly free to vary among 
individuals pertain to the accumulation of noisy sensory information.  As such, this model 
explicitly posits that variability in monitoring processes would underlie most of the variance in a 
response inhibition task like the Stop task. 
The Importance of Behavioral-Relevance 
 Recent fMRI and TMS studies support the aforementioned computational arguments that 
context-monitoring processes may be more central to the Stop task than motoric stopping per se, 
particularly with respect to the issue of whether the infrequent stimuli are behaviorally-relevant.   
For example, the rVLPFC actually more strongly recruited in response to rare behaviorally-
relevant stimuli that indicate subjects must commit, rather than stop, a response (Hampshire et 
al., 2010).  Similarly, the rVLPFC is more strongly recruited during tasks in which a rare 
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behaviorally-relevant stimulus indicates that subjects must commit an additional response rather 
than stop a response (Dodds et al., 2011; Chatham et al., under revision).  Temporary 
deactivation of the rVLPFC via TMS yields a deficit in the ability to quickly commit these 
additional responses; the magnitude of this effect is equivalent to the deficit in SSRT that is 
yielded by the same procedure (Verbruggen et al., 2010).  These studies clearly indicate that 
recruitment of the rVLPFC is not specific to the motoric stopping demands of the Stop task, and 
thus that rVLPFC function should not be unequivocally interpreted as reflecting the motoric 
stopping demands required during response inhibition tasks. 
 Significantly different results have been achieved from studies that assess the recruitment 
of the rVLPFC during tasks that present rare but behaviorally-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., stimuli that 
indicate subjects must merely “continue” with a planned or prepotent response, rather than to 
stop or to commit an additional response).  In these studies, the rVLPFC is less strongly recruited 
by infrequent and task-irrelevant stimuli than by infrequent stimuli that are task-relevant by 
virtue of indicating a need to stop (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Chikazoe, Konishi, Asari, Jimura, & 
Miyashita, 2007; Ramautar et al., 2006; Rubia et al., 2001; Barch, et al, 1997; Sharp et al., 2010; 
Dodds et al., 2011).  Two of these studies have found slight differences in the precise 
localization of these responses, such that a more dorsal region of the rVLPFC (the inferior frontal 
junction, or rIFJ) was more responsive to these “continue” stimuli than to stimuli that demanded 
motoric stopping; motoric stopping demands were instead more associated with the pars 
opercularis (Brodmann Area 44) subregion of rVLPFC (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Cai & Leung, 
2011).  However, work with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) indicates neither of these 
possible subdivisions of rVLPFC is functionally specific to motoric stopping (Verbruggen et al., 
2010); If there is indeed such a functional distinction, this work suggests that it would instead lie 
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between detecting infrequent stimuli (as subserved alone by a region dorsal to the rVLPFC, the 
right inferior frontal junction; rIFJ) and further processing of such stimuli that are also relevant 
for behavior (as subserved by rVLPFC proper, in particular the pars opercularis and the 
adjoining anterior insula; Verbruggen et al., 2010) 
Collectively, this evidence would appear to refute all claims that the rVLPFC is 
functionally specific to demands on motoric stopping.  Upon closer inspection, however, these 
results are not so clear-cut: subjects may in fact engage a motoric stopping process even when 
this is not strictly required by a given task.  Indeed, according to the context-monitoring 
hypothesis we advanced above, such motoric stopping is actually an automatic consequence of 
the outcome of context-monitoring processes. 
When the presence of motoric stopping has been examined within tasks with rare and 
behaviorally-relevant stimuli that do not demand stopping, it has been uniformly detected.  
Specifically, the presentation of “continue” stimuli leads to interference on these to-be-
committed responses in both the Stop task (Sharp et al., 2011; Cai & Leung, 2011) and the 
closely related NoGo task (Chikazoe, 2009).  This slowing is from one perspective unsurprising: 
subjects must first evaluate this infrequent stimulus, to determine whether it is a “continue” 
stimulus or a stimulus that demands motoric stopping.  Subjects may engage motoric stopping 
while such evaluation takes place.   
Other studies suggest that this motoric stopping is not limited to cases in which stimulus 
evaluation of this kind must take place.  For example, slowing of responses is also observed 
following the presentation of rare behaviorally-relevant stimuli that require not only a planned or 
prepotent response must be committed but also that an additional response must be provided 
(Verbruggen et al., 2010; also Chapter 2).  This occurs even when there is no possibility that this 
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stimulus will demand the subject to stop their planned motor action, and even when subjects are 
explicitly informed to minimize any possible delay in their actions (Chatham et al under 
revision).The presence of this slowing suggests that subjects may in fact engage motoric 
stopping processes, even when an abstract task analysis would suggest that motoric stopping is 
unnecessary and undesirable.   
On the other hand, this slowing does not appear to be strongly related to the functional 
recruitment of the rVLPFC.  A between-subjects contrast of those who undergo substantial 
slowing and those who do not reveals a correlation with activity in the pre supplementary motor 
area (pre-SMA; Sharp et al., 2010), but not with rVLPFC (Sharp et al 2010; also Chatham et al., 
under revision).  Within-subjects analysis of the precise duration of this motoric slowing also 
fails to reveal any correlation with activation in the rVLPFC, but shows a trend towards a 
correlation with activity in the subthalamic nucleus (Chatham, Claus, Kim, Curran, Banich & 
Munakata, 2011).  Thus motoric stopping does not seem to be particularly related to the function 
of the rVLPFC.  To the extent motoric stopping occurs automatically, it may also not play a very 
central role in the cognitive demands of response inhibition tasks.  
The Importance of Contextual-Frequency 
The processing of contextually-infrequent stimuli has long been studied in the oddball 
paradigm.  Oddball paradigms all share a common feature: They expose subjects to a sequence 
of stimuli of varying probability, including a standard stimulus (occurring with 60% to near 
100% probability), and one or more deviant stimuli (each occurring with lower probability).  
Oddball paradigms differ in the discrepancy between standards and deviants (in terms of 
probability, perceptual deviance, and other factors like modality) as well as in terms of which (if 
any) stimuli require attention or responses.  Despite these considerable variations, oddball tasks 
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consistently elicit one or more event-related potentials (ERPs) from a collection of ERPs termed 
the “N2-P3 complex.” 
The N2-P3 complex consists of at least three dissociable components: a negative peak 
over anterior electrodes between 200 and 350 ms after stimulus onset (the N2), a subsequent 
low-amplitude positive peak over frontocentral electrodes occurring within roughly the same 
time frame (the novelty P3, or P3a), and a large positive peak maximal at centroparietal 
electrodes after 300ms (the P3b).  The N2 is itself sometimes further dissociated into as many as 
three separate components even within a single modality (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008), and 
dipole source modeling indicates that medial frontal regions are responsible for its generation. 
We will not focus here on the N2 complex, because it is recognized to reflect processes other 
than motoric stopping, irrespective of the task used to elicit it (Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Azizian et al., 2006) 
In contrast, interpretations of the P3 component have been task-dependent.  P3 
components recorded during tasks requiring response inhibition (the so-called “Stop P3” and 
“No Go P3”) have been interpreted to reflect motoric stopping processes per se.  However, there 
are extensive similarities between these P3 components and those recorded in oddball paradigms 
without concomitant demands on motoric stopping.  P3 components as elicited by such oddball 
paradigms have identified a source in the rVLPFC (as well as the adjoining anterior insula; 
Bubic, von Cramon, Jacobsen, Schroger, & Schubotz, 2008; Doeller et al., 2003; Kiehl, Laurens, 
Duty, Forster, & Liddle, 2001; Linden, 2005; Linden et al., 1999; Mulert et al., 2004; Opitz, 
Rinne, Mecklinger, von Cramon, & Schroger, 2002; A. Stevens, 2000), the same region 
interpreted to be specialized for the stopping demands of response inhibition.  However, 
numerous theorists from other domains have linked this area to the exogenously-triggered 
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orienting of attention (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Ranganath 
& Rainer, 2003) and some to monitoring in particular (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). 
The individual components that compose the P3 complex have been cleanly dissociated 
with the use of spatiotemporal principal components analysis (Spencer, Dien, & Donchin, 2001).  
This technique yields spatiotemporally uncorrelated “virtual” ERPs, at least two of which have a 
predominantly frontal and right-lateralized topography.  These virtual ERPs are elicited a) in 
response to rare stimuli, b) when the perceptual features of those rare stimuli are highly deviant 
from the standard, and c) when those stimuli are task-relevant (relative to conditions where they 
serve as distractors).  In other words, they precisely fit the characteristics of the hypothetical 
context-monitoring capacity introduced above, especially with respect to issues of contextual 
frequency (a and b, above).  
Manipulations of stop signal frequency typically show increased rVLPFC activity, or 
increased contributions of ventral prefrontal areas to the P3, with increasingly rare stop or NoGo 
trials (Ramautar, Kok, & Ridderinkhof, 2004; Ramautar, Slagter, Kok, & Ridderinkhof, 2006),2 
consistent with a role for the rVLPFC in detecting rare stimuli.  One might assume that such 
effects reflect increasing difficulty with stopping an increasingly prepotent motoric response; 
however, such intuitions are apparently not borne out by empirical data, which demonstrates no 
change in SSRT as a function of stop signal frequency (Logan & Cowan, 1984).  As such, the 
increased rVLPFC response to rare Stop signals is apparently unexplained by accounts which 
posit the centrality of motoric stopping and rVLPFC to response inhibition processes. 
Even when stimulus probability is matched, oddball effects are enhanced to stimuli that 
are more perceptually deviant relative to those that are less deviant (Sawaki & Katayama, 2008).  
Thus, an oddball effect in the rVLPFC might be evoked to a NoGo stimulus (e.g., “A”) if it is 
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less similar to the fixation stimulus used on every trial (e.g., +) than an equiprobable Go 
stimulus (e.g., X).  This raises the possibility that perceptual confounds could underlie the greater 
rVLPFC activity observed to NoGo stimuli in several studies that do not counterbalance the 
identity of equiprobable stimuli (Kaladjian et al., 2007; Liddle, Kiehl, & Smith, 2001; Mazzola-
Pomietto, Kaladjian, Azorin, Anton, & Jeanningros, 2009) – evidence previously taken to 
support a specific role for the rVLPFC in the motoric stopping demands of response inhibition 
tasks.  Moreover, P3 components are exquisitely sensitive even to minute differences in stimulus 
characteristics: P3 components are elicited by tones differing as little as .8% in frequency, even 
when the average discrimination threshold is only .73% (Tervaniemi, Just, Koelsch, Widmann, 
Schroeger, 2004).  Similarly, some estimates of area discrimination thresholds are as high as 
20% (Morgan, 2005), and yet even 24% differences in area yield a P3 component (Sawaki & 
Katayama, 2008).  Given this extreme sensitivity to perceptual characteristics, it is very 
important to counterbalance stimuli to control for potential perceptual confounds. 
Independent of stimulus probability and perceptual deviance, certain events may also be 
contextually-infrequent by virtue of their response demands.  Some studies have controlled for 
this factor by requiring motoric stopping on fully 50% of trials, under the assumption that any 
differences between stopping and responding could not therefore reflect differences in response 
frequency.  However, several of these studies “pre-train” subjects on tasks involving the same 
stimuli but without the demand for motoric stopping – meaning that subsequent motoric stopping 
demands are infrequent in the larger context of the experiment (Kok, Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, 
& Ridderinkhof, 2004; Ramautar et al., 2004).  This contextual-infrequency may be sufficient for 
engaging rVLPFC: Activity in this region is not observed in equiprobable response inhibition 
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paradigms when such pretraining is omitted (as described by Konishi, Nakajima, Uchida, 
Sekihara, & Miyashita, 1998).   
Contextual frequency also has an influence at a shorter time-scale; for example, some 
tasks require that subjects inhibit their responses to certain stimuli only if they follow another 
particular stimulus (Mostofsky et al., 2003).  A recent metanalysis indicates that rVLPFC activity 
can be predicted across Go/NoGo studies on the basis of this factor alone (Simmonds, Pekar, & 
Mostofsky, 2008). 
Finally, events may also be contextually-infrequent if they differ markedly in difficulty or 
priority from other events, disregarding any modulations of frontal activity due to task difficulty 
itself, which may be particularly large in the rVLPFC (Barch et al., 1997).  Task difficulty is a 
near-universal problem for studies of response inhibition: error rates are typically much higher 
on trials that require inhibition than those that do not.  Intermixing response inhibition and 
infrequent response commission trials in the same task may thus induce a strategic prioritization 
of inhibition (Morein-Zamir, Chua, Franks, Nagelkerke, & Kingstone, 2007), further 
complicating the interpretation of studies which intermix trials that differ in inhibitory demands. 
These confounds are not unique to Stop signal and Go/NoGo tasks, but apply more 
widely to a number of paradigms thought to measure response inhibition.  For example, rVLPFC 
involvement in the antisaccade task – in which subjects must putatively inhibit the tendency to 
look towards stimuli with rapid visual onset – is limited to those paradigms with infrequent 
antisaccade trials (Chikazoe et al., 2007; Ettinger et al., 2008; Hodgson et al., 2007).  Likewise, 
rVLPFC involvement in the Stroop task is not unique to incongruent trials, but is also observed 
during other infrequent Stroop trial types (Melcher & Gruber, 2006;similarly, Milham, Banich & 
Barad, 2003 also find a small cluster of rVLPFC activation).  In the Posner cueing paradigm, 
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invalid spatial cues – towards which subjects must putatively inhibit their spatial attention in 
order to detect the target in another location – also activate the rVLPFC, but this appears to be 
due to the fact that invalidly-cued trials are unexpected, as suggested by the similarity of the 
rVLPFC response to invalidly cued trials vs. unexpected targets (Forstmann et al., 2008; Vossel, 
Weidner, Thiel, & Fink, 2008).   
In summary, the contextual-frequency of stimuli seems to be a determining factor in the 
functional recruitment of the rVLPFC, irrespective of motoric stopping demands.  One 
dimension of contextual-frequency is stimulus probability: Stop signals as well as infrequent 
stimuli that do not require motoric stopping reveal increasing contributions of anterior prefrontal 
areas to the P3 complex or increasing recruitment of the rVLPFC.  Another dimension of 
contextual-frequency is perceptual deviance: paradigms with equiprobable Go/NoGo stimuli 
tend to show increased rVLPFC responses or P3 components when stimulus identity is not 
counterbalanced, such that differences in perceptual deviance could be a confounding source of 
variance.  Finally, stimuli can be contextually-infrequent for more endogenous reasons, for 
example because certain trial types are intrinsically more difficult, of a higher strategic priority 
than others, or are otherwise unexpected from the local temporal context.  All of these factors 
seem important in determining rVLPFC activity and the associated prefrontal subcomponents of 
the P3, confirming the importance of contextual-frequency in the processes subserved by the 
rVLPFC. 
Evidence from Psychopathological Disorders and Neural Insult 
Disinhibition is thought to be a “core deficit” in a number of psychopathological 
disorders.  However, many of these same disorders are also associated with deficits in 
monitoring (as assessed by responses to contextually-infrequent and behaviorally-relevant 
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stimuli that do not require inhibition).  For example, delayed or reduced P3 components in 
oddball tasks have been demonstrated for attention deficit disorder (Barry, Clarke, & Johnstone, 
2003), borderline personality disorder (Drake, Phillips, & Pakalnis, 1991), and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Karl, Malta, & Maercker, 2006).  All of these disorders are associated with less 
efficient stopping in terms of SSRT (Casada & Roache, 2005; Nigg, Silk, Stavro, & Miller, 
2005), but the coincident abnormalities in the processing of infrequent stimuli indicate that such 
inhibitory deficits might be more parsimoniously interpreted as failures of a more general ability 
(as did Alderson, Rapport, Sarver & Kofler, 2008), such as context-monitoring. 
Conversely, the context-monitoring hypothesis and motoric stopping accounts are both 
indefinite in identifying a deficit in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  Some studies of 
those with OCD demonstrate superior monitoring (as reflected in earlier P3 components in 
oddball tasks Morault, Bourgeois, Laville, Bensch, & Paty, 1997), as well as more efficient 
stopping in the Stop Signal task (Krikorian, Zimmerman, & Fleck, 2004), while other studies 
demonstrate a deficit in monitoring (as reflected in a delayed or reduced P3 components; Sanz, 
Molina, Martin-Loeches, Calcedo, & Rubia, 2001) and impaired stopping in the Stop Signal task 
(Menzies, Achard, Chamberlain, Fineberg, Chen, Campo, Sahakian, Robbins & Bullmore, 
2007).  Given this inconsistency in inhibitory deficits among those with OCD, neither 
monitoring nor inhibition can be unambiguously considered a core deficit in this disorder.   
Patients with focal brain damage also often show symptoms that are more consistent with 
deficits in monitoring than inhibition, so much so that inhibition has been omitted from recent 
revisions to taxonomies of executive function based on neuropsychological data (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007).  For example, in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, patients with damage to the 
right lateral PFC spontaneously revert to sorting cards by outdated sorting criteria (so-called 
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“loss of set” errors) even when explicitly informed of which criterion to use at the beginning of 
the task and of the fact that the criterion changes every ten trials.  Because these “loss of set” 
errors all followed at least three correct trials under a single sorting criterion, and were tabulated 
separately from those errors resulting from sorting by the immediately preceding criterion, these 
patients have not simply failed to inhibit previous sorting criteria; instead they may be losing 
vigilance and responding randomly, or perhaps even preemptively changing their sorting criteria 
due to deficits in their ability to monitor for the need to change criteria.   
The explicit task-setting from which these patients failed to benefit strongly reduces the 
“loss of set” errors observed among patients with damage to left lateral PFC, consistent with 
production/monitoring accounts of hemispheric asymmetry (Cabeza, Locantore, & Anderson, 
2003).  Monitoring deficits are also thought to be revealed by the inability of right lateral PFC 
patients to benefit from larger inter-stimulus intervals, their greater variability in performance 
even at the beginning of a block, and their lack of post-error adjustments to behavior (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007).  
Evidence from Psychopharmacological Manipulations 
A wealth of pharmacological evidence is also consistent with the context-monitoring 
hypothesis: Stopping and context-monitoring efficiency (as indicated by SSRT and the P3 
latency/amplitude recorded in oddball tasks without concomitant inhibitory demands, 
respectively) are affected by the same drugs in the same way.  (Because Eagle, Bari & Robbins, 
2008 have recently documented the effects of various neurotransmitters on SSRT, we will 
redescribe that evidence here only in sufficient detail to highlight the parallel findings from the 
P3 component). 
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Enhancement of adrenergic mechanisms tend to improve both context-monitoring and 
SSRT.  For example, atomoxetine (a norepinephrine [NE] reuptake inhibitor) improves SSRT 
among many of those with ADHD (Chamberlain et al., 2006), and although it is unknown 
whether the P3 changes as a result of this treatment, response to atomoxetine treatment can be 
predicted based on the pre-treatment P3 profile of the patients (Sangal & Sangal, 2006).   
Atomoxetine is also associated with increased recruitment of the rVLPFC (Chamberlain et al., 
2009).  Methylphenidate (an NE and dopamine [DA] reuptake inhibitor) remediates stopping 
efficiency in ADHD (Aron, 2003) and also partially normalizes P3 latency (Winsberg, Javitt, 
Silipo, & Doneshka, 1993).  Similarly, modafinil (a stimulant with widespread effects on NE, 
DA, and other neurotransmitter systems) improves SSRT (Turner, Clark, Dawson, Robbins & 
Sahakian, 2004) but can also remediate delayed P3s in humans (Sangal, Sangal, & Belisle, 
1999).   
In contrast, serotonergic mechanisms appear to minimally influence both monitoring and 
response inhibition.  For example, the antiserotonergic drug methysergide does not appear to 
affect the latency or amplitude of the P3 (Meador, Loring, Davis, Sethi, Patel, Adams, Hammon, 
1989), nor does acute depletion of the dietary precursor to serotonin, tryptophan (Ahvenien, 
Kähkönen, Pennanen, Liesivuori, Ilmoniemi, Jääskeläinen 2002).  Similarly, serotonergic 
mechanisms do not appear to affect response inhibition: SSRT is unaffected by serotonin uptake 
blockage (Chamberlain, Mueller, Blackwell, Clark, Robbins & Sahakian, 2006) or by dietary 
challenge (Clark, Roiser, Cools, Rubinzstein, Sahakian, Robbins, 2005).  In general, this 
evidence supports the idea that serotonin manipulations affect neither context-monitoring (as 
reflected in the P3) nor SSRT. 
21 
 
Surprisingly, given the theorized involvement of dopaminergic basal ganglia mechanisms 
in response inhibition (Aron & Poldrack, 2005), relatively few studies have investigated the 
possible effects of dopamine on response inhibition.  Of those that do, SSRT is unaffected by 
both nonselective dopaminergic agonists and antagonists (for a review, see Eagle, Bari & 
Robbins, 2008).  Context-monitoring mechanisms (again, as reflected in the P3) are similarly 
unaffected by dopamine, in terms of D2 dopamine receptor polymorphisms (Lin, Yu, Chen, Tsai, 
& Hong, 2001), D2 antagonists (Antal, Kéria, Bodis-Wollner & 1997), or L-dopa (Oranje, De 
Wied, Herman, Westenberg, Kemner, Verbaten, Kahn, 2006).   
Only one study has found a dopaminergic affect on SSRT (Eagle et al., 2011), only did so 
by directly injecting D1 and D2 receptor antagonists into the dorsomedial striatum.  Even so, this 
study failed to obtain any kind of monotonic dose/response curve.  The results of this study are 
further difficult to interpret because Stop trial accuracy was uniformly above 85% - the upper 
limit at which SSRT can be reliably calculated (Band et al., 2003).  One cautious conclusion is 
that any subcortical dopaminergic mechanisms uniquely recruited by response inhibition play 
little role in governing behavioral performance, relative to the much larger role played by 
context-monitoring and as reflected in the P3.   
In contrast, prefrontal dopamine seems particularly important for both monitoring and 
stop signal performance.  For example, the D4 receptor, expressed preferentially in prefrontal 
(relative to subcortical) regions (Mulcrone & Kerwin, 1997), is associated with novelty seeking 
(Schinka, Letsch & Crawford, 2002), with increased SSRT (Congdon, Lesch & Canli, 2008) and 
with poorer monitoring (as reflected in a lower amplitude P3; Vogel, Laucht, Furtado, Becker & 
Schmidt, 2006, although this is also not always consistent across studies; Demiralp, Herrmann, 
Erdal, Ergenoglu, Keskin, Ergen, Beydagi, 2007).  Variants in the gene that codes for catechol-
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O-methyl transferase (COMT; which also has a particularly strong influence on prefrontal 
dopamine) are similarly associated with consistent changes both in SSRT (Kramer et al., 2007) 
and the P3 in oddball paradigms without concomitant inhibitory demands (Gallinat et al., 2003).  
In sum, this evidence suggests that the effect of D4 receptors and COMT on both the P3 and 
SSRT may be due to the common influence of monitoring for contextually-infrequent and task-
relevant stimuli, and provides further support for our claim of a prefrontal basis for monitoring. 
Cholinergic mechanisms also affect context-monitoring and performance on the stop 
signal task in similar ways.  Context-monitoring is impaired by the administration of the 
cholinergic antagonists scopolamine and benztropine mesylate (as reflected in an increased P3 
latency; Meador, Potter, Davis, Sethi, Patel, & Adams, 1985), and improved by the acute 
cholinergic agonist nicotine (perhaps by affecting the earlier components of the P3 complex in 
particular; Polich & Criado, 2006, Edwards, Wesnes, Warburton, & Gale, 1985).  Although there 
are no reports of the effects of anticholinergics on response inhibition, SSRT is improved with 
nicotine (Potter & Newhouse, 2008).  In summary, pharmacological cholinergic manipulations 
show similar effects on context-monitoring and SSRT, suggesting again strong overlap in their 
neural mechanisms. 
More commonly-used drugs (such as caffeine and alcohol) have less consistent effects, 
perhaps due to the widespread influences these drugs have on the different neurotransmitter 
systems, and the difficulties inherent in administering drugs that subjects are familiar with (i.e., 
the concomitant unblinding of subjects, as well any potential withdrawal due to abstinence).  
Nonetheless, previous reviews have identified several effects of acute exposure (Polich & Kok, 
1995): Caffeine can increase P3 amplitude (with smaller effects on latency), and ethanol 
decreases P3 amplitude and increases its latency.  Both of these drugs are also associated with 
23 
 
the concomitant changes in SSRT predicted by the context-monitoring hypothesis (de Wit, 
Crean, & Richards, 2000; Potter & Newhouse, 2008; Tieges, Snel, Kok, & Richard 
Ridderinkhof, 2009; but see Bekker, Bocker, Van Hunsel, van den Berg, & Kenemans, 20053).  
Clearly many of these drugs affect more than just SSRT and context-monitoring abilities, but 
based on this pharmacological evidence, it seems that many of the same mechanisms that 
underlie monitoring (as reflected in the P3 component) may also drive performance in Stop 
Signal task. 
Red Herrings 
As reviewed above, the context-monitoring hypothesis offers a plausible and 
parsimonious account of a number of findings from a variety of domains and methods, including 
electrophysiology and neuroimaging, neuropsychology, psychopharmacology, and clinical 
psychopathology.  It is at this point useful to dispense with several “red herrings” that may have 
contributed the absence of similar theoretical accounts in the literature.  
First, context-monitoring accounts have been criticized as inconsistent with a long history 
of theorizing which dictates that bottom-up attentional capture (as might arise from contextually-
infrequent stimuli) should be most reliant on posterior brain regions, whereas prefrontal regions 
like the rVLPFC should be involved in more purely “top-down” attentional processes.  
Relatedly, monitoring hypotheses seem too strongly stimulus-related to viably explain prefrontal 
function, which is thought to be an evolutionary outgrowth of the more response-related 
posterior frontal cortex.  However, the context-monitoring hypothesis is not alone in 
contradicting these long-held views.  The What-How model of prefrontal function (O’Reilly, 
2010) also posits that ventral areas of prefrontal cortex may be particularly involved in stimulus-
related processing; similarly, the ventral-dorsal attentional networks theory (Corbetta, Patel & 
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Shulman, 2008) posits that a ventral prefrontal network subserves the goal-contingent capture of 
attention.  In this way, the context-monitoring hypothesis is not merely inconsistent with some 
historical perspectives; it is in precisely these same ways consistent with emerging and more 
recent views. 
Specific concerns have also been raised about the association of context-monitoring with 
rVLPFC function.  For example, it has been argued that monitoring accounts cannot explain the 
increased rVLPFC recruitment to successfully stopped trials, relative to unsuccessfully stopped 
trials.  However, such evidence is also clearly consistent with the more pronounced use of 
context-monitoring processes (and thus heightened rVLPFC recruitment) on successfully-
stopped trials.   
Similarly, motoric stopping is induced by direct electrical macrostimulation of rVLPFC 
in both humans and non-human primates (Luders et al., 1988; Sasaki et al. 1989), effects which 
might seem straightforwardly validate motoric stopping accounts and falsify context-monitoring 
accounts.  However, we note that stimulation of the medial temporal lobe (MTL) leads to 
difficulties in memory retrieval (e.g., Halgren et al 1985), but the MTL is not thus assumed to 
inhibit memory retrieval processes.  Applying analogous logic to the rVLPFC, we suggest (as did 
Luders et al, 1988) that these rVLPFC macrostimulation effects may reflect some more general 
loss of function, rather than the induction of a normal “stopping” function implemented by 
rVLPFC. 
A variety of more equivocal evidence has been represented as more consistent with 
motoric stopping accounts of rVLPFC function than with context-monitoring accounts (e.g., 
Tabibnia et al, 2011).  For example, it has been argued that the rapid inhibitory effects of 
rVLPFC on primary motor cortex, as determined through paired-pulse TMS techniques, supports 
25 
 
a motoric stopping role for rVLPFC (Buch et al., 2010).  However, such rapid inhibitory effects 
are also observed with paired-pulse TMS to regions outside of the rVLPFC – suggesting that 
these effects may be a relatively more general feature of cortex, and not related to some 
functional specialization of the rVLPFC (Reis et al., 2009).  Similarly, increases in the power of 
beta-band frequency oscillations in the ongoing electroencephalogram (EEG) have been linked 
to both the rVLPFC and to successful stopping (Swann et al., 2009), but increased rVLPFC beta-
band coherence is also observed during simple preparation of motor responses (Fischer, Langner, 
Diers, Brocke & Birbaumer, 2010).   
Context-monitoring accounts have also been criticized for relying on the P3 complex to 
demonstrate the similarities of tasks involving the detection of behaviorally-relevant but 
infrequent stimuli across various populations and pharmacological manipulations.  Specifically, 
it is argued that the P3 tends to peak too late for it (the peak) to play a causal role in response 
inhibition.  However, if a component peaks relatively late that does not mean that the component, 
or the process it reflects, is not also operative much earlier.  Indeed, the Stop P3 has often been 
taken to reflect motoric stopping processes per se despite this prolonged peak latency.   
Concerns have also been raised regarding the ability of the context-monitoring hypothesis 
to explain inhibitory control deficits in ADHD.  In particular, context-monitoring has been 
criticized for predicting that children with ADHD should show difficulty not only in stopping 
responses but in committing alternative responses as well, whereas only the former is observed 
in Marriott et al. (2005).  In actuality, this study demonstrated not only an elevated SSRT among 
children with ADHD but also more variable and slower execution of alternative responses – a 
finding that is conceptually consistent with their elevated reaction times to behaviorally-relevant 
but infrequent stimuli (Schachar & Logan, 1993), if both phenomena reflect deficits in context-
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monitoring.  Notably, motoric stopping accounts have more recently been the subject of these 
same criticisms with respect to ADHD given the inefficacy of therapies targeted at these 
mechanisms (Rappoport et al., 2001; Alderson et al., 2008).  
Other criticisms of context-monitoring concern the fact that stop-signal performance is 
not particularly resource-demanding, insofar as it has failed to show the "psychological 
refractory period" (PRP) effects (e.g., Logan & Burkell, 1986).  It is difficult to draw conclusions 
from this null effect (although see Pashler, 1994 for one attempt).  More informative are both 
preceding and subsequent reports which demonstrate that response inhibition is not only subject 
to refractoriness (Horstmann, 2003; Welford, 1957), but also induces a PRP effect (Horstmann, 
2003).  These results can be straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that context-
monitoring is both cognitively-controlled and demanding of central executive resources. 
More significantly, the context-monitoring hypothesis has been criticized as being overly 
broad.  There is however some support for a role of the rVLPFC specifically in context-
monitoring, as opposed to that of a more general role in executive control.  First, consider a 
paradigm in which subjects must focus on a central stimulus while inhibiting the interference 
arising from an array of incongruent stimuli presented to the left and right of the central stimulus 
(a flanker task).  At the onset of these stimuli, gamma-band oscillations increase in power, with 
dipole sources localized to the rVLPFC (Fan et al., 2007).  This change in power is abolished by 
orienting subjects to the vertical position of the upcoming stimuli – regardless of whether the 
flanking stimuli were congruent or incongruent (the latter clearly demanding on executive 
control) to the central stimulus (Fan et al., 2007).  There are also reasons to believe that the 
rVLPFC is not critical for the monitoring of rules in working memory (e.g. Rushworth et al., 
1997, who incidentally also concluded that “the inclusion of a response suppression element is 
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not necessary for a task to be impaired” by VLPFC damage, consistent with our claims).  These 
studies would seem to put limits on the generality of context-monitoring and rVLPFC-associated 
processes; indicating that they are not simply recruited in every case where executive control is 
required. 
Genuine Outstanding Challenges 
On the other hand, a handful of results are genuinely difficult to reconcile with the 
current framework, although they also tend to be unnatural bedfellows with motoric stopping 
accounts.  In this light, these studies suggest that the complete account of rVLPFC function is yet 
undiscovered, particularly with respect to the functional hemispheric asymmetry of the rVLPFC, 
its functional relationship to goal maintenance, and its mapping between humans and higher 
primates. 
In terms of functional asymmetry, the rVLPFC may show a somewhat greater sensitivity 
in the processing of nonverbal relative to verbal stimuli, even when these stimuli are task-
irrelevant and not contextually infrequent.  For example, in a flanker paradigm with equiprobable 
neutral and incongruent flankers (Morimoto et al., 2008), the rVLPFC was more activated in 
response to incongruent color than incongruent word flankers, whereas a homologous region of 
the left VLPFC showed the opposite pattern.  This finding was interpreted to reflect right-
lateralized inhibition of irrelevant color information, and left-lateralized inhibition of irrelevant 
word information (contrary to previous reports that the rVLPFC is not modality specific; 
Hazeltine, Bunge, Scanlon, & Gabrieli, 2003).  However, this conclusion is cast into doubt by a 
correlation with performance: This effect was pronounced among those with lower accuracy, 
contrary to suggestions that those with superior response inhibition tend to more strongly 
activate the rVLPFC (Aron & Poldrack, 2006).   
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Such results are also difficult to reconcile with a context-monitoring account of the 
rVLPFC.  A plausible alternative account is that greater activation of right frontal regions 
reflects increased processing of the color flankers, and greater activation of left frontal regions 
reflects increased processing of the word flankers, consistent with verbal/nonverbal accounts of 
functional hemispheric asymmetry.  This account is further compatible with theories that VLPFC 
regions work in concert with more dorsal regions of the PFC in implementing the top-down 
selection of task-relevant information, such that greater activity in the hemisphere with more 
sensitivity to the flanker modality is actually an index of interference.  By this expanded account, 
task-relevance and contextual-frequency are sufficient, but not necessary characteristics for 
determining the recruitment of the rVLPFC. 
An additional example of the potential role of the rVLPFC in other functions thought to 
rely on the prefrontal cortex at large, such as goal maintenance, comes from a cued Simon task 
with equiprobable congruent and incongruent stimuli (Forstmann et al., 2008); in this 
experiment, a minority of trials were invalidly cued as to the congruency or incongruency of the 
location of an upcoming stimulus and the location of the required response.  Given that 
congruent and incongruent trials were matched for probability, the context-monitoring 
hypothesis would predict no greater involvement of rVLPFC as a function of congruency; 
accordingly, no differential rVLPFC activity was observed in the invalid or the valid conditions.  
This result runs contrary to motoric stopping accounts of the Simon task, in which such stopping 
is important on incongruent trials, and perhaps particularly important in the invalid condition.   
Nonetheless, greater involvement of the rVLPFC was observed on invalidly-cued 
incongruent relative to neutral trials among those with greater inhibitory skill, a finding that 
would not have been predicted by the context-monitoring hypothesis.  This measure of inhibitory 
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skill was a composite “difference of differences” score, raising the possibility that the correlation 
actually reflects an advantage in goal maintenance for those with putatively better inhibition 
(consistent with evidence from the Stroop task; Kane & Engle, 2003).  Again, these results show 
that top-down goal maintenance may be another function of the rVLPFC, and another important 
ability governing response inhibition, in addition to the important role played by the detection of 
contextually-infrequent and behaviorally-relevant stimuli. 
Finally, our review has focused primarily on the human literature, in which the neuronal 
processes recruited by context-monitoring tasks (and response inhibition tasks) are typically 
right-lateralized.  Given that non-human primates do not show such consistent lateralization of 
function, it is possible that both monitoring and motoric stopping accounts are not well-suited to 
explain non-human primate data.  For example, the majority of cells in the monkey rVLPFC 
differentiate between Go and NoGo stimuli only when they differ in color (Sakagami et al., 
2001), and not motion (64 out of 73 cells; contrary to reports from the human literature that 
rVLPFC responses are not modality-specific; Hazeltine, Bunge, Scanlon, & Gabrieli, 2003).   
A majority of these color-sensitive cells responded preferentially to go stimuli (41 out of 
64 cells), and, most critically, these rVLPFC cells never showed consistent firing patterns in 
response-locked analyses (contrary to theories that the rVLPFC is involved in the execution of 
response inhibition, as opposed to context-monitoring, which should be more closely related to 
the stimulus onsets in such tasks).  Clearly, these results are incompatible with perspectives 
emphasizing the importance of motoric stopping demands. 
But two aspects of these results are also difficult to interpret from a monitoring 
framework – especially since Go and NoGo stimuli were equiprobable in this design.  First, the 
majority of color-sensitive cells in the rVLPFC differentiated between Go and NoGo only by 
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suppressing their activity to the color NoGo stimulus, responding similarly to color Go stimuli 
and both Go and NoGo when defined by motion.  Conversely, a minority of rVLPFC cells 
increased their activity selectively to the color NoGo stimulus, not showing much response to 
any other stimulus type whether defined by color or motion.  Thus, in this particular study, NoGo 
stimuli do appear to have a special status in the rVLPFC.  While NoGo trials were arguably more 
difficult (instead of requiring no response, they actually required a more delayed response than 
Go stimuli), the larger issue is that our context-monitoring hypothesis is primarily based on 
human data, and may not straightforwardly apply to animal models, even those based on higher 
primates.  Clearly, integration of human and animal work is an important area for future research 
and theorizing – not just in the domains of monitoring and response inhibition, but in executive 
function as a whole. 
Novel Predictions 
While not offering a complete account of rVLPFC function, context-monitoring 
hypothesis nonetheless makes specific and falsifiable predictions about how factors like task 
difficulty, stimulus deviance (whether in terms of stimulus probability or perceptual 
characteristics) and task-relevance should influence activity in the rVLPFC, independent of 
motoric stopping demands.  To the extent that such predictions can be falsified, they may point 
the way towards a more comprehensive account of the rVLPFC. 
Foremost among these predictions is that rVLPFC damage should alter frontal P3 
components, and produce “attentional neglect” for infrequent and behaviorally-relevant stimuli, 
in a way that should mediate any concomitant deficits observed from these patients in tests of 
response inhibition.  Second, the context-monitoring hypothesis predicts that relatively domain-
general mechanisms should support performance on the Stop task and related response inhibition 
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tasks.  In particular, a neural network implementation of context-monitoring may naturally 
emerge when an otherwise general architecture for executive control is trained on the Stop task 
(e.g., the PBWM framework; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006).  Such architectures should be capable of 
giving rise to canonical phenomena from the Stop task if the context-monitoring hypothesis is 
correct. 
Third, the context-monitoring hypothesis predicts that the variations in SSRT and 
response interference observed in “selective stop” paradigms (where only one of multiple 
responses must be stopped) are more likely to reflect differences in the recruitment of these 
rather domain-general mechanisms, rather than reflecting differences in the neural circuitry that 
is specific to motoric stopping demands.  Existing accounts of such paradigms posit that 
selective stop paradigms recruit the use of a slower but more specific pathway for motoric 
stopping – the subcortical “indirect” pathway of the striatum as opposed to the hyperdirect 
pathway of the subthalamic nucleus – and that this indirect pathway is preferentially used when 
subjects have foreknowledge about which of the multiple responses may need to be stopped.  By 
contrast, the context-monitoring hypothesis would predict that this foreknowledge does not have 
its effects by changing the precise subcortical route used in support of motoric stopping, which is 
instead hypothesized to be automatic and uniformly global.  Instead, foreknowledge may have its 
effects (for example) by reducing the contextual-infrequency or behavioral-relevance of the stop 
signals, thereby yielding reduced rVLPFC activation, and concomitantly a less abrupt onset of 
automatic motoric stopping mechanisms. 
Conclusions 
Response inhibition paradigms typically require not only motoric stopping but also the 
ability to monitor for and detect behaviorally-relevant and contextually infrequent stimuli.  This 
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more general attentional demand may underlie the recruitment of the rVLPFC in a variety of 
tasks, including those that do not require motoric stopping.  This context-monitoring hypothesis 
illuminates the tight relationship between inhibitory deficits and abnormalities in oddball 
paradigms in populations with brain damage, with psychopathological disorders, and those 
undergoing pharmacological treatment.  It also offers a coherent and comprehensive account of 
rVLPFC function in the context of response inhibition tasks.  The exact computations performed 
by the rVLPFC in the service of monitoring remain to be specified, and some findings cannot be 
explained by any single existing theoretical account.  Nonetheless, the context-monitoring 
hypothesis offers an important step towards understanding the processes that constitute the 
ability to inhibit, towards characterizing individual differences in that ability, and towards 
understanding the role of the rVLPFC in a variety of domains. 
 
 
Footnotes 
1While the use of a global braking mechanism appears to be automatic, the amount of 
braking can be modulated by the degree to which stop signals are unexpected: stopping 
interference is reduced, but not abolished, when subjects have informative foreknowledge about 
the occurrence of a stop signal (Aron & Verbruggen, 2009).   
2One recent study of a paradigm without inhibitory demands reported a null interaction of 
rVLPFC activity with target frequency (Hampshire, Thompson, Duncan & Owen, 2009), but the 
frequency manipulation was small (40% vs 50% targets). 
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3Bekker et al report a null effect in the case of nicotine; on the other hand, Bekker et al 
used an unusually high proportion of stop trials (40%), which may attenuate the influence of 
monitoring or inhibition. 
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CHAPTER 2: COGNITIVE CONTROL REFLECTS CONTEXT MONITORING, NOT 
MOTORIC STOPPING, IN RESPONSE INHIBITION 
 
Adapted from Chatham, C.H., Claus, E.D., Kim, A., Curran, T., Banich, M.T., Munakata Y (in 
press) Cognitive Control Reflects Context-Monitoring, Not Motoric Stopping, In Response 
Inhibition. PLoS One. 
 
Abstract: 
 
The inhibition of unwanted behaviors is considered an effortful and controlled ability.  However, 
inhibition also requires the detection of contexts indicating that old behaviors may be 
inappropriate – in other words, inhibition requires the ability to monitor context in the service of 
goals, which we refer to as context-monitoring. Using behavioral, neuroimaging, 
electrophysiological and computational approaches, we tested whether motoric stopping per se is 
the cognitively-controlled process supporting response inhibition, or whether context-monitoring 
may fill this role.  Our results demonstrate that inhibition does not require control mechanisms 
beyond those involved in context-monitoring, and that such control mechanisms are the same 
regardless of stopping demands. These results challenge dominant accounts of inhibitory control, 
which posit that motoric stopping is the cognitively-controlled process of response inhibition, 
and clarify emerging debates on the frontal substrates of response inhibition by replacing the role 
of a controlled mechanism for motoric stopping with context-monitoring. 
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Introduction 
  
The inhibition of responses is critical for enabling controlled behavior: bad habits, 
unfamiliar situations, and dangerous environments often require that default behaviors be 
stopped and more context-appropriate actions performed (Aron, 2007).  Response inhibition has 
been localized to brain regions implicated in behavioral control, such as the right ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (rVLPFC), and response inhibition has been statistically equated with the 
behavioral and genetic variance common across multiple tests of cognitive and behavioral 
control (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004; Friedman et al., 2008).  Moreover, the inhibition of 
responses has been exempted from skepticisms about the existence of other forms of inhibition 
(MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson & Bibi, 2003), supporting theorizing that similar mechanisms 
enable the inhibition of thoughts and emotions. Thus, modern theorizing is largely consistent 
with a hypothesis proposed 130 years ago: that “the centers of inhibition being thus the essential 
factor of attention, constitute the organic basis of all the higher intellectual faculties” (Ferrier, 
1876). 
However, response inhibition not only requires that inappropriate behavior be stopped – 
it also requires the detection of behaviorally-relevant signals.  For example, one goal may be to 
cross a street; this requires actually crossing the street, and stopping these motor actions if 
oncoming traffic is approaching, but to do so the environment must be monitored so that motoric 
stopping can be performed as appropriate.  In other words, the environmental context must be 
monitored to support behavior that may be contingent on that context.  Both motoric stopping 
and context-monitoring are also intermingled in the most precise laboratory assessment of 
response inhibition, in which subjects must cancel a prepotent or planned response after the 
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presentation of a signal to stop (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Hampshire et al., 2010; Sharp et al., 2010; 
Cai & Leung, 2011; Dodds et al., 2011).  Estimates of the time that subjects require to stop an 
action, or “Stop Signal Reaction Time” (SSRT; Logan & Cowan, 1984) are thought to include 
the time spent detecting and encoding the signal to stop, but do not explicitly distinguish between 
this process and the motoric process involved in actually stopping the action.  Thus, the apparent 
centrality of a controlled stopping process in this task could in principle reflect the centrality of 
controlled context-monitoring processes.  
Here, we experimentally determine whether context-monitoring or motoric stopping 
constitutes the cognitively-controlled process recruited during response inhibition by examining 
tasks with identical context-monitoring demands, one of which requires stopping and one of 
which does not. In both tasks, 75% of trials (“No Signal” trials) require a 2-alternative forced 
choice (2AFC; Fig. 2A); in the remaining 25% of trials (“Signal” trials), the 2AFC is followed 
by a behaviorally-relevant stimulus (the “signal”) after a variable delay (Fig. 2B).  In the Stop 
Task, Signal trials require the stopping of motor responses on that trial.  In contrast, in the 
“Double Go Task,” Signal trials require subjects to repeat their response for that trial as quickly 
as possible (see methods and Supporting Information). Thus, both tasks require monitoring for 
the context that signals what actions should be executed, but only the Stop Task explicitly 
requires actions to be stopped. 
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Figure 2. Task Design.  Identical stimuli and trial structure were used across tasks in three 
separate experiments.  In both the Stop and the Double Go tasks, most trials are “No Signal” 
trials where only a 2AFC decision is required (A).  However, the tasks differ on “Signal” trials 
(B) where an additional stimulus, a white box, is presented with a variable inter-stimulus interval 
following the onset of the 2AFC stimulus.  On Double GoSignal trials, this additional stimulus 
indicates that the appropriate 2AFC button press be repeated.  On StopSignal trials, this stimulus 
indicates that the 2AFC button press must be stopped.  Thus, although only the Stop Task 
requires motoric stopping, both tasks share demands on context-monitoring. 
 
The cognitive control required for response inhibition is thought to rely on the prefrontal 
cortex, to be most crucial at the moment when motoric stopping is required, to be associated with 
substantial mental effort, to be recruited in a goal-directed fashion, and to support consistent 
individual differences. We therefore assessed each of these characteristics of context-monitoring 
and stopping, to determine which of these components may reflect the cognitively-controlled 
process recruited during response inhibition. 
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess the recruitment of the 
prefrontal cortex in our tasks. Numerous previous fMRI studies have demonstrated transient 
activation within the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rVLPFC) and the adjoining anterior 
insula during trials that require motoric stopping (e.g., Chikazoe et al., 2009; Hampshire et al., 
2010; Dodds et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2011).  Collectively, this and related evidence has been 
interpreted to indicate that the rVLPFC is a dedicated substrate for inhibition, and that this 
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function may also be deployed proactively to support behaviors like “responding with restraint” 
(Aron, 2010; Jahfari et al., 2010).  Alternatively, it is possible that these hemodynamic patterns 
reflect the context monitoring demands of the Stop task, which could also be deployed 
proactively as well as transiently at the moment a goal-relevant feature of the environment (e.g., 
a Stop Signal) is encountered.  Recent work has begun to examine this alternative possibility 
using fMRI but has unfortunately yielded inconsistent results: either more (Hampshire et al., 
2010; Dodds et al., 2010), less (Chikazoe et al., 2010; Cai & Leung, 2011) or roughly equivalent 
(Sharp et al., 2010) rVLPFC activity is observed during the Stop task, in either overlapping 
(Sharp et al., 2010; Dodds et al., 2011; Hampshire et al., 2010) or distinct (Chikazoe, et al., 2009; 
Cai & Leung, 2011) subregions of the rVLPFC.  In addition, none of these studies have 
examined whether the sustained component to the rVLPFC hemodynamic response could reflect 
a tonic and proactive process of context-monitoring (in which case sustained activity should also 
be observed in a context-monitoring task) rather than a process of responding with restraint.  
Finally, all of these studies have examined only the univariate patterns in hemodynamics, and 
have not assessed whether rVLPFC demonstrates multivariate commonality across tasks 
involving context-monitoring (as would be predicted by context-monitoring accounts), or 
whether any such commonality is relatively decreased on trials requiring motoric stopping (as 
would be predicted by stopping accounts).  Below, we measured each of these aspects of the 
recruitment of the rVLPFC during the Stop and Double Go tasks to test these differing 
predictions of the context-monitoring and motoric stopping accounts. 
We also assessed whether the event-related potentials commonly associated with 
response inhibition tasks, and often presumed to reflect motoric stopping processes, might 
instead reflect context monitoring processes.  The most characteristic ERP from response 
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inhibition tasks is the “Stop P3” or “No/Go P3,” a frontocentral positivity elicited following the 
onset of stimuli which demand motoric stopping (e.g., Smith, Johnstone & Barry, 2008).  We 
tested whether this “Stop P3” would be more strongly expressed during the Stop task than the 
Double Go task (as motoric stopping accounts would predict), and whether the correlation of all 
ERPs across these tasks would be reduced following the onset of the Signals (as would also be 
predicted by motoric stopping accounts). In contrast, accounts positing the centrality of context-
monitoring to the Stop task would predict roughly equivalent frontocentral ERPs across these 
tasks, despite their differing demands on motoric stopping.  
Finally, we assessed the task-evoked pupillometric response (TEPR), a well-validated 
measure of mental effort (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Beatty & Lucero-Wagner, 2000), to 
determine whether the more effortful component to the Stop task reflects motoric stopping (in 
which case pupil diameter should be increased on StopSignal trials) or whether it might reflect the 
act of monitoring context for goal-relevant signals (in which case, pupil diameter may show a 
more complex pattern, such as a modulation of pupil diameter by the relevance of a monitored 
signal to the planned response). Previous work examining pupil diameter in the Stop task has 
utilized it mainly as a control measure of arousal in TMS studies (Chambers et al., 2006; 
Verbruggen et al., 2010).  
To foreshadow our results, our results uniformly suggest that, during response inhibition, 
cognitive control is primarily engaged for the purpose of monitoring the environmental context 
in the service of goals, rather than for motoric stopping per se. 
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Materials and Methods 
Participants.  
For experiment 1, 86 subjects (mean age 19.11 years; SD = 1.17 years; 32 males) were recruited 
using the University of Colorado undergraduate research pool and successfully completed the 
Double Go and Stop Tasks.  2 subjects failed eyetracker calibration and were excluded from 
pupillometric analyses.  For experiment 2, 45 subjects (mean age 19.86 years; SD = 2.21; 23 
males) were recruited using the University of Colorado undergraduate research pool and 
successfully completed the Double Go and Stop Tasks.  7 of these subjects were excluded from 
ERP analysis for artifacts caused by excessive blinking (>60% of trials).  For experiment 3, 19 
subjects (mean age 23.3: SD = 4.4; 10 males) were recruited from the local community and 
successfully completed the Double Go and Stop Tasks.  One subject was excluded from fMRI 
analyses due to motion artifact. 
 
Behavioral Task.   
All subjects in all experiments completed the Double Go Task prior to completing the 
Stop Task. This fixed task order was adopted for reasons described in Supporting Materials – in 
particular, the use of a fixed task order is ideal for the investigation of individual differences 
(e.g., Friedman et al., 2008), which was a central goal of the study reported here.  Nonetheless, 
appropriate precautions were taken to prevent the contamination of experimental effects with 
cognitive phenomena that might arise from the fixed task order (e.g., the use of within-task 
baselines are used for all pupillometry, ERPs, and fMRI analyses, so as to control for the 
relatively general effects of phenomena like fatigue).   
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In all respects the Double Go and Stop Task were identical within any given experiment 
(e.g., the precise interstimulus and intersignal intervals, the presence of “null” trials, etc), with 
the following exception: subjects are naturally aware of when they fail to successfully stop a 
response, but seem unaware of their relative speed on trials with the infrequent stimulus.  To 
avoid any possible mismatch across the two tasks owing to this difference, we provided explicit 
feedback on all signal trials.  Specifically, in the Double Go Task, the signal turned red if 
subjects were slower than their average running RT (experiments 2 & 3); in experiment 1 this 
was presented as sham feedback.  (Double Go task trials with categorically incorrect responses – 
such as a failure to respond twice on Signal trials, or anything but a single correct response on 
No Signal trials – were extremely rare and excluded from all analysis).  Similarly, in the Stop 
Task, the signal turned red if subjects failed to successfully stop their response on that trial (in all 
experiments).  Additional cross-experiment differences in our tasks suggest the generality of our 
results across minor variations in experimental procedure (see Supporting Figure S1 & 
Supporting Table S1).  
 
Statistical Analysis of fMRI 
Data were acquired with a 3T GE Signal whole-body MRI scanner at the University of 
Colorado Health Sciences Center, using T2-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) (TR= 2000 ms, 
TE= 32 ms, flip angle= 70º). Additional acquisition details are available in Supporting Methods. 
Image pre-processing and analyses were conducted with FSL (FMRIB’s Software Library). The 
first six volumes of each run were discarded to allow the MR signal to reach steady state, the 
remaining images in each participant’s time series were motion corrected using MCFLIRT, and 
non-brain voxels were removed using a brain extraction algorithm (BET). The data series was 
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spatially smoothed with a 3D Gaussian kernel (FWHM = 5 mm), intensity normalized for all 
volumes, and high-pass filtered (s=50 sec).  
After statistical analysis of each time series (details of the regression model are available 
in Supporting Methods), statistical maps were normalized into the MNI-152 stereotaxic space 
using FLIRT (FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool).  Parameter estimates (PE) were 
transformed into a common stereotaxic space using the above-mentioned three-step registration 
prior to the group analyses with FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects).  Z-
statistic images were thresholded using clusters with z > 2.58 as well as a whole-brain corrected 
cluster significance threshold of p < .05 using the theory of Gaussian Random Fields. 
ROIs for Brodmann areas were anatomically defined using the Talairach labeled atlas, and mean 
percent signal change was extracted using FSL’s featquery tool.  The subthalamic nucleus was 
anatomically defined using a 10mm3 region centered on the MNI coordinates previously used in 
the Stop Task to interrogate BOLD in the STN (10, -15, -5) (Aron & Poldrack, 2006).  The TPJ 
was anatomically defined using a 30mm3 region centered on the MNI coordinates (-54, -52, 30) 
previously observed in a target detection task (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy & Shulman, 
2000). 
Pattern classification analyses were conducted on the beta-weights resulting from the 
above fMRI analysis pipeline, with four minor exceptions.  First, the BOLD data were not 
spatially smoothed; second, the PEs were not statistically thresholded; third; the PEs were z-
transformed across all voxels within a given ROI for each subject, to ensure that the classifiers 
were forced to operate on the basis of distributed patterns of activation instead of overall 
magnitudes.  Finally, voxels with z-values falling outside of +/- 4.5 were windsorized.  
Classifiers were implemented as neural networks in Emergent (Aisa, Mingus & O’Reilly, 2008); 
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separate networks were then trained, using Hebbian and Contrastive Hebbian learning, for each 
ROI (and therefore differed in terms of the number of input units), and for identifying which 
individuals generated the data vs. what trial type the data was estimated from (and therefore 
differed in terms of the number of output units) but all other aspects of the network architecture 
were the same.  See Supporting Methods for full details on classifier implementation. 
 
Statistical Analysis of ERPs.  
During the Double Go and Stop Tasks scalp voltages were recorded with a 128-channel geodesic 
sensor net (Tucker, 1993). Amplified analog voltages (0.1- to 100.0-Hz bandpass) were digitized 
at 250 Hz. Individual sensors were adjusted until impedances were less than 50 k. The EEG was 
digitally low-pass filtered at 40 Hz.  Trials were discarded from analyses if they contained 
incorrect responses, eye movements (eye channel amplitudes over 70 V), or more than 20% of 
channels were bad (average amplitude over 100 V or transit amplitude over 50 V). Individual 
bad channels were replaced on a trial-by-trial basis with a spherical spline algorithm. EEG was 
measured with respect to a vertex reference (Cz), but an average-reference transformation was 
used to minimize the effects of reference-site activity and accurately estimate the scalp 
topography of the measured electrical fields. The average reference was corrected for the polar 
average reference effect (Junghoefer, Elber, Tucker & Braun, 1999). ERPs were obtained by 
stimulus-locked averaging of the EEG recorded in each condition. ERPs were baseline-corrected 
with respect to a 200-ms prestimulus recording interval.  These baselines were calculated 
separately for each task, thereby controlling for nonspecific effects like fatigue.   
Where montages are used, the occipital montage was centered on Oz (including Oz, O1, O2, and 
the contiguous set of electrodes 76, 70, 74 and 82) and the frontal montage was centered on Fz 
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(including Fz and the contiguous set of electrodes 4, 5, 10, 12, 16 18 and 19). For scalp-wide 
voltage correlations we calculated Pearson’s R across tasks at every time point as the variance 
shared between the subjects x electrode matrix across tasks.  Thus, this correlation reflects 
changes in voltage that covary across tasks in the same subjects at the same electrode sites.  For 
montage-based voltage correlations we calculated Pearson correlations separately for the frontal 
and occipital montages both before and after signal onset. 
 
Statistical Analysis of Pupillometry.  
Pupil diameter was recorded continuously during the Double Go and Stop Tasks via a Tobii X50 
infrared eyetracker calibrated to each subject.   Sampling at 50 Hz was synchronized to fixation 
onset, and pupil diameter was calculated as the average diameter of successfully-tracked eyes for 
each sample.  Baseline measurements of pupil diameter were calculated as the average diameter 
during the 200ms preceding the onset of each signal (or the corresponding time period for no 
signal trials); this value was subtracted from the averaged samples recorded following the onset 
of the signal (or the average signal onset for no signal trials).  Baseline periods were calculated 
independently for the Stop and Double Go tasks, providing a within-task baseline to control for 
nonspecific cognitive effects like fatigue.  These normalized, averaged pupil diameter samples 
were then smoothed using a box-car filter with width of 60ms. 
 
Statistical Analysis of Behavior – Double Go Task.  
In the Double Go Task, all RTs falling below 150ms or above 750ms were excluded from 
analysis, as well as those on No Signal trials falling outside of 3.5 standard deviations of the 
iteratively-calculated mean for each subject.  RTs were only analyzed on correct trials (i.e., trials 
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in which two responses of the correct type were provided on Signal trials, and where one and 
only one response of the correct type was provided on No Signal trials). 
Individual differences were extracted from the Double Go task using a mixture model-
based adaptation of the classic race model of the Stop task (see also Supporting Methods).  
Specifically, to classify individual trials as slowed or unslowed, we first decomposed the 
distribution of equipercentile residuals into two underlying distributions: a Gaussian distribution 
with a mean of zero (corresponding to unslowed first RTs), and a Gamma distribution 
(corresponding to the slowed first RTs).  The two free parameters to the Gamma and the one free 
parameter to the Gaussian were fit in a fixed-effects analysis using maximum likelihood 
estimation via with the Nelder-Meade simplex algorithm (Nelder & Mead, 1965; Ratcliff & 
Starns, 2009).  The maximum likelihood fit is illustrated as overlaid lines on the residual 
histogram (Fig. S3A), which was relatively stable across multiple optimizations with different 
starting parameters and yielded a better overall fit (see Supporting Table S1) than a single 
Gaussian in terms of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), calculated as: 
   (1) 
Where  N is the total number of observations, D is the total number of distributions fit, Dpis the 
total number of free parameters used in fitting those distributions, d is the weight of the dth 
distribution, and Ld(RTn) is the likelihood of the nth RT given the best fit parameters for the dth 
distribution (µ and σ for Gaussian and k and ϴ for Gamma).  
We next categorized individual trials as slowed or unslowed using the likelihood of 
observing each RT under either of the two fitted distributions.  RTs were categorized as slowed 
if there was even weak evidence in favor of the RT belonging to that distribution (as quantified 
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by a difference in BIC of ≥ 2.35); otherwise RTs were categorized as unslowed.  Other standards 
of evidence lead to similar results as those presented here, but do not as cleanly separate the 
slowed and unslowed trials (c.f. Fig S3B). 
To calculate TOSD, we subtracted the signal delay from the nth percentile of no signal 
trial RTs, where n corresponds to the proportion of RTs classified as unslowed at that signal 
delay.  This approach is conceptually identical to that used to calculate SSRT in the race model, 
in which the signal delay is subtracted from the nth percentile of No Signal RTs, where n 
corresponds to the proportion of unsuccessful stop trials at that signal delay.  TOSD was 
calculated for each subject as the median of these estimates across all signal delays.  This 
estimate was unreasonably high for subjects for whom no RTs had been classified as slowed 
(n=34 out of 150), so in those cases we used the minimum estimate of TOSD across all signal 
delays.  
We then calculated the duration of slowing as the average difference between RTs 
classified as slowed and RTs of corresponding percent rank in the no signal RT distribution; 
subjects for whom no RTs had been classified as slowed were excluded from all analyses 
involving duration of slowing.  The resulting estimates of TOSD and duration of slowing can be 
found in Table S2.    
 
Statistical Analysis of Behavior – Stop Task.  
In keeping with the recommendations based on Monte Carlo simulations (Band et al., 2003), we 
estimated SSRT as the nth percentile of the No Signal RT distribution minus the signal delay, 
where n is the proportion of errors observed at each signal delay.  This estimate was averaged 
across the signal delays yielding 15% to 85% accuracy for each subject to generate the 
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recommended dependent measure for Stop Tasks with fixed interstimulus intervals (SSRTAV).  
Data from the Stop Task confirmed assumptions of the race model:  RTs were faster on Signal 
trials than on No Signal trials (t(145)=11.31, p<.0005) and accuracy was a monotonically 
decreasing function of interstimulus interval (100 vs 150: t(145)=13.52, p<.0005; 150 vs 250: 
t(145)=17.20, p<.0005; 250 vs 300: t(145)=7.14, p<.0005). 
Results 
 
Univariate fMRI Results 
 
First, we found that context-monitoring rather than stopping explained the transient 
prefrontal contribution to response inhibition.  Accounts which posit that motoric stopping is the 
controlled process during response inhibition tasks predict rVLPFC activation only in the Stop 
task, but event-related fMRI revealed that the Stop and Double Go tasks activated completely 
overlapping regions of prefrontal cortex (Fig.3A), consistent with the tasks’ shared context-
monitoring demands.   Specific regions of interest (ROIs) in the rVLPFC and interconnected 
subthalamic nucleus (STN) that have been proposed to be specific to the motoric stopping 
demands were uniformly more strongly recruited on Signal trials in the Double Go Task (Fig 
3B&C; STN: t(17)=5.49, p<.0001; BA44: t(17)=5.08, p<.0001; BA45: t(17)=2.83, p=.012; 
BA47: t(17)=2.5, p=.023), challenging any characterization of these areas as specialized for 
motoric stopping.  A significantly different pattern was observed in areas thought to have a more 
general attentional role (e.g., the temporo-parietal junction; TPJ (Chikazoe et al., 2007; Konishi 
et al., 1998); F(1,17)=31.57, p<.0001), such that both tasks recruited this area equivalently.  This 
equal recruitment of the TPJ across tasks indicates that decreased recruitment of the rVLPFC in 
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the Stop task cannot be explained by globally-decreased activation during that task (e.g., as 
might result from fatigue; see also discussion in Supporting Information).  Moreover, the 
increased recruitment of rVLPFC during the Double Go task is consistent with several recent 
findings, which also demonstrate that tasks involving both context-monitoring and response 
commission are associated with increased rVLPFC activity relative to tasks involving both 
context-monitoring and a demand to stop motor actions (Hampshire et al., 2010; Sharp et al 
2010; Dodds et al., 2011; but see Cai & Leung, 2011 and discussion, below). 
 
Figure 3. Hybrid fMRI analyses revealed overlapping neural activity in the Stop and (Double) 
Go Tasks (A), with significantly more rVLPFC activity in the Go Task (B).  ROI analyses for the 
contrast of Signal vs. No-Signal trials (C) revealed increased activity in the Go Task throughout 
a putatively stopping-specific network; this pattern did not generalize to regions with more 
general attentional functions (e.g., TPJ). Sustained rVLPFC activity was also observed across all 
trials within each task (D). 
Our hybrid fMRI design also allowed us to assess the extent to which neural regions were 
recruited in a sustained fashion across all trials within the Stop and Double Go tasks.  Such 
sustained activity is potentially a hallmark of proactive context-monitoring processes.  Indeed, 
this analysis revealed sustained hemodynamics in the rVLPFC during both tasks at the timescale 
of seconds-to-minutes (Fig. 3D), consistent with their shared sustained context-monitoring 
demands.  In contrast, accounts positing that motoric stopping is the cognitively-controlled 
process during response inhibition predict no sustained rVLPFC activity in the Double Go task, 
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since only response commission is required by that task, and “responding with restraint” is 
unnecessary. 
 
Multivariate Pattern Analysis 
 
We next leveraged multi-voxel pattern analysis to determine whether the same 
information was encoded by rVLPFC regardless of whether motoric stopping is required by a 
given task.  First, we trained classifiers to identify hemodynamic patterns that reliably predicted 
subject-specific patterns of rVLPFC activation in the Double Go task over 10 independent runs 
of the classifier (see methods in Supporting Information).  Classifiers readily generalized their 
training on the Double Go task to distinguish individuals in the Stop task, indicating that the 
rVLPFC is recruited in an individual-specific but consistent way across tasks.  These patterns 
were significantly more consistent across tasks on Signal trials in the rVLPFC – precisely when 
and where context-monitoring processes are most crucial, but also when motoric stopping 
demands differ most across these tasks (Fig.4A; BA44: t(9)=13.5, p<.0001; BA45: t(9)=11.39, 
p<.0001; BA47: t(9)=12.35, p<.001).  Critically, the increased cross-task similarity of Signal 
trials relative to No Signal trials was not observed in an area known to encode responses – 
primary motor cortex – and this pattern was significantly different from that observed in rVLPFC 
(F(1,9)=85.12, p<.0001).  Although these results do not conclusively demonstrate that the 
cognitive processes engaged by both tasks are the same, they do demonstrate that the 
multivariate representations in the rVLPFC fail to show differential sensitivity to the explicit 
stopping demands imposed by Signal trials within the Stop task (in contrast to the multivariate 
patterns within primary motor cortex).  While this pattern contradicts the idea that 
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representations in rVLPFC are specialized for the motoric stopping that is required on Signal 
trials in the Stop task (but not in the Double Go task), it is wholly consistent with the idea that 
similar context-monitoring processes are elicited by Signal trials within both tasks. 
 
Figure 4. (A) rVLPFC was recruited in subject-specific but consistent ways regardless of 
stopping demands: individual differences in (Double) Go task hemodynamic activity also 
differentiated subjects in the Stop task.  (B). rVLPFC showed trial-type-specific recruitment that 
was consistent across tasks, contradicting stopping-specific accounts of rVLPFC function.  ** 
p<.0001 *** p<.005. 
 
In a second multi-voxel pattern analysis, subject-specific classifiers were trained to 
decode the multivariate patterns that differentiate Double GoSignal and Double GoNo-Signal trials.  
Classifiers generalized this training on the Double Go task to correctly identify StopSignal trials 
with 92-97% accuracy in the rVLPFC, significantly higher than the 59% accuracy achieved in 
primary motor cortex (F(1,17)=9.413, p=.007).  To control for the possible effects of classifier 
bias on this result, we utilized signal detection theory.  Classifiers readily discriminated between 
StopSignal and StopNo-Signal trials in the rVLPFC but not primary motor cortex in terms of d’ 
(Fig.4B; F(1,17)=13.14, p<.005), indicating that rVLPFC similarly encodes the different 
51 
 
processes invoked by Signal and No-Signal trials, despite their different demands on motoric 
stopping, unlike the sensitivity shown by primary motor cortex to the demands on motoric 
stopping invoked by StopSignal trials. 
 
Event-related potentials 
 
The ERPs evoked by our tasks also reflected context-monitoring demands rather than 
stopping demands.  In particular, motoric stopping accounts predict that a prefrontal ERP called 
the “Stop P3” reflects stopping-specific processes (Smith et al., 2008) and should therefore be 
enhanced in the Stop task.  However, the so-called Stop P3 was enhanced in the Double Go task, 
in direct contradiction to the stopping account (Fig.5A; t(35)=2.92, p<.03), but consistent with 
our observations of increased transient hemodynamics in the Double Go task relative to the Stop 
task (see Univariate fMRI results, above). 
 
Figure 5. A prefrontal positivity peaking around 300ms, known as the “Stop P3,” has been 
previously associated with stopping, but this component (darkened region of A) was significantly 
enhanced in the (Double) Go task.  Individual differences in voltage were also highly correlated 
across tasks, indicating substantial overlap in the underlying cortical processes (B).  Moreover, 
prefrontal correlations between the scalp voltage recorded across tasks were disproportionately 
increased following the presentation of the signal, relative to the increase in occipital correlations 
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observed at the same time (C).  This difference indicates increased cross-task similarity in 
prefrontal processing specifically at signal onset. 
 
These ERPs from the Stop and Double Go tasks were not two distinct potentials 
masquerading as the same; individual differences in this ERP were also highly correlated 
between tasks (Fig.5B).  Critically, correlations between the ERPs elicited by each task were 
disproportionately increased over prefrontal electrodes, relative to occipital electrodes, following 
signal onset, when context-monitoring is most required but stopping demands differ most 
(Fig.5C; F(1,98)=12.59, p=.001). 
 
Pupillometry 
 
We also found that context-monitoring, not motoric stopping, explains the patterns of 
mental effort elicited during our tasks.  We measured pupil diameter, a psychophysiological 
index of mental effort (Kahneman  & Beatty, 1967; Beatty & Lucero-Wagner, 2000), following 
the onset of a signal (or the average signal onset time in the case of No-Signal trials; Fig.6).  
Averaging across all time points, mental effort was less for stopping than for monitoring for 
signals that fail to appear (StopSignal<StopNo-Signalt(85)=7.00, p<.001; StopSignal<Double GoNo-Signal 
t(85)=2.07, p<.05).  Mental effort was also less for context monitoring and motoric stopping than 
for context monitoring and an additional act of going (StopSignal<Double GoSignal t(85)=13.67, 
p<.001).  Finally, mental effort was greater when monitoring for signals that would require a 
change to the planned response than when monitoring for those that would not (StopNo-Signal 
>Double GoNo-Signal t(85)=10.25, p<.001), a result which also rules out global reductions in effort 
during the Stop task (e.g. from fatigue; see also supporting discussion).  Thus, motoric stopping 
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is not itself associated with any effort beyond that required for the processes involved in other 
trial types, contrary to the idea that motoric stopping of a response constitutes the cognitively-
controlled, and therefore effortful, component of response inhibition.  Instead, context-
monitoring demands are more central to mental effort, and this relationship is modulated by the 
relevance of the monitored stimulus to the planned response. 
 
Figure 6. Patterns of mental effort assessed via pupillometry indicate that effort matches 
demands on context-monitoring, not stopping, and is modulated by the relevance of the 
infrequent stimulus to the planned response. In particular, stopping a response (StopSignal trials) 
was associated with more mental effort was required by monitoring for the appearance of stimuli 
that would demand stopping (StopNo-Signal trials) than by stopping itself (StopSignal trials) or by 
monitoring for the appearance of stimuli that would demand an additional act of going (GoNo-
Signal trials). 
 
Model-based decomposition of behavior and correlations with brain activity 
 
Stopping is not associated with differential mental effort or prefrontal recruitment, 
contrary to stopping-centric accounts of cognitive control.  This pattern of results could imply 
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that motoric stopping is not a cognitively-controlled process, in the sense that it may not be 
employed in a goal-directed manner, given the widely-held assumption that goal directed 
behavior recruits the prefrontal cortex and requires mental effort.  Consistent with this idea, 
subjects appeared to engage transient stopping on the Double Go task even though such stopping 
runs contrary to goals in this task.  Specifically, although Double GoSignal trials require that 
subjects commit a subset of the motor responses required on Double GoNo-Signal trials, subjects 
were nonetheless slower to provide a response to stimuli when they were followed by the signal 
than when they appeared alone (Double GoSignal1st RT>Double GoNoSignalOnly RT; t(148)=9.59, 
p<.0005; Fig.7A).  To the extent that this behavioral slowing in the Double Go task reflects some 
transient stopping, it runs contrary to subjects’ goals in the Double Go task and therefore may 
not be engaged in a controlled manner.   
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Figure 7. Response slowing was observed in the Double Go task (A), perhaps suggesting that 
stopping is not associated with differential mental effort or prefrontal activity because it is an 
automatic consequence of detecting an infrequent stimulus. Critically, this slowing was 
dependent on ISI; indeed, large individual differences were observed in the shortest ISI to yield 
zero slowing (B contains data from four representative subjects). A subtraction of reaction times 
on (Double) GoNo-Signal trials from those with a corresponding percent rank on (Double) GoSignal 
trials reveals a pronounced positive skew to these equipercentile residuals (C), indicating that 
some proportion of reaction times on GoSignal trials are disproportionately delayed.  Trials 
undergoing this slowing were identified as those more likely to come from a distribution not 
centered on zero, as determined through a two-component mixture model (see overlaid lines on 
histogram in C). This procedure adequately separated the slowed and unslowed distributions, as 
revealed by zero significant difference between GoSignal trials categorized as unslowed and their 
corresponding reaction times in the GoNo-Signal distribution, but a large difference between GoSignal 
trials categorized as slowed and their corresponding reaction times in the GoNo-Signal distribution 
(D).  From this we estimated two individual differences: how long subjects are slowed (duration 
of slowing; DoS) and the time at which signals are detected (time of signal detection; TOSD).  
Only TOSD positively correlated with SSRT, whereas DoS showed a slight negative correlation, 
indicating that the slowing experienced by subjects in the Double Go task cannot be the source of 
shared variance between the Stop and Double Go tasks (E). Brain-behavior correlations 
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confirmed this conclusion: SSRT and TOSD, but not DoS, overlapped in their correlations with 
neural activity only in the rVLPFC (F). 
 
An alternative interpretation of this slowing is that it does in fact reflect a controlled and 
goal-directed process: it may be an attempt to stop or replace the motor plan required on Double 
GoNo-Signal trials (i.e. the motor plan for “respond once” is stopped or replaced with the motor 
plan for “respond twice”).  We assessed this possibility with a model-based decomposition of 
subjects’ behavior; however, the results of this analysis argue against this possibility, and further 
show that the efficiency of subjects’ context-monitoring, rather than the efficiency of motoric 
stopping or motor plan replacement, shares a closer relationship with SSRT. 
To assess the alternative accounts, we developed a formal model of context-monitoring 
and stopping by building on the classic race model of the Stop task (Logan & Cowan, 1984) in 
order to precisely estimate the duration of motoric slowing experienced by subjects in the Double 
Go task, as well as exactly which trials underwent such slowing.  The race model of the Stop task 
posits that responses undergo inhibition when a stopping process, triggered by the onset of the 
Stop signal, completes before the “going” processes triggered by the onset of the 2AFC stimulus.  
The race between stopping and going processes is the model’s namesake, and is supported by the 
monotonically-decreasing relationship of interstimulus interval (ISI) to successful inhibition: 
larger ISIs give the “going” process an increasing advantage in the race, and thus leads to less 
successful inhibition.  We observed a similar phenomenon in our Double Go task, such that 
increasing ISIs led to less slowing of first responses; this effect was visible at the group level 
(see additional results in Supporting Information) but also even at the level of individual subjects 
(Fig. 7B), who showed substantial variability in the earliest ISI to yield zero observable slowing. 
57 
 
We utilized this behavioral variability to estimate individual differences in Double Go 
task performance.  First, we estimated the probability that each trial belonged to either the 
“slowed” or “unslowed” distribution of reaction times.  This categorization was accomplished by 
fitting a mixture model to the difference between reaction times of Double GoSignal1st RT and 
Double GoNoSignalOnly RT trials of corresponding percent rank.  To the extent these reaction times 
come from the same (i.e., unslowed) distribution, these equipercentile residuals should be 
centered on zero; however, there was pronounced positive skew (Fig. 7C), indicating that a 
substantial proportion of trials did undergo slowing.  We considered as “slowed” those trials that 
were marginally less likely to come from a Gaussian distribution centered on zero, relative to an 
alternative distribution with a positive mean (see overlaid curves on Fig 7C, and supporting 
methods).  This method clearly separated “slowed” from “unslowed” trials on the basis of the 
first RT on Double GoSignal trials: “unslowed” trials showed approximately zero slowing relative 
to corresponding trials within the No Signal distribution, whereas “slowed” trials were 
significantly longer than corresponding trials within the No Signal distribution (Fig. 7D). 
Next, we estimated for each subject the amount of time that must elapse after signal 
presentation until responses are categorized as “slowed” (yielding the time of signal detection 
[TOSD], our measure of context-monitoring), and the difference between that subjects’ “slowed” 
and “unslowed” reaction times (yielding the duration of slowing [DoS], our measure of stopping 
from the Double Go task).  If motoric stopping (or, equivalently, motor plan replacement) is 
controlled, and initiated in this controlled fashion in the Double Go task, then the process of 
motoric stopping or motor plan replacement should should cease (as estimated by DoS, in the 
Double Go task) in proportion to how quickly competing motor plans can be stopped, as assessed 
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by SSRT in the Stop task.  That is, the “controlled motoric stopping” and “controlled motor plan 
replacement” accounts both predict that DoS and SSRT should be positively correlated.   
However, DoS and SSRT were not positively correlated – they instead showed a weak 
negative correlation (Pearson R=-.188, p=.048; Fig 7E), in direct contradiction to the prediction 
motivated by these alternative accounts.  SSRT was instead positively correlated only with 
TOSD – i.e., the efficiency with which signals could be detected (Fig. 7E; R=.418, p<.0005) – as 
predicted by accounts which posit that context-monitoring underlies the commonalities of the 
Double Go and Stop Signal tasks.  This positive relationship persisted when controlling for DoS 
(R=.410, p<.0005), indicating that the overlapping variance in TOSD and SSRT does not reflect 
motoric stopping or motor plan replacement.  Strikingly, this relationship of context-monitoring 
to SSRT was also regionally-specific: SSRT and TOSD overlapped in their relationship to 
hemodynamics only within the rVLPFC (Fig.7F). 
A second, independent assessment of the origin of the observed commonalities across our 
tasks is also enabled by our formal model.  Specifically, the model identifies exactly which trials 
undergo motoric stopping/slowing within the Double Go task, and thus permits these trials to be 
excluded from analysis.  To the extent that similar hemodynamic, electroencephalographic, and 
pupillometric patterns are observed when these “slowed” trials are excluded, it would suggest 
that the commonalities across our tasks do not reflect a motoric stopping process common to 
these tasks.   
Consistent with the claim that a common and cognitively-controlled process of context-
monitoring – and not a common process of motoric stopping – underlies the commonalities of 
our tasks, a complete re-analysis of the data without such “slowed” trials replicated all of our 
primary results: the increased transient hemodynamic response in the rVLPFC during the Double 
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Go task, the prominent sustained hemodynamic activity observed in that task, the multivariate 
hemodynamic commonalities across tasks, the increased Stop P3 response in the Double Go task, 
the strong correlations of scalp voltage across tasks as well as the selective increase in those 
correlations over frontal electrodes following signal onset, and yields qualitatively similar 
patterns of mental effort (see Supporting Methods and Supporting Table S4).  This analysis 
further substantiates our conclusion that context-monitoring, not motoric stopping, reflects the 
cognitively-controlled component of this canonical response inhibition task. 
 
Discussion 
 
By matching our tasks on all characteristics except motoric stopping demands, we find that 
monitoring context for behaviorally-relevant signals, not stopping, is an effortful, controlled, and 
prefrontal process that explains individual differences in cognitive control during response 
inhibition. We were able to replicate all of our primary results when utilizing only the trials that 
were categorized as “unslowed” from the Double Go task, indicating that the slowing in that task 
was not the origin of the hemodynamic, electroencephalographic, and pupillometric 
commonalities of the Stop and Double Go task.  This conclusion is consistent with recent 
evidence that the behavioral slowing expressed in context-monitoring tasks is not related to 
hemodynamics in rVLPFC, nor to that in any portion of lateral prefrontal cortex (Sharp et al., 
2010).  In contrast, SSRT was instead more closely related to our measure of context monitoring.   
More broadly, our conclusions are also largely concordant with comparisons of the same 
Double Go task we used above (Dodds et al., 2011) and alternative context monitoring tasks 
(Sharp et al., 2010; Cai & Leung 2011; Hampshire et al., 2010) with the Stop Signal task, as 
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described below.  It nonetheless remains possible that the prefrontal cortex could subserve some 
form of motoric stopping, or motor plan replacement, or that motoric stopping could in some 
cases be cognitively controlled.  Our results indicate only that there is no need to assume that 
motoric stopping occurs in a cognitively controlled fashion within the canonical task of response 
inhibition, the Stop task.  Instead, many of the phenomena from this task – including both 
transient and sustained hemodynamics, multivariate patterns in those hemodynamics, event-
related potentials, mental effort as quantified through pupillometry, and the primary behavioral 
measure from this task – seem to primarily reflect this task’s demands on context monitoring 
processes. 
Relation to Recent Work.  
Our study addresses the evolving debate on the functional specialization of the rVLPFC 
in three ways: by developing a formal model, by distinguishing subprocesses within these tasks 
that may have led to otherwise unresolved discrepancies across previous findings, and by testing 
a question of different scope: whether by any major criteria, motoric stopping could be 
considered a specific cognitive control mechanism utilized during response inhibition.   Previous 
formal models did not separately account for motoric stopping and monitoring, or even explicitly 
distinguish between them (Logan & Cowan, 1984).  Previous empirical attempts to dissociate 
monitoring and motoric stopping yielded conflicting results: less, more, or equivalent 
recruitment of either the same or separable subregions of rVLPFC (Sharp et al., 2010, Hampshire 
et al., 2010; Dodds et al., 2011).  Finally, previous neuroimaging work has largely focused only 
on transient prefrontal hemodynamics in context-monitoring and response inhibition tasks.  By 
investigating not only transient but also the sustained and effortful components to inhibitory 
control, their goal-directedness, and the extent to which they drive individual differences in 
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behavior, event-related potentials, and multivariate hemodynamics, we demonstrate the 
importance of context-monitoring as a mechanism of cognitive control. 
Nonetheless, our results may seem to stand in contrast to some conflicting findings of 
previous work.  Below, we step through these findings and describe how the context-monitoring 
account may offer a consistent way to understand these otherwise contradictory results, with 
respect to issues of statistical efficiency in estimating the hemodynamic response, potential 
dissociations between inferior and superior rVLPFC, the role of arousal, and the potential 
importance of goal replacement in the Stop task. 
 
Statistical Efficiency.   
In previous neuroimaging work that included two types of Signal trials within the Stop task – 
signal trials that require stopping and “distractor” signal trials which indicate no change to the 
planned response – the latter activated parts of the rVLPFC that are either spatially 
indistinguishable or spatially distinct from the portions of the rVLPFC recruited by the former.  
These conflicting results may indicate that the hemodynamic responses to these two types of 
signal trials were estimated with differential efficiency. 
Indeed, when statistical efficiency is precisely matched across tasks, as in one previous 
study (Hampshire et al., 2010), response inhibition in the Stop task is actually associated with a 
decreased transient hemodynamic response relative to tasks involving response commission 
(consistent with our ERP and fMRI results). This previous study also demonstrated that rVLPFC 
activity was increased to infrequent stimuli that required either response commission or response 
inhibition, relative to infrequent stimuli that required no overt behavior.  This result can be 
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viewed as consistent with context-monitoring, which posits the rVLPFC is involved in the 
detection and interpretation of behaviorally-relevant stimuli to guide the selection of action.   
Dissociations between inferior/superior lateral PFC.   
Some studies suggest that a region of superior rVLPFC may be more crucial for 
processes analogous to context-monitoring than an inferior section of rVLPFC, which is more 
crucial for stopping (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Verbruggen et al., 2010; Cai & Leung, 2011).  In our 
results, these inferior and superior rVLPFC regions were distinctly activated, but both foci were 
more strongly activated on Double GoSignal trials than StopSignal trials (Fig. 3B).  Thus, while 
inferior and superior rVLPFC could differentiate in principle, a simple monitoring vs. motoric 
stopping dichotomy is not sufficient for explaining the patterns observed here. 
Instead, the apparent dissociations between superior and inferior rVLPFC observed 
previously may represent differences in efficiency across trial types, as described above, or the 
absence of a viable model to analyze behavior in paradigms with infrequent response 
commission trials.  Specifically, the behavioral model used in one recent TMS study of the 
functional specialization of the rVLPFC (Verbruggen et al., 2010)  assumes that the first 
response is unaffected by the appearance of the signal.  However, we found that the first 
response is slowed by the appearance of a signal (Fig. 7A), and that measures extracted from 
these dynamics correlate selectively with rVLPFC (Fig. 7F).  These results challenge the 
assumptions of the behavioral model in the TMS study, and the associated claims of 
dissociations between inferior and superior rVLPFC. 
A second recent TMS study applied a “conditioning” pulse to the rVLPFC prior to a 
“test” pulse to primary motor cortex, and demonstrated a reduction in the observed motor-evoked 
potential (MEP) (Neubert et al., 2010).  The authors interpreted their results to reflect a direct 
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inhibitory role of the rVLPFC on M1.  However, similar effects have been observed with 
conditioning pulses to dorsal prefrontal cortex (Civardi et al., 2011).  It is thus likely that these 
TMS effects reflect relatively general mechanisms (e.g., short- or long-interval intracortical 
inhibition) that are not functionally specific to the rVLPFC. 
The role of arousal.  
 Previous work has reported a null effect of TMS to rVLPFC on pupil diameter using a 
relatively small sample of 17 subjects (Chambers et al., 2006), contrary to what might be 
expected if effortful monitoring processes were disrupted by rVLPFC TMS.  However, we note 
that TMS did lead to a consistent reduction in pupil diameter on correctly inhibited trials across 
all time points (Fig. 6D of Chambers et al, 2006).  Moreover, subsequent work has identified a 
generalized arousal effect of TMS (Verbruggen et al., 2010), which may have increased pupil 
diameter and thus masked decreases in pupil diameter after disruption of context-monitoring.  
Thus, to the extent any conclusions can be drawn on a null effect in a small sample, this previous 
result may suggest that the disruption of effortful context-monitoring processes (and 
consequently, decreases in pupil diameter) was only partially offset by the generalized arousal 
resulting from rVLPFC TMS. 
The relationship of response inhibition to goal-switching.   
Some theoretical accounts of Stop task performance emphasize the importance of goal-
switching, such that a “Go goal” must be replaced with a “Stop goal” on StopSignal trials 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009).  However, factor analytic studies of individual differences in 
response inhibition (including the Stop task) and those in task-switching and working memory 
updating indicate that there is significant switching- and updating-specific variance in individual 
differences that is non-overlapping with that in performance on response inhibition tasks 
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(Friedman et al., 2008).  The prevailing interpretation of these findings is that performance on 
response inhibition tasks is primarily driven by cognitive control processes supported by active 
maintenance mechanisms, and are thus common across all executive function tasks, rather than 
being specific to goal- or task-switching, or to working memory updating processes (Friedman et 
al., 2008).   Our ongoing neurocomputational modeling work indicates that such active 
maintenance mechanisms, used in the service of context-monitoring, may indeed be sufficient for 
explaining detailed patterns of performance on the Stop task.  This conclusion is further 
consistent with the fact that task-switching and Stop task performance do not influence one 
another (i.e., their effects are additive) (Verbruggen, Liefhooge, Szmalec, & Vandierendonck, 
2005), a result which argues against the idea that a controlled goal-switching process is operative 
during the Stop task. 
Broader Implications  
Our results contradict a long-standing and currently-dominant account of cognitive 
control in response inhibition tasks and demonstrate that a role for the rVLPFC in transient 
stimulus processing is not mutually-exclusive with the sustained prefrontal dynamics emphasized 
by neuropsychological and neurocomputational theories (Stuss & Alexaner, 2007; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly, 2010).  
The context-monitoring account of rVLPFC function also supports emerging taxonomies 
of prefrontal organization.  According to one recent taxonomy (O’Reilly, 2010), ventral areas of 
the prefrontal cortex are particularly important for contextual processing of stimulus significance 
(broadly speaking, “what” processing) whereas more dorsal areas may be particularly important 
for the processing contextually-appropriate responses to those stimuli (“how” processing”).  The 
putative localization of context-monitoring to rVLPFC is fully compatible with this framework.  
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To the extent that response-related “stopping” processes have a dedicated prefrontal substrate, 
this taxonomy predicts that such processes should localize to areas dorsal to the rVLPFC, some 
of which project to the STN with similar or greater density (Nambu et al., 2002).   However, our 
results do not suggest that dorsal areas are differentially associated with stopping, consistent with 
the wider literature, and further supporting our conclusion that motoric stopping does not have a 
dedicated lateral prefrontal substrate within the Stop task. 
The context-monitoring role of rVLPFC may also be understood as arising from the 
proximity of rVLPFC to the anterior insula, which appears to monitor interoceptive information 
(Craig, 2009), in some cases proactively (Lovero, Simmons, Aron & Paulus, 2009).  The anterior 
insula also shows greater hemodynamic responses to demands on action selection than to 
demands on motoric stopping, and is thought to be tightly integrated with the rVLPFC (Lim, 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2009).  Thus, a basic mechanism in anterior insula for monitoring the internal 
significance of upcoming stimuli may have been evolutionarily adapted for use in monitoring 
their relevance for action selection in the nearby rVLPFC.  These representations may even be 
tightly integrated, such that context monitoring can be effectively recruited when it counts most 
– under conditions of threat or pain.  Indeed, target detection is improved when the targets are 
predictive of pain, an effect that is associated with greater activity in both rVLPFC and anterior 
insula (Lim, Padmala & Pessoe, 2009).   
The context-monitoring account is also compatible with recent revisions to a classical 
taxonomy of the effects of prefrontal insult, in which the inhibitory deficits arising from right 
lateral prefrontal damage are now explained as monitoring deficits instead (Stuss & Alexander, 
2007).   The match between our findings and those motivating this taxonomic revision may 
indicate the need to rethink a broad range of putative inhibitory deficits.  For example, focal 
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rVLPFC damage can lead to poor target detection, such that even when the location of an 
upcoming target is cued before trial onset, this location is not effectively monitored following the 
onset of any stimulus (Michael, et al., 2006) .  While this deficit might reflect problems with 
inhibiting locations in space, our results suggest this patient’s focal rVLPFC damage may have 
yielded a deficit in monitoring contextually-appropriate locations in the service of target 
detection and action selection. 
In addition to the significance of our result for understanding neural insult, our result may 
also impact the treatment of pathological impulse control deficits (e.g. as in substance abuse or 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD]).  Specifically, our result suggests that 
pathological impulse control deficits might not reflect a failure to stop in particular, but rather the 
more effortful and prefrontal processes involved in context-monitoring.  For example, ADHD 
may be associated with a monitoring deficit in which many stimuli, regardless of their 
behavioral-relevance, are thought to warrant attention.  This prediction is supported by the 
finding that ADHD is more strongly associated with increased reaction time variability, as might 
result from a context-monitoring deficit, than with deficits in tasks that require stopping 
(Castellanos et al., 2006).  Relatedly, the resistance of response inhibition to improvement via 
training (Thorell et al., 2009) may reflect that monitoring context for contingent action selection, 
not the act of stopping, is the controlled process to be targeted for effective intervention. 
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CHAPTER 3: A NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF MONITORING AND STOPPING 
IN RESPONSE INHIBITION 
 
 
Abstract 
Although the importance of motoric stopping has long been emphasized in the domain of 
response inhibition, recent evidence suggests that this task is subserved by highly domain-
general attentional mechanisms.  In particular, it has been argued that the role of the prefrontal 
cortex in the canonical test of response inhibition – the Stop task – is to monitor the 
environmental context for behaviorally-relevant stimuli, and further that the prefrontal cortex 
subserves no stopping-specific function in this task.  Here we assess this hypothesis with a 
computational model of the Stop task using the Prefrontal Basal Ganglia Working Memory 
architecture, which is here extended to include a simulated subthalamic nucleus.  Our model 
matches data from behavioral, hemodynamic, and pharmacological studies of response 
inhibition, and further confirms recent claims that monitoring (rather than stopping) better 
characterize the computational role of prefrontal cortex in this classic test of response inhibition. 
 
Introduction 
The construct of inhibition has been fractionated into multiple heterogeneous abilities 
(Nigg, 2000; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Aron; 2007), but modern work has focused particularly 
intensively on the processes supporting the inhibition of responses.  The processes are thought to 
most conspicuously include the controlled stopping of unwanted motor actions (Logan & 
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Cowan, 1984).  Deficits in this ability in particular have been argued to underlie a variety of 
psychopathological disorders (e.g., Barkley et al., 1994; Shanahan, Pennington & Willcutt, 2008) 
and to be a central characteristic of frontal lobe injury and immaturity (e.g., Diamond et al., 
1990). 
One task has emerged as a canonical test of response inhibition because it permits a 
precise estimate of the latency for response inhibition to take place (Logan & Cowan, 1984).  In 
the Stop task, subjects are presented with an imperative stimulus that requires a response 
(typically a 2-alternative forced choice; 2AFC).  On a subset of trials (so-called “Signal” trials), 
this 2AFC is followed with a variable delay by a stop signal indicating that no motor response 
should be executed on that trial.  By titrating the delay between this 2AFC stimulus and the stop 
signal, one can estimate the latency of the latent “stopping process” (an estimate known as the 
Stop Signal Reaction Time, or SSRT) under the assumption that this stopping process initiated 
on Signal trials is engaged in a race with a “going” process that is similarly initiated on Signal 
and No Signal trials alike.  The assumptions underlying this calculation have been formalized as 
a race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984), which can in turn be captured as a diffusion model 
(Shenoy & Yu, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) and as a two-unit neural network (Boucher et 
al., 2007).   
Central to the theories underlying these successful models, and the models themselves, is 
a mechanism that is explicitly dedicated for motoric stopping.  Indeed, it is often presumed that 
the involvement of this motoric stopping mechanism is the defining feature of response 
inhibition paradigms.  Both forward and reverse inferences have been common in this domain: If 
a task demands motoric stopping, then neural regions recruited by that task are often interpreted 
to reflect motoric stopping processes; when other tasks activate that region, they are sometimes 
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presumed to involve a motoric stopping process as well.  Importantly, the models underlying 
these inferences have been “built to order” for the underlying theories – they are not extensions 
to more domain-general systems that can also perform tasks which do not explicitly require 
motoric stopping. 
Accumulating empirical work, however, suggests that such dedicated motoric stopping 
mechanisms may not be of such central importance to response inhibition tasks.  Studies of 
individual differences suggest that the higher cognitive abilities that drive performance on the 
Stop task, and other tasks involving motoric stopping, are overlapping with those driving 
performance on tasks with little apparent demands on motoric stopping (Friedman et al., 2008; 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Likewise, experimental work also indicates that common 
mechanisms drive performance on response inhibition tasks and those that do not involve 
motoric stopping (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan & Strayer 1994; Ridderinkhof, Band & 
Logan, 1999; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Notebaert & Vandierendonck, 2005;Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2004, 2006; van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) indicates that these domain-general 
mechanisms may in fact have direct correlates at the implementational level (Marr, 1982).  The 
right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rVLPFC) is the cortical area most consistently associated 
with inhibition across numerous domains (Cohen, Berkman & Lieberman, 2010), and is 
particularly reliably associated with tasks that demand motoric stopping (Aron et al., 2007) but is 
now also recognized as performing a more general function than motoric stopping (Munakata et 
al., in press).  For example, the rVLPFC is often more strongly activated by tasks that require the 
infrequent commission of a response than by those that require the inhibition of a response 
(Chatham et al., 2011a, Dobbs et al., 2010; Hampshire et al., 2010).  Similarly, when transcranial 
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magnetic stimulation (TMS) is applied to this region, the induced deficits in inhibitory 
performance are paralleled by equivalent deficits in target detection, even in the absence of 
distracting sensory information (Verbruggen et al., 2010).  These results suggest that the 
rVLPFC is not specific to tasks that demand motoric stopping, but may instead subserve more 
abstract goals, such as those that involve monitoring for behaviorally-relevant information in the 
current context (so-called “context monitoring”).  This ability may be particularly important for 
Stop task performance (Chatham et al., 2011a) as well as for performance in domains to which 
performance on the Stop task relates. 
Recently, multivariate pattern analysis has demonstrated evidence uniquely consistent 
with the use of this kind of domain-general context monitoring process.  In particular, a 
multivariate classifier was trained to identify individual subjects on a task that involves similar 
context monitoring processes as the Stop task, but does not require motoric stopping.  This 
classifier was then able to generalize this learning to identify individual subjects performing the 
Stop task on the basis of hemodynamic responses in the rVLPFC, and did so better on the basis 
of rVLPFC responses than on the basis of responses in primary motor cortex. This pattern was 
more pronounced on Signal trials in particular, relative to the more frequent No Signal trials, 
indicating that such “hemodynamic fingerprints” are highly consistent across tasks regardless of 
the demands of Signal trials on motoric stopping mechanisms. This evidence could imply that 
context-monitoring processes are a special case of more abstract goal maintenance mechanisms 
within the prefrontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 2001), such that the rVLPFC-represented goal in 
these tasks is effectively “look for behaviorally-relevant stimuli.” 
Here we provide a computational test of this hypothesis, as well as the idea that the role 
of the prefrontal cortex in this task – putatively for “context-monitoring” (Chatham et al., 2011) 
71 
 
– can be understood as a particular instantiation of goal maintenance.  We do so in the context of 
simulated subcortical mechanisms, including the subthalamic nucleus, which have been widely 
associated with response inhibition.  This framework also allows us to assess whether some 
functionally specific motoric stopping process would emerge in the prefrontal layers of our 
model – offering a further test of the idea that such stopping-specific mechanisms are not 
localized to the prefrontal cortex (Chatham et al., 2011).  If correct, our hypothesis would 
significantly circumscribe the currently central role of specialized motoric stopping mechanisms 
in extant theorizing on response inhibition, and in associated “built to order” computational 
models.   
To test these predictions, we implemented a neural network model of the Stop task using 
an adaptation of the Prefrontal/Basal Ganglia Working Memory (PBWM) architecture (O’Reilly 
& Frank 2006; Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly 2007).  The core components of this architecture are 
illustrated in Figure 8.  PBWM utilizes a combination of Hebbian and error-driven learning rules 
to adapt the connection weights throughout a series of layers that simulate both posterior cortical 
sensorimotor processing, as well as prefrontal mechanisms for active maintenance.  These 
prefrontal layers are unique relative to others in the model insofar as they are capable of stably 
maintaining such information over time (by virtue of self-excitatory connections and intrinsic 
maintenance currents).  They are also unique insofar as they are also capable of flexibly updating 
this information based on activity elsewhere in the model, if a “gating” signal is triggered by 
subcortical striatal mechanisms.  These subcortical mechanisms, implemented as distinct layers 
in the model, are trained to initiate such gating signals via a biologically-plausible reinforcement 
learning rule based on subcortical dopamine function (the Primary Value/Learned Value 
algorithm; PVLV).  PBWM models have simulated a wide range of tasks, including those 
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involving task-switching (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006) and working memory updating (O’Reilly & 
Frank, 2006; Chatham et al., 2011), suggesting that they should be sufficient for capturing 
phenomena in response inhibition tasks. 
  
Figure 8. Schematic illustration of extension to the PBWM architecture, in which prefrontal 
context representations of relevant prior information and current goals bias the sensory-motor 
mappings that are learned by posterior cortical “hidden” layers.  The prefrontal context 
representations are updated via dynamic gating by the basal ganglia.  These gating functions are 
learned by the basal ganglia on the basis of input from the PVLV system, which provides 
modulatory dopaminergic input depending on the reward value of the actions performed by the 
basal ganglia. 
 
One way in which we extended the PBWM model was to include a layer corresponding 
to the subthalamic nucleus (STN).  The STN is part of an inhibitory subcortical circuit, such that 
its activation has a rapid and net inhibitory effect on thalamic output (e.g., Nambu et al., 2002).  
Computational modeling and empirical work both suggest that the role of the STN may be to 
dynamically adjust decision and response thresholds (e.g., Frank et al., 2007). Here, we opted for 
an abstract implementation of this computational function, such that activation in an STN layer 
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directly determined the response threshold of the network.  By this scheme, even maximal output 
unit activation was considered insufficient for generating a response when the STN was highly 
activated; conversely, when the STN was minimally active, a relatively small amount of 
activation in the output layer was considered sufficient for generating a response.  This simulated 
STN receives projections from the prefrontal layers of the network, consistent with the 
widespread projections to STN from numerous prefrontal areas (including ventrolateral, 
dorsalateral, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; Nambu et al., 1997; Nambu et al., 2002). 
A second extension to the PBWM model involved a neuromodulatory input to prefrontal 
cortex intended to simulate the effect of prefrontal norepinephrine (NE) neuromodulation.  NE 
mechanisms are important for Stop task performance (Aston-Jones & Gold, 2009; Chamberlain 
et al., 2009; Overtoom, 2003), and may selectively activate the rVLPFC during inhibitory control 
(e.g., Chamberlain, et al 2009).  The possible computational role of NE mechanisms is less well 
understood than that of the STN, but it has been suggested that phasic NE release may 
accompany the presentation of Stop signals due to their low frequency or unexpectedness (Dayan 
& Yu, 2006; Frank, Santamaria, O’Reilly & Wilcutt, 2007).  Here we simply assumed that such 
phasic NE release occurs during the presentation of Stop Signals and provides an additional 
excitatory signal to prefrontal areas.  We then tested whether the model would reproduce the 
observed reduction in SSRT that accompanies potentiation of NE mechanisms (Chamberlain et 
al., 2009). 
To foreshadow our results, the model demonstrates that the relatively domain-general 
mechanisms implemented by PBWM are indeed capable of simulating a wide variety of data 
from the Stop task, and do so in a way that matches a number of detailed findings.  After 
demonstrating the ability of the model to capture these hallmark phenomena from the Stop 
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Signal task (including a number of behavioral effects, as well as canonical results from 
neuroimaging and psychopharmacological manipulations of noradrenergic mechanisms), we 
present a descriptive analysis of the model’s behavior to illuminate how such benchmark 
phenomena naturally arise from these domain-general mechanisms.  
 
Methods  
Implementation.  
Our model is implemented using the Local, Error-driven and Associative Biologically 
Realistic Algorithm (Leabra) framework (O’Reilly, 2001). In Leabra, neural processing occurs 
across a series of interconnected units each of which has a membrane potential with separate 
excitatory, inhibitory and leak conductances. A rate-coded output is derived from fluctuations in 
this membrane potential and this output contributes to the excitatory conductance of all units to 
which a given unit is connected, in proportion to the connection weight between them. Although 
initially randomized, these connection weights are adjusted over training according to Hebbian, 
reward-driven, and biologically realistic error-driven learning rules (see Appendix I).  Units are 
further grouped into layers that undergo a k-winners-take-all function for simulating the 
influence of local inhibitory interneurons. Leabra has been used in over 40 models of a variety of 
cognitive phenomena (e.g., O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000) and thus constitutes a biologically-
constrained formalism that yields human-like performance across many domains. 
Each named layer of the implemented model contains features which uniquely associate 
its layers with the identified brain regions. For example, prefrontal layers are unique due to 
recurrent connections and an excitatory hysteresis current, as well as the stripe-wise organization 
that is paralleled by stripe-wise organization in striatal layers.   Striatal layers are unique due to 
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their dopamine-driven reinforcement learning via PVLV (see Appendix). The posterior layer is 
distinct because it contains none of the unique features above, but only the more general 
mechanisms implemented by Leabra and thought to apply to neocortex in general. Finally, the 
connectivity among these layers is based on known neurobiology (Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly, 
2006, 2007, 2010; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006). 
The subthalamic nucleus was implemented as a single-unit layer whose activation 
determined the precise level of activation in the output layer that was sufficient for generating a 
response.  To enable a match to the phasic bursting dynamics of the subthalamic nucleus, we 
utilized the accommodation currents of Leabra.  This separately simulated ion channel within 
Leabra is intended to capture the influence of calcium-activated potassium channel dynamics, 
which are known to be important in driving the phasic nature of STN bursting (e.g., Gillies & 
Willshaw, 2005).  In the model, increases in the basis variable driving this channel (i.e., calcium) 
accumulated at a rate of .005, and decreased at a rate of .001; once the basis variable passed a 
value of .05, the accommodation current was turned on, with a possible total conductance of 1, 
and not turned off until the basis variable passed a value of .001.  These parameter settings have 
the effect of allowing for a rapid short burst of firing within the STN, which then strongly and 
persistently accommodates. 
The inputs and outputs presented to the network are depicted in Figure 9.  The network 
includes an input layer with units corresponding to the 2AFC stimuli as well as to the stop signal 
(and to other inputs, corresponding to tasks not presented in the current report).  The network 
also includes a distinct NE input layer, consisting of a single unit, which is activated when the 
Stop Signal is present in the environment.  This layer projects specifically to the prefrontal layers 
of the model.  This single-unit input layer effectively duplicates the sensory representation of the 
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Signal that exists in the input layer but, as mentioned above, acts as an additional 
neuromodulatory signal to the prefrontal cortex that may correspond to the pronounced NE 
modulation of rVLPFC during response inhibition (Chamberlain et al., 2009).  Finally, the output 
layer of the network consists of units corresponding to the 2AFC responses (as well as to 
alternative outputs corresponding to tasks not presented in the current report). 
 Training & Testing.  
All models were run in batches of 25 networks, and each network was initialized with 
random patterns of connection weights. Training proceeded in epochs of 500 events, 30% of 
which were Signal trials, and the remainder of which required only a 2AFC, until networks had 
performed at between 30 and 80% accuracy on the Signal trials for four consecutive epochs or 9 
epochs total, whichever occurred first.  The last epoch was used for analysis, and any 
experimental manipulations of the network were made only on that final epoch (e.g., NE layer 
projection strength, Signal trial frequency, or lesions to the prefrontal layer). 
On Signal trials, networks were considered to have responded correctly if no unit of the 
output layer was activated above the response threshold, which was determined in an online 
fashion as [.25 + STNactivation].  Similarly, on No Signal trials, networks were considered to have 
responded correctly if only a single output unit corresponding to the 2AFC stimulus was 
activated above the current threshold value, calculated in the same way as on Signal trials.  The 
stop signal delay was adjusted using an adaptive staircase algorithm such that if the network 
failed to respond correctly, the stop signal delay was shortened by a single processing cycle; if 
the network responded correctly, the stop signal delay was lengthened by a single processing 
cycle.   
Individual differences were simulated as arising from a combination of sources: not only 
77 
 
those effects of initial weight randomization, idiosyncracies in the precise training events 
presented to each network, and any influences of noise that persisted throughout training, but 
also as the effects of differences between networks in the activation gain of units in the prefrontal 
layers.  For consistency these gain values were kept at their default levels for the PBWM models 
applied to working memory updating and task-switching paradigms.  In these models, which will 
be the subject of a future report, differences in gain appear to underlie individual differences in 
human subjects performing executive function tasks (e.g., Chatham et al., 2011b).  Here such 
individual differences were of interest primarily to verify that SSRT was uncorrelated with No 
Signal reaction times given a plausible set of underlying individual differences.  This prediction 
must be met for SSRT to be reliably extracted (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Band et al., 2003). 
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Figure 9. Inputs to the network and corresponding outputs (A) for an example trial sequence (B).  
A. Inputs to the model include a sensory input layer with units corresponding to the 2AFC 
stimuli (left and right arrows, above), the Stop Signal (circle, above), and other units not utilized 
in the current task, as well as a single-unit layer corresponding to norepinephrine-based 
neuromodulation (which is activated with the signal).  The network must learn to produce the 
appropriate outputs given a particular set of inputs, where successful inhibition corresponds to no 
above-threshold activation in the output layer.  B. Trials proceeded serially, such that the model 
was presented with 70% No Signal trials that consisted merely of one of the 2AFC units being 
activated.  The remaining 30% of trials consisted of Signal trials, in which the stop signal was 
activated (and the 2AFC stimulus extinguished) after a variable delay (red/shaded above).  This 
variable delay was determined according to the model’s ongoing performance in the task 
utilizing an adaptive staircase algorithm (see Methods).  
 
Results 
 Our results indicate that the relatively domain-general mechanisms of PBWM cooperate 
through learning to give rise to a number of hallmark phenomena from the Stop task.  
Furthermore, they do so in a way that sheds light on both neuroimaging results and 
pharmacological manipulations, as well as reliance of the Stop task on a computational “division 
of labor” across multiple neural substrates. 
First we examined the ability of the model to reproduce the most widely-reported 
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behavioral findings from the Stop task.  Foremost among these is the fact that response inhibition 
can be made more successful by providing the stop signal more quickly after the onset of the 
2AFC stimulus; conversely, it can be made less successful by providing the stop signal relatively 
later after the 2AFC stimulus onset.  This pattern is empirically confirmed by utilizing an 
adaptive algorithm based on subject performance, whereby the stop signal is presented earlier or 
later depending on the subject’s performance from the last signal trial, and testing whether this 
procedure leads to approximately 50% accuracy across subjects.  This widely-observed pattern 
was reproduced by our model, such that iterative adjustment of the delay between the 2AFC 
stimulus and the Stop signal yielded approximately 50% accuracy on Signal trials (Signal trial 
mean accuracy = .50, one-sample t-test against 50%: t(99)=.221, p>.82), while performance on 
No Signal trials was at ceiling (Figure 10A; No Signal trial mean accuracy = .96, t-test against 
Signal trial accuracy: t(99)=107.35, p<.001).  This effect occurs in our model because there is a 
certain minimum number of processing cycles which must elapse until the presentation of the 
stop signal can influence the processing taking place in the posterior cortical layer, where the 
simple sensory-motor mappings involved on No Signal trials are executed.  Earlier presentation 
of the stop signal simply leads to an earlier initiation of such processes. 
In the model and in humans alike, this phenomenon can be understood as a race between 
those processes that support stopping and those that support going.  A test of this canonical 
interpretation of the Stop task is that trials in which inhibition failed should be precisely those for 
which a reaction was emitted too quickly for said inhibition to occur.  In other words, reaction 
times (RTs) on Signal trials in which a response was erroneously committed should be quicker 
than the mean RT on No Signal trials.  We were also able to verify this phenomenon in our 
model (Figure 10B; t(99)=11.23, p<.001), confirming again that a race-like process unfolded in 
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the model. 
For the primary dependent measure of the Stop task – the Stop Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT) – to be reliably extracted, there must be “stochastic independence” (Logan & Cowan, 
1984) such that the duration of stopping process are not correlated with the duration of going 
processes.  In our model, SSRT and No Signal RTs showed the absence of a correlation that is 
widely reported in human subjects, and taken as a confirmation of this assumption (R=-.02, p>.5; 
Figure 10C).   This stochastic independence may seem to be a surprising feature of a massively 
interactive architecture like our model; however, some aspects of the model’s mechanisms are 
more important on Signal trials (e.g., the prefrontal layers) than on No Signal trials (for which 
the simple sensori-motor mappings in posterior cortex are more crucial).  This division of labor 
can give rise to stochastic independence, as reflected in the near-zero correlation between SSRT 
and GoRT, even though the underlying processes are in fact interactive. 
 
Figure 10. Benchmark phenomena from the Stop task.  Based on the principles of the race model 
of the Stop task, the use of an adaptive algorithm should yield approximately 50% accuracy on 
Signal trials without affecting performance on the No Signal trial type; this result that was 
captured by our model (A).  The race model also predicts that reaction times on incorrect signal 
trials – those where the subject failed to stop – should be faster than the average reaction time on 
No Signal trials; our model also captured this result (B).  Finally, the race model predicts that 
reaction times on No Signal trials and the dependent measure of stopping latency, SSRT, should 
be uncorrelated; our model also reproduced this result (C; R=-.02, p>.5). 
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 Our model also captured a number of more detailed phenomena reported from the Stop 
task.  For example, subjects are slowed on No Signal trials that follow Signal trials, a finding that 
was also captured by our model (Figure 11A; t(99)=11.68, p<.001).  In human subjects, this 
slowing is exacerbated following unsuccessfully stopped trials; this additional nuance was also 
present in our model (Figure 11B; t(99)=2.92, p<.01).  Stop signals prolong subsequent reaction 
times in part because Stop Signals strongly activate the prefrontal layers of the model, which in 
turn activate the subthalamic nucleus (and thus increase response thresholds).  Such activations 
will generally continue into the following trial.  Because subthalamic activation tends to occur 
relatively later in unsuccessfully stopped trials (as discussed below), it will also more strongly 
persist into subsequent trials – thereby lead to an exacerbated slowing effect following those 
trials.   
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Figure 11. Reaction time slowing due to the presence of Signal trials (A), and in particular 
unsuccessfully-inhibited Signal trials (B), were also captured by the model.  The model was 
slowed to produce a response on No Signal trials that followed Signal trials (A), as observed in 
humans.  This pattern was also exacerbated on No Signal trials that followed failed Stop trials, 
relative to those that followed successful Stop trials (B), as illustrated by the fact that most points 
(each corresponding to a model) lie above the line of identity. 
 
 Another widely-reported finding from the Stop task is that SSRT is unaffected by the 
frequency of Stop Signals (e.g., Logan & Cowan, 1984).  Our model once again reproduced that 
result (Figure 12; F(1,14)=.33, p>.57), while also giving rise to the additional common finding 
that No Signal trial RTs are lengthened when Stop signals were presented more frequently 
(F(2,14)=74.14, p<.001).  In contrast to the null effect of Stop Signal frequency on SSRT, the 
strong effect of stop signal frequency on No Signal reaction times in the model reflects the 
increasing contribution of post-signal (and post-error) slowing to this observed mean when stop 
signals are more frequent. 
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Figure 12.  Increasing the frequency of stop signals led to an increase in No Signal trial RTs, but 
left SSRT largely unaffected, consistent with empirical observation.  In the model, No Signal 
reaction times are lengthened when stop signals occur with greater probability, in part because of 
the increasing contribution of post-error and post-signal slowing to these observed means (e.g., 
Figure 11). 
 
 Our model also reproduced a number of widely-reported neuroscientific findings from 
the Stop task.  For example, neuroimaging experiments have repeatedly demonstrated that the 
rVLPFC is more strongly recruited on Signal than No Signal trials.  Our model reproduced that 
result, insofar as activation within the units allowed to surpass threshold was higher on Signal 
than No Signal trials on average (Figure 13A; t(99)=13.86, p<.001).  The model gives rise to this 
pattern because error-driven learning mechanisms support a representation of the “Signal” 
stimulus within the prefrontal layers on Signal trials, and this representation is then maintained 
across trials due to the excitatory currents within prefrontal layers.  These representations are 
further strengthened in the presence of congruent bottom-up input (i.e., when the Signal is 
actually present in the environment). 
Activation in these prefrontal layers was negatively correlated with SSRT (Figure 13B; 
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R=-.34, p=.001), as has been observed with fMRI for the rVLPFC.  In the model, this correlation 
arises because prefrontal units support efficient processing of the Signal, by virtue of maintaining 
that stimulus’s identity, and thereby provide a top-down biasing signal to the rest of the model 
for streamlining processing of the signal.   The importance of this prefrontal active maintenance 
mechanism is further demonstrated by the increased SSRT observed when the prefrontal layers 
of the model were lesioned after learning (Figure 13C; t(99)=12.60, p<.001), which accords with 
the finding that rVLPFC damage (Aron et al., 2003) or transient disruption (Chambers et al., 
2006) increases SSRT. 
 
 
Figure 13.  The importance of prefrontal layers in the model.  A. Consistent with extant 
neuroimaging of the Stop task, activation in the prefrontal layers was significantly increased on 
Signal trials, relative to No Signal trials.  (B)  This activation was predictive of performance, 
such that greater prefrontal responses on Signal trials led to more effective stopping.  (C). These 
activation patterns are not merely correlated with SSRT; they are an important causal factor: 
when prefrontal layers were lesioned, SSRT was significantly increased.  This effect matches 
evidence from both TMS and acquired neurological insult to rVLPFC (Aron et al ., 2003; 
Chambers et al., 2006). 
 
The importance of the prefrontal cortex for Stop task performance arises in part due to its 
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modulation by NE.  Support for this hypothesis comes from the finding that NE reuptake 
inhibitors shorten SSRT (Chamberlain et al., 2009).  Indeed, after increasing the relative weight 
of the projections from the NE layer to the prefrontal layers as a proxy for such NE reuptake 
inhibition, SSRT was also reduced in our model (Figure 14; t(99)=2.69, p<.001).  The additional 
excitatory input conveyed by this layer supports enhanced prefrontal processing of the Stop 
Signal when it appears, and thereby supports reductions in SSRT when potentiated. 
 
Figure 14. Potentiation of the simulated NE layer in our model leads to a reduction in SSRT, 
similar to that observed in humans undergoing NE reuptake inhibition. 
 
 A number of phenomena related to primary motor cortex have also been reported in the 
Stop task literature.  For example, the excitability of motor cortex – as determined through 
single-pulse TMS – differs as a function of both trial type and performance: reductions in motor 
cortex excitability on Signal trials, relative to corresponding No Signal trials, are present only 
when TMS is provided relatively late (van den Wildenberg et al., 2009).  In addition, these 
reductions are more pronounced on successfully inhibited trials than unsuccessfully inhibited 
trials.   
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We observed conceptually similar phenomena in the activation patterns occurring in the 
model’s output layer.  Specifically, the accumulation of excitatory activation in this output layer 
on Signal trials proceeded in a manner that was similar to that occurring on No Signal trials, until 
a relatively late stage.  At that point, reductions in excitatory activation became more pronounced 
on correct Signal trials, relative to incorrect Signal trials (Figure 15A).  In addition, a broad 
difference between correct and incorrect Signal trials was observed in terms of the timing of 
excitatory activation, reflecting the fact that incorrect Signal trials are precisely those where 
motor outputs race to threshold more quickly. 
 The subthalamic nucleus plays a determining role in whether these activation dynamics 
lead to a registered response: Activation in the subthalamic layer of our model determines what 
level of activation in the output layer is sufficient for actually executing a response.   In the 
model, subthalamic layer activation proceeds very similarly on No Signal trials and on incorrect 
Signal trials, but is considerably heightened on correct Signal trials (Figure 15B).  A 
compensatory increase in subthalamic activation is observed on incorrect Signal trials, but occurs 
too late to successfully raise the threshold on response execution. 
87 
 
 
Figure 15.  Activation dynamics of the output layers (A) and of the subthalamic nucleus layer 
(B) during various trials of the Stop task.  A.  The activation of the output layer proceeds more 
quickly on incorrect Signal trials than on No Signal trials, consistent with the idea that 
unsuccessfully inhibited trials are those where responses were emitted relatively quickly.  
Correct signal trials, by contrast, tend to show a slightly later accumulation of activation in the 
output layer; this delay provides an additional opportunity for these responses to be cancelled.  
B.  The subthalamic nucleus layer is activated on all trials, but particularly on successfully 
inhibited trials.  In contrast, unsuccessfully inhibited trials show a more delayed response in the 
subthalamic layer. 
 Having verified that our model gives rise to a number of hallmark phenomena from the 
Stop task, including those from investigations of behavior, hemodynamics, neuropsychological 
insult, pharmacological manipulations, and corticomotor excitability, we next assessed the 
precise computational role of the prefrontal cortex in the Stop task.  It has often been assumed 
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that the role of the prefrontal cortex in this task is to engage motoric stopping processes, but we 
found no evidence for this in the model.  Specifically, those units in the prefrontal layer that were 
most active before the signal onset, and before the average signal onset time on No Signal trials, 
were also those that showed a large increase following signal onset on Signal trials (Figure 16A; 
t(56)=6.70, p<.001).  Because motoric stopping is only required in the latter case, this 
phenomenon would seem to suggest that the role of the prefrontal cortex is more general than 
simply initiating a motoric stopping process.  Had that been the case, a distinct set of prefrontal 
units should have been recruited when motoric stopping was required (i.e., on Signal trials). 
 It could nonetheless be argued that these units are those which engage motoric stopping, 
and that this function is also recruited (albeit to a lesser extent) on the No Signal trials.  The use 
of a motoric stopping process on No Signal trials could then be understood as a proactively-
controlled form of response inhibition, akin to “responding with restraint”.  However, and 
contrary to this account, the units showing this activation dynamic were no more strongly 
connected with the subthalamic nucleus than the units that failed to show this activation dynamic 
(Figure 16B; t(56)=.55, p>.58).  In other words, these units clearly did not develop any 
functional specialization for motoric stopping, although they did clearly develop a functional 
specialization for detecting the Stop signal.   
This effect substantiates accumulating evidence that the computational role of the 
prefrontal cortex in the Stop task is more general than simply engaging motoric stopping.  
Instead, it appears to subserve the more general process underlying detection of behaviorally-
relevant stimuli within the environmental context (Chatham et al., 2011a).  The emergence of 
such a function within the model clearly establishes that context monitoring can be understood as 
a particular instantiation of the domain-general active maintenance mechanisms implemented in 
89 
 
our model.  It is not a privileged “stopping-specific” subset of prefrontal units which drive 
activation of the subthalamic layer; instead, such subthalamic activation is simply driven by 
more global changes in prefrontal activation overall. 
 
Figure 16. Evidence for a domain-general, and not stopping-specific, function of prefrontal 
cortex.  (A) Units which showed the strongest activity on No Signal trials prior to the average 
onset time of Signals were precisely those which also showed a further increase in activation 
when Signals were actually subsequently presented.  The recruitment of these units could in 
principle reflect a proactive engagement of motoric stopping mechanisms on No Signal trials, but 
in actuality these units were no more strongly interconnected with the subthalamic layer than the 
remainder of the units (B).  Together, this evidence indicates that subthalamic activation occurs 
as a relatively general side-effect of prefrontal activation, and that while the Stop task crucially 
relies on a subset of prefrontal units that are specialized for detecting the Stop signal, they are not 
specialized for engaging motoric stopping. 
 
Discussion 
 Our results demonstrate that the relatively domain-general mechanisms supported by the 
PBWM architecture give rise to a number of detailed phenomena from the canonical test of 
response inhibition, the Stop task.  Specifically, our model’s behavior matches the predictions of 
a more abstract race model that accurately characterizes the Stop task, including the convergence 
of the model’s performance to approximately 50% accuracy following the use of an adaptive 
algorithm for determining Signal onset times, the relatively fast mean RT on failed Signal trials, 
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and the stochastic independence of stopping and going processes.  The model also exhibits both 
the post-error slowing and the post-signal slowing commonly observed in humans.  The effects 
of signal frequency manipulations match those observed empirically, including the sensitivity of 
No Signal RT to such manipulations and the specificity of this effect to No Signal RTs in 
particular (i.e., SSRT was unaffected).  
 Our model also gives rise to a wide array of phenomena that have been reported in the 
neuroscientific literature.  Specifically, the model demonstrated an increased recruitment of 
prefrontal layers on Signal trials, similar to the increased hemodynamic recruitment to Signal 
trials observed empirically.  This activation negatively correlated with SSRT, as it does in 
humans.  Lesions to the prefrontal layer of the model led to increases in SSRT that were similar 
to those yielded by rVLPFC lesions in humans.  Conversely, SSRT was decreased by 
potentiation of the simulated NE inputs to these prefrontal layers, consistent with the effects of 
NE reuptake inhibition in humans.  Patterns of excitability in the output layer of our model were 
also broadly consistent with patterns of corticomotor excitability in the Stop task probed with 
single pulse TMS. 
 In addition to capturing these effects, the model also provides novel support for an 
emerging perspective on the apparently domain-general components of response inhibition.  In 
particular, we found that the prefrontal units of the model which responded most strongly to 
demands on motoric stopping were also those which were engaged most strongly on No Signal 
trials, as though supporting a process involved in monitoring the environment for the 
behaviorally-relevant “signal” stimuli regardless of whether motoric stopping was required.  
These units demonstrated no unique specialization for motoric stopping demands: they 
manifested no differential interconnectivity with the subthalamic layer of our model.  
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Conceptually similar conclusions have been reached previously, such that the role of the 
rVLPFC in response inhibition is now interpreted to be substantially more general than what 
would be expected if rVLPFC were dedicated for motoric stopping (Chatham et al., 2011; Dodds 
et al., 2011; Hampshire et al., 2010; Sharp et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2011).   
The current model goes beyond such work to clarify why the cognitive abilities involved 
in response inhibition tasks may not be clearly differentiable from those involved in a much 
wider array of tasks, including those tasks which have little apparent demands on motoric 
stopping processes.  Such tasks all rely on specific instantiations of the active maintenance 
processes that lie at the core of prefrontal function (Miller & Cohen, 2001) and at the core of the 
PBWM architecture.  Additional quantitative tests of this model and its ability to give rise to 
individual differences across a battery of executive function tasks (Miyake et al., 2000) are 
currently underway. 
 The model also supports a deeper understanding of how such active maintenance 
mechanisms may be utilized in the Stop task, particularly with respect to rVLPFC function.  
Recruitment of the rVLPFC is strongly associated with tasks that involve the detection of stimuli 
that are relevant for behavior in general, regardless of whether they specifically demand motoric 
stopping.  This finding is consistent with the fact that prefrontal interconnectivity with 
subcortical basal ganglia and subthalamic circuits is a relatively general feature of prefrontal 
cortex, and not particularly associated with rVLPFC anatomically (Nambu et al., 2002).  This 
widespread pattern of connectivity could reflect the phylogenetic origins of prefrontal cortex for 
motoric behaviors in general, for which subthalamic and other subcortical circuits are widely 
regarded as crucial.   
92 
 
The function of the subthalamic nucleus in this circuit is sometimes thought to be 
cooperative, rather than competitive, with motor initiation processes (Nambu et al., 2002).  In 
essence, the dynamic modulation of response thresholds can be facilitative for producing robust 
motoric output, such that motor actions commence only when under robust cortical drive.  This 
perspective could explain why dorsal regions of prefrontal cortex – which are in general more 
strongly associated with motoric processes than rVLPFC (O’Reilly, 2010) – are also more 
strongly interconnected with subthalamic areas than rVLPFC (Nambu et al., 2002).   
 On the other hand, the rVLPFC is more strongly interconnected with the anterior 
temporal regions thought to subserve high-level stimulus identification (Fernandez-Miranda et 
al., 2008) relative to other prefrontal areas.  This connectivity implies that high-level visual 
information extracted by anterior temporal cortex might then be passed to rVLPFC, which would 
in turn evaluate this information with respect to its possible relevance for actions, behavior, and 
goals.  For particularly rapid interactions with anterior temporal lobe, this information might 
partially bypass the “gating” process subserved by subcortical regions.  Consistent with these 
claims, the gating functions subserved by the striatal mechanisms of our model are not used to 
any large extent in the current task.  Models of the homologous region on the left hemisphere 
have captured a similarly wide array of data without the use of such mechanisms (Snyder et al., 
2010).  The rather secondary role of such subcortical mechanisms is also consistent with the 
notable absence of effects from subcortical dopaminergic manipulations or individual differences 
in subcortical dopaminergic function on Stop task performance (Bari et al., 2011).  Finally, 
gating deficits as would be caused by dopaminergic dysfunction do not seem to be identifiable 
with pure ADHD (Castellanos, Fine, Kaysen, Marsh, Rapoport & Hallet, 1996), despite that 
disorder’s association with impaired response inhibition (e.g., Barkley et al., 1994).  Conversely, 
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psychopathologies that do show gating deficits can be unimpaired on response inhibition tasks 
(e.g., Kriete PhD Dissertation).  Thus, these “natural experiments” as well as those in conducted 
in the laboratory provide further support for the aforementioned computational arguments that 
gating effects are relatively unimportant to response inhibition phenomena. 
Rather, the diffuse connectivity of STN with prefrontal layers, and the absence of 
preferential recruitment of prefrontal units that were strongly interconnected with STN, could 
suggest that subthalamic activation is a very general or even obligatory consequence of 
prefrontal recruitment.  Taken to its extreme, this position holds that if any experience activates 
prefrontal cortex it may also activate some corresponding area of the subthalamic nucleus. 
Although speculative, this hypothesis offers a clear explanation of the commonly observed 
psychomotor slowing that occurs under intense working memory load (e.g., Barch et al., 1997), a 
phenomenon which has not been previously explained at the implementational level.  This 
hypothesis also leads naturally to several falsifiable predictions.   
First, to the extent any task strongly recruits areas of prefrontal cortex at the same level 
along the rostro-caudal hierarchy as the rVLPFC, it may also produce motoric slowing by way of 
activating the subthalamic nucleus.  Careful non-parametric analyses of reaction time 
distributions (e.g., Chatham et al., 2011a) will be required to test this hypothesis.   
Second, task-evoked recruitment of more rostral prefrontal areas may in turn activate 
correspondingly more rostral areas of the subthalamic nucleus, and thereby yield more abstract 
or cognitive (i.e., less motoric) “slowing” of rostral cortico-thalamic loops.  This kind of 
obligatory subthalamic recruitment following prefrontal activation could relate to disparate 
domains, such as the cognitive slowing observed during the psychological refractory period, or 
the attentional blink.  Both these paradigms relate to rVLPFC recruitment (Marois et al., 2006; 
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Verbruggen et al., 2011), but our model further predicts these paradigms should be related to 
performance on the Stop task.   
 Third, obligatory subthalamic activation following prefrontal recruitment could have 
notable computational advantages.  Activation of prefrontal cortex is widely associated with 
difficulty and conflict (e.g., Barch et al., 1997).  The activation of prefrontal cortex could thus be 
a very ecologically-valid signal that deliberation, rather than action, is a more advantageous 
behavior in the current context (e.g., Frank et al., 2007).  If prefrontal areas tend to innervate 
more caudal subcortical areas, as supported by emerging neuroimaging data and computational 
investigations (e.g., Badre & Frank, in press; Frank & Badre, in press) as well as established 
neuroanatomical data (e.g., Alexander, 2007), this kind of cascading architecture may extend to 
subthalamic innervation as well.  In this case, there would be a clear computational benefit to 
pausing the downstream output of more caudal prefrontal regions: their representations might be 
first be relevantly informed by the representations of more rostral prefrontal areas. 
 Verification of these predictions could provide novel support for the current 
neurocomputational account of response inhibition, but there are also more direct tests of the 
model.  Nearly 25 years of research has accumulated on the Stop task, and there are numerous 
phenomena which could fall within the scope of an extended model.  These systematic 
extensions could further establish the viability and generality of our account. 
For example, a number of detailed phenomena have been reported from Stop tasks with 
more highly structured demands on motor processes, including 4AFC tasks (Bissett & Logan, 
2011) and bimanual dual-2AFC tasks (e.g., Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).  The current model is 
capable of performing both such tasks, but their hierarchical motoric demands may require a 
more biologically-realistic motor circuit.  Specifically, our current output layer is merely a proxy 
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for the motor strip and an interconnected array of basal ganglia mechanisms.  We have abstracted 
over these substrates here, but investigation of such hierarchical architectures is crucially 
important, and is the subject of much ongoing work. 
At the more cognitive level of analysis, our model also does not suffer from “goal 
neglect,” which we hypothesize to be an important feature driving the hemodynamic differences 
between successful and unsuccessful Signal trials.  Goal neglect has sometimes been simulated 
as arising from stochastic dopamine fluctuations (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2006).  These fluctuations 
are present in PBWM but are apparently insufficient for generating these differences in the Stop 
task.  This failure of the model is nonetheless informative (Chatham, Yerys & Munakata, under 
review): it suggests that goal neglect in the Stop task could take the form of stochastic dips in NE 
rather than fluctuations in dopamine.   
While this extension would clearly be sufficient for generating the desired hemodynamic 
effect in the model, we abstain from implementing these NE dynamics here.  Current data on NE 
function is simply too underconstrained for this to represent a strong biological constraint on the 
model.  For example, a wide variety of current hypotheses regarding the computational role of 
NE release have been proposed; these hypothesis range from a NE gain effect (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005, although cortical dopamine is sometimes hypothesized to do the same thing; e.g., 
Dursteiweitz & Seamans, 2008) to its near opposite – supporting a broadening, rather than 
sharpening, of representational attractors (Bowman, Wyble, Chennu & Craston, 2008).  A 
systematic extension of the model to better capture these possible functions of NE thus awaits 
more hypothesis-driven empirical work.   
 Finally, the current model is trained to perform the Stop task alone.  Clearly, humans are 
(generally) capable of performing the Stop task but do not require the extensive task-specific 
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training that is required by our model.  This difference is a widespread issue for numerous 
models, particularly those that are “built to order” for a particular task.  While PBWM was 
certainly not “built to order” for the Stop task – unlike previous models of the Stop task – the 
ability of PBWM to perform more ecologically-valid tasks awaits future assessment. 
 
Conclusion 
The centrality of controlled motoric stopping to response inhibition in extant models and 
much theorizing is here significantly circumscribed: we demonstrate that a domain-general 
architecture succeeds in capturing numerous phenomena from the canonical test of response 
inhibition, the Stop task.  The model matches well-established behavioral, neuroimaging, and 
psychopharmacological phenomena, and also accords with findings that the primary frontal 
substrate of response inhibition, the rVLPFC, has a domain-general rather than stopping-specific 
role.  The model provides insight into the possible computations of this area, suggesting that its 
role in detecting behaviorally-relevant stimuli in the environment may be one instantiation of 
active maintenance mechanisms.  Our work provides a quantitative existence proof that such 
mechanisms could underlie a number of findings, including the commonalities across tasks that 
do not appear to demand motoric stopping. 
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CHAPTER 4: STRATEGIC STOPPING AND FOREKNOWLEGDE IN RESPONSE 
INHIBITION 
 
 
Abstract 
 Recent evidence suggests that subjects can exert strategic control over the precise 
subcortical pathways that support response inhibition, utilizing a slower but more selective form 
of motoric stopping when it is advantageous for the task at hand.  Such accounts contrast with 
arguments that motoric stopping is a uniformly global and automatic outcome of more general 
attentional mechanisms.  Utilizing a large sample of children and a control group of healthy 
adults, we find a double dissociation in the phenomena previously taken as diagnostic of 
strategic control over stopping (namely, an increase in the latency to stop a response, and a 
concomitant increase in the selectivity of that stopping).  The results circumscribe current claims 
that subjects exert strategic control over stopping, and may point towards a counterintuitive 
effect of foreknowledge on the detection of behaviorally-relevant stimuli. 
 
Introduction 
The ability to stop or inhibit unwanted responses has long been considered central to 
higher level cognition (Ferrier, 1885).  However, recent work casts doubt on the centrality of 
motoric stopping processes to the cognitive demands of response inhibition.  Specifically, it has 
been argued that the cognitive control processes engaged by at least one canonical test of 
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response inhibition, the Stop task, may be better characterized as involving the active 
maintenance of task goals (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Friedman et al., 2008) and the ability to 
monitor the environmental context in support of these goals (Chatham et al,. in preparation).  
Motoric stopping mechanisms may instead be engaged relatively automatically, and fall outside 
the purview of cognitive control (Chatham, Claus, Kim, Curran, Banich & Munakata, 2011). 
This account contrasts with claims that subjects can strategically engage different kinds 
of motoric stopping depending on the demands of the task (Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).  In 
particular, when subjects must selectively stop only one of multiple concurrent actions, they are 
thought to do so by relying on the “indirect” pathway of the basal ganglia and its more focal 
inhibitory effects on thalamic output, rather than the more global “hyperdirect” subthalamic 
pathway that stops the execution of all actions.  Two central pieces of evidence are used to 
support this claim.  First, when subjects are provided with foreknowledge about which one of 
multiple responses may need to be stopped, this foreknowledge reduces the interference exerted 
by stopping one action on the performance of concurrent actions – consistent with the use of the 
slower but more selective “indirect” pathway.  Second, the latency to stop a response (as 
estimated by Stop Signal Reaction Time, or SSRT; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Band et al., 2003) is 
prolonged given such foreknowledge, again consistent with the use of the slower and more 
selective “indirect” pathway.  
While neuroanatomically plausible, the argument that subjects can cognitively control 
their use of these motoric stopping pathways seems to contradict previous claims that motoric 
stopping is a relatively uncontrolled phenomenon that follows automatically from the detection 
of behaviorally-relevant items in the environment (Chatham, Claus, Kim, Curran, Banich & 
Munakata, 2011).   On the other hand, if these two effects arise from alternative mechanisms, 
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these data may be fully compatible with the idea that subjects have little cognitive control over 
these motoric stopping mechanisms.  In fact, there are several reasons to believe that these two 
particular effects have rather little basis in cognitive control.  
First, the reduction in interference caused by foreknowledge is extraordinarily small (only 
~20ms; Aron & Verbruggen, 2008; Claffey et al., 2010).  Moreover, concurrent actions still 
undergo substantial interference despite this foreknowledge (around 100ms; Aron & 
Verbruggen, 2008, Claffey et al., 2010).  This large “leftover” effect is surprising because 
foreknowledge should allow one to commit the non-cued response with 100% confidence: it is 
never the case that the non-cued response will have to be stopped.  Apparently, responses with 
one hand simply cannot be sufficiently insulated from the influence of stopping the other hand, 
even with perfect foreknowledge.  If one interprets such small benefits, and such large leftovers, 
to be the outcome of strategic cognitive control processes, then cognitive control must also be 
regarded as particularly ineffective in this domain. 
More persuasive physiological effects of selective stopping have occasionally been 
reported, but some of these effects have also been observed in tasks that do not require stopping 
– once again calling into question whether they reflect a control-induced dissociation of two 
subcortical pathways.  For example, single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation has been used 
to demonstrate a specific decrease in the motor excitability of a hand that may soon need to be 
stopped (Cai, Oldenkamp & Aron, 2011).  This effect has been interpreted as reflecting selective 
stopping, but a similar decrease in motor excitability is also observed following cues indicating 
that a hand may soon be involved in committing a response (Duque & Ivry, 2009).  This finding 
thus raises doubts about the specificity of reduced motor excitability to strategic and controlled 
demands on selective stopping. 
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If, as argued above, these effects do not reflect strategic cognitive control over which 
pathway is used in support of motoric stopping, then what might then drive the effects of 
foreknowledge on behavioral measures of stopping?   We propose that by virtue of providing 
behaviorally-relevant foreknowledge, cues in the selective stop task make more predictable the 
nature of the subsequent stop signal’s relevance to behavior.  The appearance of the stop signal 
then more weakly drives the prefrontal mechanisms that monitor for behaviorally-relevant 
stimuli, notably the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rVLPFC; Chatham et al., 2011).  
Because the recruitment of these prefrontal mechanisms may be ensued by an automatic and 
global form of motoric stopping (Chatham et al., 2011), foreknowledge would tend to increase 
SSRT to the extent it weakens this prefrontal recruitment.  Interference will also be thereby 
reduced: more responses will have already been emitted, unabated, before this global stopping 
takes effect. 
This alternative hypothesis gathers some preliminary support from the extant literature on 
the effects of stimulus predictability.  Relative to unpredictable rare stimuli, predictable rare 
stimuli lead to less pronounced behavioral slowing (Sussman, Winkler, Schroeger, 2003).  If the 
mechanisms supporting such behavioral slowing overlap with those that support motoric 
stopping, and if stimuli are made more predictable in the selective stop task by providing 
foreknowledge regarding their impending behavioral-relevance, these patterns could explain both 
the slightly increased SSRT and slightly reduced interference that result from such 
foreknowledge. 
Second, predictable rare stimuli lead to a reduced frontal event-related potential (ERP; 
the p3a) relative to unpredictable rare stimuli (Sussman, Winkler, Schroeger, 2003; Sandman, 
Donnelly, O’Halloran, Isenhart, 1990).  The Stop task is also associated with a frontal p3a, 
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although it is nonspecific to demands on motoric stopping (Chatham et al., 2011); instead, the 
p3a may reflect the recruitment of prefrontal mechanisms that monitor for behaviorally-relevant 
stimuli.  Changes in this p3 component consistently covary with changes in SSRT across 
numerous pharmacological manipulations and psychopathological disorders (Chatham et al., in 
preparation).  Thus, because predictable rare stimuli reduce the frontal p3a, manipulations that 
make stop signals more predictable (e.g., foreknowledge) may also lead to an increase in SSRT. 
Interestingly, the effects of manipulating stimulus predictability in healthy adults are 
significantly different than those observed among the elderly (Sandman, Donnelly, O’Halloran, 
Isenhart, 1990), among 7-8 year-old children (Wetzel, Widmann & Schroeger, 2009), and among 
patients with frontal lobe damage (Barcelo & Knight, 2007).  In all of these cases, the typical 
reduction of the p3a to predictable stimuli often shows a trend towards reversal, with a slightly 
enhanced frontal p3a to predictable targets.  This reversal raises a natural test of the hypothesis 
that foreknowledge makes stop signals more predictable, and that this drives the concomitant 
changes in SSRT and interference observed with foreknowledge.   
If this hypothesis is correct, the effect of foreknowledge on SSRT and interference may 
show a qualitatively different pattern in young children, relative to healthy adults.  To test this 
hypothesis, we adapted the selective stopping task for 6-year-old children, and administered the 
same tasks to a group of adult control subjects.  We utilized a global stop task as well as an 
uncued selective stop task (in which subjects must stop only one of two responses, but have no 
foreknowledge about which response may have to be stopped), and a cued selective stop task (in 
which subjects are provided foreknowledge about which of two responses may have to be 
stopped; Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).  Short practice tasks were also used to familiarize subjects 
with the experimental apparatus, including a 2 alternative forced choice task (Choice RT; 
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administered prior to the global stop task) and a dual simple response task (Double RT; where 
children had to press with both hands, administered prior to the uncued selective stop task). 
Methods. 
Participants.  
76 6-year-olds (mean age of 72 months; SD=4 months, range 67-81 months) and 11 
young adults successfully completed the tasks. Children were recruited from the Cognitive 
Development Center’s recruitment pool at the University of Colorado, Boulder.  Adult subjects 
were recruited from the University of York’s undergraduate psychology pool.  An additional 
eight children were excluded from all analyses because their accuracy on Signal trials fell below 
the 15% minimum required for reliable extraction of SSRT (n=2), because their extracted SSRT 
was negative for one of the three stop tasks (n=2), or because their accuracy on the No Signal 
trials of one of the three stopping task fell below 75% (n=4).  One additional adult subject was 
excluded for zero accuracy on Signal trials of the cued Stop task. 
All subjects completed the tasks in a set order: Choice RT, Global Stop task, Double RT, 
Selective Uncued Stop Task, Selective Cued Stop task.  (Additional tasks were also administered 
following these five tasks, but will not be described here).  The stimuli used in the first five tasks 
are illustrated in Figure 17 and described in detail below. 
Choice RT.  
 In this task subjects are introduced to “George the Monkey” and told to press a button with their 
left hand if the banana appears to George’s left, and with their right hand if the banana appears to 
George’s right.  The experimenter then demonstrates how and when to respond on two 
successive trials.  The child completes 24 subsequent trials with a randomly-selected 
interstimulus interval of 1.2-2s.  Upon completion of the task, the child is allowed a short break 
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to pick a small prize (one sticker).  The median RT is then calculated, trials exceeding the 
median RT by a factor of 2.3 or more are excluded, and the median is finally recalculated.  This 
median is used throughout subsequent tasks to ensure that subjects do not attempt to slow their 
responses in those tasks.   
Global Stop.   
Subjects are told that the bananas will now sometimes turn brown, and that because George does 
not like brown bananas, they should try to refrain from pressing the button on those trials.  The 
experimenter demonstrates the task on 4 trials, 2 of which constitute signal trials, one with a 
signal delay of 50ms and the other with a delay of 600ms.  Subjects are then given 24 practice 
trials.  Signals are presented with 33% frequency, and with an initial signal delay of 600ms.  This 
delay is adjusted according to an adaptive staircase algorithm, such that signal onset delay is 
lengthened by 50ms following a successful stop, and shortened by 50ms following unsuccessful 
stops.  The child then completes 3 blocks of 48 trials each, with short breaks to select a prize in 
between each block.  If on any trial the reaction time is 2.3 times the median RT calculated 
above, a “ding” sound is played by the computer and the experimenter encourages the child to 
press the buttons more quickly. 
Double RT.  
Subjects are told that now two bananas will appear at once, and so they should press 
simultaneously with both their left and right hands so that George can get as many bananas as 
possible.  They complete 32 trials of this task.  If the reaction times of the left and right hands 
differ by 200ms or more, a recorded voice says “Press the buttons at the same time.”  The 
purpose of this task is to give children some practice with responding with both hands, and to 
ensure that they understand the requirement to press both buttons relatively simultaneously. 
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Uncued Selective Stop.  
Subjects are told that now two bananas will appear, but one of the two bananas may turn brown.  
They are instructed to press the buttons corresponding to those bananas that do not turn brown.  
The experimenter completes 4 demonstration trials (2 of which are signal trials); next, the subject 
completed 24 practice trials, followed by 3 blocks of 48 test trials.  If at any time subjects do not 
press the buttons within 200ms of each other, a recorded voice says “Press the buttons at the 
same time.”  Similarly, if any reaction time is larger than 2.3 times the median calculated above, 
the computer makes a “ding” sound and the experimenter encourages the subject to press the 
buttons faster.  Signal onset delays begin with the asymptotic value reached in the Global stop 
task and continue to be adjusted in this task, according to the same adaptive algorithm. 
Cued Selective Stop.  
Subjects are told George knows which one of the two bananas might turn brown, and that he will 
point to the banana that might turn brown.  Otherwise, the task is identical to the uncued 
selective stop task: the experimenter completes 4 demo trials, and the child completes 24 practice 
trials followed by 3 blocks of 48 test trials.  Signal onset delays are modified via the adaptive 
algorithm, and reaction times are monitored for inter-response intervals greater than 200ms and 
reaction times larger than 2.3 times the median. 
Trimming and Preprocessing.   
Incorrect No Signal trials were excluded from analysis.  All correct No Signal trial reaction times 
were then subjected to an iterative trimming procedure, conducted separated for each task.  
Specifically, any reaction times falling beyond 2.5 standard deviations away from a child’s mean 
No Signal reaction time for that task were omitted from analysis; the mean and standard 
deviation for that task was then recalculated.  This procedure was repeated iteratively 100 times, 
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or until no additional trials were excluded, whichever came first.  Trials were also excluded from 
the Selective Stop tasks if the reaction times for the two hands differed by more than 70ms (as in 
Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).  SSRT was then calculated as the average SSD minus the nth 
percentile of No Signal reaction times, where n was the proportion of errors observed (SSRTAV 
in Band et al., 2003).  In the selective stop task, SSRT was calculated separately for the two 
hands, and then averaged (again, as in Aron & Vebruggen, 2008).  Interference was calculated as 
the difference between the response times on successfully stopped trials and those occurring on 
No Signal trials.  Finally, two tailed independent t-tests without the assumption of equal 
variances were used for all comparisons of children and adults.  
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Figure 17. Stimuli used in the Stopping tasks. A. In the Global Stop Task, each trial begins with 
presentation of George without any bananas; following a variable intertrial interval, a yellow 
banana appears.  On No Signal trials (and the preceding ChoiceRT task) this stimulus remains on 
screen until subjects press the corresponding button on a button box (with the left hand for 
bananas on the left and with the right hand for bananas on the right).  On Signal trials, the banana 
turns brown with a variable stop signal delay (SSD) which remains on screen until subjects 
respond (in which case the monkey appears ill) or until the termination of the trial. B. As in A, 
trials begin with the presentation of George without any bananas.  In the uncued selective stop 
task (as well as the Double RT task) the next stimulus is of George with two bananas.  On No 
Signal trials (and the Double RT task), this stimulus remains onscreen until subjects press both 
buttons, at which point George is shown grasping the two bananas.  On Signal trials, one of the 
two bananas turns brown with a variable SSD.  If subjects press the button corresponding to the 
brown banana, George is shown to be ill; otherwise subjects are then shown an image of George 
grasping the yellow banana.  The Cued Selective Stop Task differs only insofar as an additional 
stimulus is presented, for 1 second, which shows George pointing to the banana that may turn 
brown. 
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Results 
Both children and adults performed with high accuracy on No Signal trials across the 
Global, Uncued Selective, and Cued Selective Stop tasks (children: MGlobal= 93% MUncued=92% 
MCued=92%; adults: MGlobal= 99% MUncued=99% MCued=99%).  Furthermore, performance on the 
Signal trials across tasks was within the 15-85% range that is most sensitive for reliable 
extraction of SSRT, both for children (MGlobal= 49% MUncued=44% MCued=42%) and for adults 
(MGlobal= 50% MUncued=43% MCued=47%).  Significant differences between children and adults in 
terms of Signal trial accuracy were achieved only on the Cued Selective task, where children had 
slightly lower accuracy (unequal variance t(85)=17, p<.05; Figure 18). 
108 
 
 
Figure 18. Accuracy on Stop Signal trials across tasks.  For both children and adults, stop trial 
accuracy approximated 50%.  A slight decrease in accuracy across tasks was observed; this 
decrease was significantly different between children and adults only during the Cued Selective 
stop task.  In all tasks and subjects, accuracy on stop trials remained within the 15-85% window 
that is most sensitive for calculation of SSRT (Band et al., 2003). 
The two further assumptions required for reliable extraction of SSRT were also met.  
First, failed stop trial reaction times were reliably faster than reaction times on No Signal trials 
across all three tasks, for both children (all t’s>14.5, p’s<.001; Figure 19A) and adults (all 
t’s>2.7, p’s<.02; Figure 19B), consistent with the assumptions of the independent race model 
that underlies the calculation of SSRT.  Second, reaction times on No Signal trials were 
uncorrelated with SSRT on all three tasks, for children (all p’s>.25) and adults alike (all p’s 
>.05), again consistent with the assumptions of the independent race model that underlies the 
calculation of SSRT.   
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Figure 19. Across all tasks, Failed Stop trials were significantly faster than reaction times on No 
Signal trials, both for children (A) and for adults (B).  One of the assumptions underlying the 
calculation of SSRT is that “going” and “stopping” processes are engaged in a race.  Failed stop 
trials are presumed to be those in which the “going” process won this race, and thus were emitted 
too quickly for the “stopping” process to complete.  This assumption was confirmed for both 
children and adults across all three tasks. 
The latency to stop a response during the Global stop task, as estimated by SSRT, was 
significantly longer in children than adults (unequal variance t(29)=2.9, p<.01; Figure 4).  This 
pattern is similar to that found in previous work, which has established a developmental decrease 
in the latency to stop a response (e.g., Ridderinkhof, Band & Logan, 1999). 
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Figure 20.  Children showed significantly increased SSRT for the Global stop task.  Consistent 
with prior developmental work, we found that children required significantly more time to 
successfully stop a response, as estimated by SSRT (e.g., Ridderinkhof, Band & Logan, 1999).  
This difference is notably more minor than that observed for overt reaction times on No Signal 
and Failed Stop trials (c.f., Figure 19). 
The effects of foreknowledge on interference were significantly different between 
children and adults.  In particular, whereas adults showed a decrease in interference when 
provided with foreknowledge (t(10)=3.1, p=.01), children showed a nonsignificant effect in the 
opposite direction (t(74)=.84, p=.4).   These patterns significantly differed by age (unequal 
variance t(31)=2.8, p<.01) (Figure 21A). 
The effects of foreknowledge on SSRT were also significantly different between children 
and adults.  Whereas children showed a significant increase in SSRT when provided with 
foreknowledge (t(75)=2.6, p=.01), contrary to the patterns previously observed in adults, our 
adult sample showed no such effect (t(10)=.245, p=.81).  These effects significantly differed 
across age groups (unequal variance t(65)=2.1, p<.05 Figure 21B). 
Finally, the opposite influences of foreknowledge on interference and SSRT observed in 
adults was altogether reversed in the younger age group.  In particular, the foreknowledge 
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provided by cues decreased interference among adults (but not children), whereas it decreased 
SSRT among children (but not adults) (t(57)=3.0, p<.005; Figure 21C). 
 
Figure 21.  Foreknowledge as provided by cues affected both interference (A) and SSRT (B) in 
ways that were significantly different across children and adults (C).  A. When adults were 
provided with foreknowledge via cues, they showed a reduction in the interference on concurrent 
actions that was exerted by stopping an action.  In contrast, children demonstrated a 
nonsignificant effect in the opposite direction.  B.  When children were provided with 
foreknowledge via cues, they manifested a significant reduction in the latency to stop a response, 
as estimated by SSRT; adults showed no such effect.  C.  These effects of foreknowledge were 
significantly reversed as a function of age: foreknowledge decreased interference only for adults, 
and decreased SSRT only for children. 
Discussion 
 It has been argued that the subcortical motor pathways supporting response inhibition can 
be differentially recruited depending on task demands.  In particular, when only one of multiple 
concurrent actions must be stopped, and when subjects are provided with appropriate 
foreknowledge, they are thought to be capable of recruiting a slower but more selective pathway 
for stopping.  Here we assessed whether these effects may not be specific to the controlled 
recruitment of motoric stopping mechanisms by examining whether foreknowledge might elicit 
the unusual developmental trajectory previously associated with manipulations of target 
predictability. 
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Consistent with this prior literature, we observed that foreknowledge had significantly 
opposing effects on children and adults.  For children, foreknowledge significantly reduced the 
latency to stop a response, and numerically increased interference.  In adults, such 
foreknowledge significantly reduced interference, and had no apparent effect on the latency to 
stop a response. 
This pattern is not naturally accommodated by existing accounts of selective stopping.  
Such accounts predict that foreknowledge about the upcoming selectivity of response inhibition 
should encourage a strategic recruitment of the slower but more selective “indirect” pathway.  
Given the difficulty children have with proactive cue processing (Chatham, Frank & Munakata, 
2009), these effects might be predicted to be merely less pronounced in children.  Instead, we 
found significantly different patterns in children than in adults, whereby children showed an 
indication of a reversal of these effects of foreknowledge. 
On the other hand, this reversal is not complete.  Behaviorally-relevant foreknowledge 
failed to significantly increase SSRT in our adult group, contrary to previous findings 
(Verbruggen & Aron, 2008), although it did significantly decrease the observed interference of 
stopping on concurrent actions.  The former null finding may reflect the small number of 
subjects in our adult group.  Conversely, behaviorally-relevant foreknowledge failed to 
significantly increase interference in children, although it did significantly decrease the latency 
to stop a response.  We suggest that this null finding may reflect the increased reaction time 
variability of children; indeed, the mean change in interference experienced by children was 
similar to that experienced by adults, but with a significantly larger amount of variability around 
that mean (Figure 21C). 
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 Strictly speaking, the pattern we observed thus reflects only a double dissociation – by 
which foreknowledge affected only SSRT in children, and only interference in adults.  While 
broadly consistent with the idea that foreknowledge has much more general attentional effects on 
stimulus predictability (see Introduction), we did not observe the full double crossover 
interaction predicted by this account – in which foreknowledge would have affected both SSRT 
and interference in both children and adults, but in opposite directions. 
There are alternative interpretations of our results, but they seem even less viable.  For 
example, the information extracted by children from the cues may have been less about the 
precise behavioral-relevance of a probabilistic stop signal, and rather more about the certain 
impending onset of a trial.  Indeed, in our design (Figure 17A), the stop signal cues act as a 
reliable indicator of trial onset, and the Cued Selective Stop task was associated with faster 
reaction times than the Uncued Selective Stop task among children (Figure 19A), as would be 
expected if cues alerted children to the upcoming task’s demands.  This interpretation is unlikely 
to be the whole story, however, given two prominent features of our data.  First, the same pattern 
was not observed among adults (Figure 3B), even though adults benefit from warnings about 
trial onset in other paradigms (e.g., Valessi, Shallice & Walsh, 2007).  Second, there was no 
evidence that this difference in reaction times significantly influenced the changes in SSRT or 
interference induced by foreknowledge1, contrary to the idea that this kind of “alerting” affect 
might explain the observed results. 
                                                
SSRTCued, SSRTUncued, and the SSRTCued-Uncued difference scores were all uncorrelated with the difference in reaction 
times on the Cued and Uncued blocks (R’s <.14, p’s>.2).  Similarly, interference on the Cued task, the Uncued task, 
and the difference in interference between the cued and uncued tasks were also uncorrelated with the reaction time 
differences across these tasks (R’s<.12, p’s>.27).  Controlling for the differences across tasks also revealed a 
continuing significant effect of foreknowlegde on SSRT among children.  In all cases, the extent to which reaction 
times changed across tasks in children does not seem to be related to the effects we report. 
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Alternatively, the observed patterns may reflect the significantly reduced accuracy in the 
Cued Selective Stop task observed among children (Figure 18).  However, the observed patterns 
were highly stable across multiple exclusion criteria; they actually increase in size when subjects 
with lower performance on the Cued Selective Stop task are excluded.  This remains true even 
when such exclusion yields a significant accuracy advantage for children, relative to adults, on 
the Cued Selective task.  Once again, such differences seem insufficient for explaining the 
observed patterns. 
More broadly, it is possible that some other more general feature of the task design has 
given rise to the observed effects.  For example, our child-friendly adaption of the selective stop 
paradigm utilizes a dual simple reaction time task (dual SRT; where each hand only had one 
possible response) as opposed to a dual 2-alternative forced choice (dual 2AFC; where each hand 
can make one of two possible responses, as in Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).  We chose this design 
in part because children of this age had difficulty even with the dual SRT, particularly within the 
Cued Selective Stop task (where accuracy on No Signal trials dropped to as low as 57%), and in 
part because the Global Stop task has been successfully administered as a SRT (Logan & Cowan, 
1984).  Nonetheless, the use of a dual SRT could have reduced the number of possible stimulus-
response mappings in a way that enabled adults (but not children) to more deftly manage 
response interference, while at the same time obviating any need to use a slower pathway for 
more selective stopping.  Future work will be needed to test this more sophisticated hypothesis. 
The central alternative we propose – that foreknowledge may have more general 
attentional effects while falling short of enabling strategic control over the precise subcortical 
pathway utilized for stopping – is also further testable.  Specifically, it motivates three basic 
predictions.  First, the frontal “Stop p3” component should be reduced when foreknowledge is 
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provided in adults but enhanced among children, as hinted at by previous developmental and 
neuropsychological work.  Second, the rVLPFC should be more strongly recruited among 
children when foreknowledge is provided, but less strongly recruited among adults, given its 
putative role in the detection of behaviorally-relevant stimuli (Chatham et al., 2011).  Effects 
consistent with this claim may have already been observed (Coxon, Stinear & Byblow, 2010).  
Third, adult subjects should still show some interference on concurrent actions even when no 
motoric stopping is required; this interference should be expressed relatively later when 
behaviorally-relevant foreknowledge is provided in advance.  More concretely, subjects might 
perform a dual 2AFC task in which a rare “Go Again” signal indicates that both of the two 
possible responses should be committed by a particular hand.  Foreknowledge would be provided 
regarding the hand to which this “Go Again” signal would pertain, if it appeared.  The duration 
and time of onset of interference can then be interrogated through nonparametric distributional 
analyses of reaction time (Chatham et al., 2011). 
If this alternative hypothesis is correct, it will provoke the question of why the effects of 
predictability might be reversed in children.  Such questions can only be speculatively raised, 
much less answered, at this time.  Nonetheless, one possibility is that children simply find it 
more behaviorally significant to have correctly predicted something than to have failed to predict 
something.  Indeed, children may (at least initially) feel surrounded by a panoply of highly 
unpredictable sights and sounds, making those few that they can successfully predict all the more 
significant for their future behavior.  This kind of bias towards “positive prediction” might 
encourage the updating and maintenance of environmental information that is predictive of 
future experiences, and thereby encourage the development of increasingly adult-like proactive 
control (Chatham, Frank & Munakata, 2009).  
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Conclusions 
We have presented a double dissociation of the effects previously taken to be diagnostic 
of strategic control over selective stopping.  Foreknowledge reduced the latency to stop a 
response among children, but had no such effect on adults; conversely, foreknowledge reduced 
the interference exerted by stopping on concurrent actions in adults, but had no such effect in 
children.  These results add to the literature by importantly circumscribing recent claims that 
such measures can index strategic control over stopping.  These accounts cannot explain the 
present pattern, at least without making significant new assumptions.  These results also add to 
the literature by demonstrating a behavioral pattern induced by foreknowledge that is similar to 
that observed in the developmental and neuropsychological literatures on target predictability.  
Finally, the present work adds to the current debate regarding the influence of attention and 
cognitive control on response inhibition by demarcating a specific set of testable predictions for 
future work in this rapidly-advancing domain. 
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CHAPTER 5: SELECTIVE STOPPING AND COMPUTATIONAL CONUNDRUMS 
Abstract 
 
It has been argued that subjects can selectively stop only one of multiple concurrent 
actions by strategically recruiting a distinct pathway for the stopping of motor actions when this 
is advantageous for the task at hand.  However, close inspection of this hypothesis and the 
supporting data reveal a number of computational conundrums that pose a significant challenge 
to the plausibility of this account as well as alternative hypotheses.  Simply put, it is unclear how 
such a system could actually work in the brain.  After first introducing our mode of inquiry – 
whereby the failures of computational models can be used to advance theorizing – we then 
describe a problem posed by existing accounts of selective stopping, and demonstrate the 
insufficiency of alternative theoretical assumptions for explaining observed empirical patterns. 
 
Introduction 
 
While computational modeling has been widely acknowledged as a useful tool for theory 
testing (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009; McClelland, 2009; Thomas et al 2009; Munakata,  Snyder 
& Chatham, in press; Elman, 2005; Weng et al., 2001; Tenenbaum, 2011), its utility has been 
most widely acknowledged as confirmatory.  That is, models are widely used to confirm that a 
particular set of theoretical assumptions are sufficient for giving rise to a set of observed data, 
and thereby motivate more targeted future assessment of those hypotheses.   
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These demonstrations are sometimes criticized as theoretically uninteresting, on the 
intuitive basis that models can be made to “do anything.”  However, computational models are 
often less flexible than typically acknowledged, and their failures can be highly informative for 
future theorizing (Chatham, Yerys & Munakata, under review).  For example, computational 
models that successfully simulate phenomena from semantic memory (Rumelhart & Todd, 1993) 
categorically fail to match phenomena from the domain of episodic memory.  Motivated by these 
failures, a drastic reconceptualization of the computational demands of episodic and semantic 
memory led to formalized account of the minimal conditions under which these opposing 
computational demands could be met (McClelland, McNaughton & O’Reilly, 1996); this 
reformulated account has now become a widely-accepted theoretical framework for 
understanding the distinction between these memory systems.  This example clearly 
demonstrates that models cannot simply be made to “do anything;” instead, cases in which 
models fail are informative because they identify the precise boundary conditions of existing 
hypotheses. 
Identifying these boundary conditions is instrumental for motivating the development of 
alternative hypotheses – without a formal model, it is often not clear that existing hypothesis 
cannot, at any unambiguous level of detail, explain existing data.  This may characterize the 
current domain of selective response inhibition, in which both dominant and alternative 
hypotheses – at least, at their current specified level of detail – appear insufficient for explaining 
phenomena from this domain.  This is here demonstrated with a series of computational models.  
The insufficiency of these models reveals a minimal set of conditions that may be required for 
human-like selective stopping to occur, and thereby illuminates a promising direction for future 
research in this domain. 
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The problem of interference in selective stopping 
 
It is now known that the stopping of unwanted motor actions occurs more slowly when 
subjects are provided with foreknowledge about which of multiple concurrent actions might need 
to be stopped (Aron & Verbruggen, 2008; Claffey et al., 2010).  This foreknowledge is not 
entirely without benefit: foreknowledge actually reduces the interference that is exerted by the 
stopping of one action on the performance of other concurrent actions. These patterns are argued 
to reflect the strategic recruitment of a slower but more selective pathway for motoric stopping – 
the “indirect” pathway through the basal ganglia – as opposed to the more rapid and more global 
“hyperdirect” subthalamic pathway for stopping (Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).   
At its currently specified level of detail, this hypothesis cannot explain the fact that 
motoric stopping appears to be an uncontrolled behavior.  That is, motoric stopping is observed 
even when subjects have perfectly reliable foreknowledge that no response will ever need to be 
stopped (Chatham et al., 2011).  This hypothesis also cannot explain the fact that increased 
recruitment of the subthalamic nucleus is observed when response force must be increased (Patil, 
Carmena Nicolelis, & Turner 2004; as opposed to only when response force must be decreased, 
as must occur in the case of stopping).  For these reasons, we have taken an alternative 
hypothesis as a starting point (in the discussion, we also consider reformulations of the original 
hypothesis). 
This alternative hypothesis states that motoric stopping is engaged globally and rather 
automatically, and thus falls outside the scope of cognitive control (consistent with ERP, fMRI, 
pupillometric, and behavioral data from Chatham, Claus, Kim, Curran, Banich & Munakata, 
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2011).  By this account, as formalized in a computational model in Chapter 3, the role of the 
subthalamic pathway is better understood as modulating a response threshold on motor actions.  
This threshold must be increased when motor actions must be committed more energetically, 
thereby explaining why subthalamic activation may increase with increased response force.   
By this alternative account, foreknowledge increases the latency of stopping because 
foreknowledge changes the information content of the stop signals.  In effect, foreknowledge 
reduces the behaviorally-relevant information that is provided by stop signals, because their 
behavioral relevance is then known in advance.   Behavioral-relevance is key for determining the 
recruitment of an area that drives the subthalamic nucleus in this task (the right ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex; rVLPFC).  Reductions in behavioral relevance may reduce the recruitment of 
the rVLPFC and of the interconnected subthalamic nucleus.  The resulting behavioral expression 
of motoric stopping is then delayed, which in turn leads to the appearance of reduced 
interference merely because a global form of stopping happens later in time – only after a larger 
proportion of responses have already been emitted. 
We assessed this hypothesis within a computational model (Figure 22).  However, we 
find that relatively general learning dynamics prevent this hypothesis from being a viable 
account on its own. As we describe below, the information content of foreknowledge in this 
paradigm is most reliably that the alternative not-to-be-stopped response will certainly need to be 
committed.  Similarly, the information content of the stop signals themselves includes the fact 
that the alternative response can be committed immediately. 
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Figure 22.  Architecture of the current model.  The current model is a systematic extension of 
PBWM, but largely identical to the model presented in Chapter 3.  Specific changes pertain 
mostly to the precise input units that were used in the current model (see also Figure 23). 
 
The models unavoidably learn to take advantage of this characteristic of the task, and 
thereby show a pattern of facilitation, rather than interference, when only one of multiple actions 
must be stopped.  In no case do human subjects appear to show this form of learning – which is a 
challenge for all extant theoretical accounts of selective stopping because they all, directly or 
indirectly, posit the involvement of the basal-ganglia mediated probabilistic learning 
mechanisms that should support precisely this kind of learning.  Systematic attempts to eliminate 
the expression of this learning in the models, e.g., by decreasing the latency or increasing the 
strength of automatic stopping mechanisms, uniformly fail for interesting reasons.  We conclude 
with a discussion of the minimal theoretical revisions necessary to accommodate this unexpected 
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competency of the models, and the apparently complete failure of human subjects to learn this 
characteristic of the task. 
Methods 
Implementation.   
The current model is implemented using Leabra (O’Reilly et al., 2001) and the Prefrontal 
Basal Ganglia Working Memory architecture (Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly, 2006, 2007, 2010; 
O’Reilly & Frank, 2006).  Leabra has been utilized in over 40 models and gives rise to a number 
of cognitive phenomena (O’Reilly & Munakata 2001). PBWM has likewise been used in dozens 
of models and represents a unified computational account of working memory and executive 
functions; it is sufficient for capturing phenomena from canonical tests of task switching 
(O’Reilly & Frank, 2006) and working memory updating (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006; Chatham, 
Herd, Brant, Hazy, Miyake, O’Reilly & Friedman, 2011). 
The current PBWM model is also capable of capturing behavioral, neuroimaging, and 
pharmacological phenomena from the canonical test of response inhibition, the Stop task 
(Chapter 3).  Here we utilized various extensions to this model in attempts to match empirical 
data, to assess its ability to capture phenomena from the selective stop tasks of Aron & 
Verbruggen (2008). 
The inputs and outputs of the model are presented in Figure 23.  As in the model 
presented in Chapter 3, the model contains a sensory input layer corresponding to the various 
stimuli of the task, a simulated norepinephrine layer for simulating the pronounced adrenergic 
modulation of the prefrontal areas recruited during the Stop task, and a manual output layer with 
units corresponding to the various behavioral responses required in the task.  There is only one 
principle differences in these patterns between the models: there are several new sensory inputs 
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that are necessary for simulating these selective stop tasks. This includes sensory inputs 
corresponding to effector-specific stop signals (i.e., inputs corresponding to “stop the left 
response” or “stop the right response”) as well as effector specific cues (inputs corresponding to 
“maybe stop the left response” or “maybe stop the right response”). These additional units were 
present in the prior model, but simply left unused. 
 
Figure 23.  Inputs and Outputs of the model (A) and as activated in the Uncued (B) and Cued 
Stop Tasks (C).  A. The sensory input layer of the model contains units for a right and left 
response, for a right and left stop signal, and for right and left cues. As in the model presented in 
Chapter 3, a simulated NE layer provides an excitatory signal to prefrontal layers upon 
presentation of the stop signal.  A motor output layer contains units corresponding to right and 
left responses.  B. In the Uncued stop task, every trial involves presentation of both the right and 
left sensory input stimuli.  On a subset of trials, an effector-specific stop signal is presented with 
a variable delay (as indicated by the red shading) following the onset of the other sensory input.  
In response to this stimulation, only one of the two motor output units must be activated.  C. The 
cued task is identical to the uncued task, except that a separate cue trial is administered prior to 
each performance trial, which consists only of the units shaded in blue.  The information 
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conveyed by this signal is twofold: it indicates which of two responses might need to be stopped, 
but conversely also indicates which of the two responses will definitely need to be committed. 
  
 
Training & Testing.  
All models were run in batches of 25 networks; each network was initialized with random 
patterns of connection weights, and trained on one task alone (i.e., either the cued selective stop 
task, or the uncued stop task). This choice was made to match the fact that these tasks are 
behaviorally assessed in distinct blocks.  Had the models been trained to perform both tasks, 
task-switching effects in the model would contaminate the measures we report here.   
All aspects of the training, testing and analysis were identical to those performed in 
Chapter 3, with two exceptions.  Both of these exceptions are parallel to the differences in how 
the selective stop tasks are assessed behaviorally, relative to the global stop task, and were thus 
adopted here for validity.  First, SSRT was calculated separately for the two possible “hands” of 
the model – that is, the separate output units that corresponded to left and right responses – and 
averaged across them, as in behavioral work.  In no case were substantial differences between 
these responses observed once models had reached criterial 15-85% accuracy on the Signal trials 
of either task.  Second, interference was calculated as the difference between a given response 
when provided in the context of a successfully stopped Signal trial, relative to when provided in 
the context of Signal trials.  This again is parallel to behavioral analyses conducted on this task.  
Interference should be positive to the extent that stopping one response leads to slowing in the 
commission of the other response. 
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Results 
Consistent with the assumptions of the race model that underlie the calculation of SSRT, 
the use of an iterative algorithm for adjusting stop signal delay lead to approximately 50% 
accuracy across both tasks (Figure 24A).  Accuracy on No Signal trials was at ceiling – 99% for 
the Uncued task and 98% for the Cued task – consistent with empirical data, which tends to show 
excellent performance on these trials.   Finally, and further consistent with both the race model 
and empirical data, failed stop trials were reliably faster than No Signal trials for both the 
Uncued (t(99)=6.3, p<.001) and Cued tasks (t(99)=2.7, p<.01) (Figure 24B).   
 
Figure 24. Results of training the model on asymptotic stop signal accuracy (A) and reductions in 
failed stop reaction times (B).  A. Consistent with the assumption of the race model, and with 
empirical data on the selective stop tasks, the use of an adaptive algorithm for titrating the timing 
of the Stop Signal yielded approximately 50% correct performance on both tasks.  B. Consistent 
with empirical observation, failed stop reaction times were significantly faster than “Go” 
reaction times on No Signal trials. 
 
 
However, and contrary to the assumption of stochastic independence in the race model, 
SSRT and Go RT were strongly negatively correlated for both tasks (Uncued R=-.70, p<.001, 
Cued R=-.77, p<.001).  The functional form of this relationship is clearly nonlinear for both the 
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Uncued (Figure 25A) and Cued tasks (Figure 25B).  As described below, this nonindependence 
reflects substantial overlap in the generative processes yielding both stopping reactions to the 
stop signals and overt No Signal reaction times. 
  
 
 
Figure 25.  Nonindependence was observed between No Signal Reaction Times and SSRT on 
both the Uncued (A) and Cued (B) Stop Tasks, indicating a violation of the stochastic 
independence assumption underlying the race model.  A. In the Uncued Stop task, SSRT was 
negatively correlated with No Signal reaction times, although the relationship was clearly 
nonlinear.  This pattern actually reflects differential learning of the often-unacknowledged 
information value of stop signals across models, which is the origin of the nonindependence 
observed here.  B.  Similar patterns were observed in the Cued task, although both the 
nonindependence and the nonlinearity of that nonindependence were even more pronounced.  
This is consistent with additional learning about the often-unacknowledged information value of 
foreknowledge, which is the source of the more pronounced nonindependence observed in this 
task. 
 
The model did give rise to the expected difference in SSRT, as previously observed in 
adults, as a function of foreknowledge: SSRT was reliably lengthened by foreknowledge 
(t(99)=5.7, p<.001; Figure 26A).  However, the model showed a negative interference effect – 
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that is, pronounced facilitation due to presentation of the Stop signals, both with and without 
foreknowledge (Uncued t(99)=3.52, p<.001, Cued t(99)=2.4, p<.02; Figure 26B).  
Foreknowledge had no significant effect on interference (t(99)=.8, p>.4). 
 
 
Figure 26. The effects of foreknowledge on SSRT (A) were consistent with some empirical 
observations, but the effects of stopping on the execution of concurrent actions led to negative 
interference (i.e., facilitation) that was pronounced with foreknowledge (B).  A. As expected, 
SSRT was reliably increased by the provision of foreknowledge.  B.  Contrary to expectation, no 
models showed a significant interference of stopping on concurrent actions.  Foreknowledge was 
without significant effect on these patterns. 
 
We examined the reaction time distributions that give rise to interference effects in 
humans (Figure 27A&B for the Uncued and Cued tasks, respectively), and the corresponding 
facilitation effects in the model (Figure 27C & D for the Uncued and Cued tasks, respectively).  
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Several features of these data are noteworthy.  First, in humans the reaction time distributions for 
correct Signal trials are shifted far to the right of the reaction time distributions for correct No 
Signal trials.  This shift reflects the fact that incorrect Signal trials are those where responses 
were provided relatively earlier, and where response inhibition thus was incapable of interrupting 
these responses.  Second, the correct Signal trial distribution exhibits a bimodality, where the left 
mode occurs largely within the reaction time distribution of No Signal trials. This left mode is 
the reduction in interference owing to foreknowledge; it occurs because the stopping initiated by 
the stop signal actually leads to a larger number of responses that can be emitted without being 
slowed by that stopping process.  The local minimum between modes reflects the instantiation of 
that slowing. 
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Figure 27. Reaction time distributions for both correct Signal trials (dotted lines) and correct No 
Signal trials (solid lines), across the Uncued (leftmost column) and Cued tasks (rightmost 
column) for human adults (upper row) and models (lower row).  A. Human adults showed a 
pronounced rightward shift of their reaction times on correct Signal trials, reflecting in part the 
fact that the left half of the reaction time distribution is led to inhibitory failure (i.e., responses 
are emitted too quickly to be stopped) but also that concurrently-executed responses are 
significantly delayed.  B. This delay is somewhat ameliorated by the provision of foreknowledge, 
which introduces a bimodality into the reaction time distribution on Signal trials.  This 
bimodality reflects the fact that a larger proportion of responses continue unabated, as in the No 
signal trial distribution, before stopping occurs.  The effect of stopping is directly reflected by 
the width between the modes. C. The model showed a significantly different pattern whereby the 
primarily effect of stopping was in fact to facilitate the concurrently-executed actions (as can be 
seen in the left side of the Signal RT distribution). D. This effect was largely similar to that 
observed when foreknowledge was provided, but with a pronounced leftward shift of the mode.  
A hint of bimodality visible in humans (c.f. B) is also present in the model. 
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Similar patterns of uni- and bimodality for the Uncued and Cued tasks, respectively, were 
also observed in the model, but critically without the rightward shift of the overall distributions 
(Figure 27C and D).  This was a learned effect; a much more valid pattern was present in the first 
epoch of model training.  (Figure 28 A & B reproduce the human data for convenience; Figure 
28 C & D show the model’s reaction time distributions in this first epoch.)  However, other 
aspects of the model’s behavior failed to match human data on this first epoch: they showed an 
inappropriately low rate of successful stopping.  Subsequent training yielded improvements in 
stopping rate, but eliminated the desired reaction time pattern far before the models reached 
criterial performance.   
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Figure 28.  Learning effects were responsible for the pronounced facilitation observed in the 
model, as demonstrated by a comparison of the same adult data presented in Figure 6 (here, A 
and B) with corresponding data from the models during the first epoch of training on the Uncued 
task (C) and Cued Stop tasks (D).  Similar to adult data from the Uncued (A) and Cued Tasks 
(B), early in training models showed a relatively greater proportion of responses on correct 
Signal trials that occurring at intervals longer than reaction times on correct No Signal trials (C), 
although the discrepancy between these proportions was somewhat reduced as a function of 
foreknowledge (D).  In no case was facilitation observed within the first epoch. 
 
 
Consistent with the robustness of this pattern, it arises from a very simple learning 
dynamic.  Units throughout the model can learn to become conjunctive for the presentation of 
one imperative sensory stimulus (e.g., “respond left”) and the stop signal pertaining to the 
opposite sensory stimulus (e.g., “stop right”).  These units are able to rapidly respond to the 
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presentation of the stop signal, and then more strongly drive the imperative response (“respond 
left”) relative to those units which detect the imperative stimulus alone (which, as described 
above, is by itself indeterminate; weights are accordingly weaker).  This situation is slightly 
exacerbated when foreknowledge is provided, because this foreknowledge provides determinate 
information regarding the opposite sensory stimulus (e.g., if the cue was “maybe stop left” the 
determinate imperative stimulus is with 100% certainty “respond right”). 
Several alternative architectures were explored to rule out the possibility that these 
unwanted effects arose from peripheral sources of the model (a subset of which are schematically 
depicted in Figure 29).  For example, the unwanted leftward shift in the Signal trial distribution 
could be instead viewed as an unwanted rightward shift in the No Signal distribution, if the two 
manual responses were interfering with one another in a way that they might not in humans.  
Indeed, facilitation is sometimes observed in the wider literature when two bimanually 
isomorphic effectors must commit symmetric actions. These facilitation effects were 
implemented in the model as a positive weight between congruent responses which were 
assigned to different layer groups, such that there was no inhibition between these groups (Figure 
29A).  This change actually yielded an increase in the unwanted facilitation effects on Signal 
trials, principally because they lengthened SSRT (and thus allowed more responses to continue 
unabated) without leading to a leftward shift of the No Signal distribution.  The simulation of 
complete bimanual independence also failed to reproduce the desired patterns (Figure 29B). 
It was also considered that the effect could in principle arise from an insufficiently quick 
form of motoric stopping, given that the shortest path from input to output was identical (two 
synapses) for both the posterior and prefrontal/subthalamic pathways.  However, inclusion of a 
distinct intermediate processing step with the most basic biologically-based connectivity (Figure 
133 
 
29C; putatively analogous to the ventral and dorsal “what” and “how” streams; Goodale & 
Milner, 1995; O’Reilly, 2010) also failed to remediate the unwanted patterns of interference.  
Likewise, increasing and decreasing the potency of the subthalamic pathway (as simulated by 
changes to the gain of the subthalamic layer’s activation, to the equation governing response 
threshold as a function of that activation, and changes to the relative weights projecting to this 
layer) also failed to yield the desired pattern (Figure 29D & E). 
  
 
 
Figure 29.  Alternative architectures explored in attempts to eliminate the facilitation effects 
observed in selective stopping, including changes to the motor output layer (A & B), changes to 
the posterior cortical pathway of the model (C) and changes to the potency of subthalamic 
mechanisms (D & E).  A. Facilitation effects were not due to the absence of a bimanual 
facilitation process, as demonstrated by an architectural change to the output layer so that the 
various responses were not competitive, but instead cooperative.  B.  Complete bimanual 
independence also failed to reproduce the observed empirical patterns.  C. Ultimately futile 
changes to the posterior cortical pathway were implemented to try to give motoric stopping 
processes a greater “advantage” in the race, and thus to intercept any facilitation effects.  D. 
Neither possible change to the subthalamic layer of the model - increasing or decreasing its 
effect on response thresholds – were sufficient for eliminating interference. 
 
Given the pervasiveness of this pattern within the model, and indeed its sensible origin in 
very domain-general learning dynamics, it seemed plausible that humans might demonstrate the 
same or a similar learning pattern at an effector-specific level.  That is, such learning effects 
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might have been relatively subtle, and simply masked by differences in the reaction time 
distributions across hands.  However, examination of the effector-specific reaction time 
distributions from adult subjects performing these tasks (as presented in Chapter 4) revealed no 
expression of any learning of this kind.  In particular, on both the Uncued (Figure 30A) and Cued 
Tasks (Figure 30B) the reaction time distributions on Signal and No Signal trials alike were 
precisely matched across hands.  Within the cued task, subjects also showed no tendency to even 
delay the cued hand (black lines), or to accelerate the uncued hand (gray lines), as would be 
expected if subjects proactively engaged some proactive form of selective response control.  
These patterns were unaffected by the duration of the task, such that there was no noticeable 
difference between the first and second half of each task.  Apparently, no learning of this type is 
expressed in humans, although it appears unavoidable in the model. 
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Figure 30.  Reaction time distributions for Signal (red lines) and No Signal trials (black/gray 
lines) were examined separately for the left (dotted lines) and right (solid lines) hands in the 
adult subjects of Chapter 4.  A. On the Uncued task, responses were strongly coupled across 
effectors, both on No Signal and Signal trials alike.  For neither hand did subjects ever show a 
facilitation.  B.  Similar patterns were observed in the cued task, such that subjects failed to show 
any facilitation effects.  Surprisingly, subjects also failed to delay their responses from the hands 
that might have needed to be stopped (grey lines), and critically also failed to accelerate their 
responses from the hands that would certainly not have to be stopped (black lines).  The absence 
of these effects confirms that a significant challenge is posed by selective stopping to 
implementational-level theories. 
Discussion 
Although we found some evidence that a model capable of performing the Stop task was 
also capable of performing selective stop tasks, it showed a persistent nonindependence of overt 
reaction times and covert stopping processes.  This nonindependence reflects facilitation effects 
arising from the most reliable information content of the stimuli presented in this task.  
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Specifically, the two sensory input stimuli provided to the model, one for “respond left” and one 
for “respond right”, are not actually determinate of the correct response: a subsequent stop signal 
will often countermand either one of the two.  This ambiguity is resolved upon presentation of 
the stop signal, which indicates with 100% certainty that the response to which the stop signal 
does not pertain will need to be committed.  Foreknowledge is likewise largely indeterminate of 
the correct stopping response: a cue that one response may need to be stopped does not mean that 
response will need to be stopped. Instead, the determinate information provided by 
foreknowledge is that the alternative response will need to be committed (again, with 100% 
certainty).  Both more determinate sources of information are robustly utilized by the model to 
produce a facilitation effect, rather than interference, when only one of multiple actions must be 
stopped. 
The most surprising feature of this phenomenon is not that it occurs across numerous 
models.  In retrospect, this effect is almost certain to arise in the absence of specific precautions 
taken to prevent it (discussed in more detail below).  The more surprising fact is that this 
dynamic does not appear to be present in humans at any detectable level.  It is of course possible 
that human subjects require additional training on this task before they will express these effects, 
in which case one might regard the current findings as prediction of the current model for a 
future training study.  However, striatally-based learning mechanisms should be sufficient for 
generating these patterns even within the timeframe of the task’s normal duration; striatal 
systems may show extremely rapid learning effects (within 60-80 trials) even when given only 
probabilistic input.  Thus, the essential conundrum here is not that the model fails to perform at 
human levels; it is that humans apparently fail to learn something that the model inevitably takes 
strong advantage of. 
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These problematic learning dynamics are not intrinsic to the context-monitoring or 
controlled stopping accounts of response inhibition that have been contrasted in this dissertation, 
but both accounts must ultimately be compatible with such basic learning dynamics if they are to 
be considered implementationally-viable theories.  There are two promising possibilities for 
resolving this dilemma: first, the empirical test of a unique prediction from the strategic stopping 
account which could falsify the context-monitoring hypothesis, and second, the reassessment of 
context-monitoring’s viability in the domain of selective stopping with a more ecologically-valid 
computational model.  Both will be discussed in turn. 
Controlled stopping accounts could be seen to make a unique prediction regarding 
response-related learning effects in the context of a selective stop task.  These accounts posit that 
prefrontal cognitive control mechanisms are biasing the use of the indirect pathway through the 
basal ganglia, comprised of so-called “NoGo” cells.  These cells are thought to be subject to 
lateral competitive inhibition with the “Go” cells of the direct pathway through the basal ganglia.  
If Go cells are indeed suppressed via top-down biasing of the NoGo cells with which they 
compete, and such top-down biasing is not in fact targeted at a particular response, then a variety 
of learning processes may simply not occur during selective stop tasks.  For example, subjects 
should be impaired at learning to choose a more rewarding stimulus, and relatively benefitted in 
learning to avoid less rewarding stimuli, if this kind of probabilistic learning paradigm were 
administered simultaneously with the selective stop task (i.e., a dual-task design).  If correct, this 
phenomenon would provide extraordinarily compelling proof that selective stopping does indeed 
reflect a bias to use the indirect pathway, albeit in a more global fashion than typically realized. 
In contrast, context-monitoring accounts make a much simpler prediction.  Specifically, 
the failure of the current model to match human behavioral data may be a primarily technical 
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one, reflecting the model’s lack of ecological validity, rather than a conceptual failure.  The 
facilitation effects observed in the model arise because the representations for “respond left 
only” are perfectly correlated with those for “stop right,” and conversely the representations for 
“respond right only” are perfectly correlated with those for “stop left.”  This leads to a 
facilitative activation of “respond left” representations in the presence of “stop right” 
representations, even though such 1:1 correspondence clearly does not characterize the learned 
experience of human subjects in the real world.  By including a small proportion of trials in 
which models must “respond left only” but in which there is no demand to “stop right” (and vice 
versa), the model should develop uncorrelated representations for these behaviors that more 
closely matches those of humans. 
This study has clear limitations.  First, it is difficult to reason on the basis of a 
computational model that does not match the behavior of interest, although there are certainly 
compelling counterexamples (see Introduction).  Second, models are useful precisely because 
they are simplifications of the system they simulate, but some of these simplifications can 
contribute to the mismatch between a model’s behavior and that of humans.  Future 
computational work will need to examine these simplifications, particularly with respect to the 
internal representations of responses in the model, to determine whether the current 
simplifications have had a deleterious effect here.  Third, it is always possible that human 
subjects will show the pattern expressed by the model, but only with extended training.  Future 
empirical work that assesses probabilistic learning during selective stopping may be useful in 
this regard: such experiments will necessitate the use of many trials over which learning effects, 
of the kind observed here, might manifest in people.   
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Nonetheless, the current work has substantial implications and does informatively shape 
future theorizing. In particular, it illuminates a previously unrecognized feature of selective stop 
tasks, and highlights important boundary conditions on current conceptual and computational 
theories of selective stopping.  It also quantitatively demonstrates that the behavioral effects of 
selective stopping could be far less specific than commonly theorized, with substantial 
implications for the current understanding of response inhibition. Specifically, if the control 
mechanisms supporting response inhibition can operate only in a relatively coarse fashion – that 
is, only switching between top-down biasing of the global hyperdirect pathway or top-down 
biasing of the indirect pathway in general  – it implies that our ability to control responses is far 
less flexible than implied by current accounts of selective stopping, but perhaps more flexible 
than predicted by context-monitoring accounts. 
Conclusions 
Subjects can selectively stop only one of multiple concurrent actions, and suffer less 
interference on concurrent actions when provided with foreknowledge.  Strategic accounts of 
motoric stopping processes seem inconsistent with this hypothesis, by failing to explain the large 
amounts of interference that persist despite foreknowledge, by failing to explain the activation 
dynamics of the subthalamic nucleus, and by failing to explain the apparently uncontrolled 
nature of stopping in other domains.  However, an alternative hypothesis is also apparently 
inconsistent with the absence of response commission-related learning effects in humans.  This 
discrepancy could reflect a technical shortcoming related to the lack of ecological validity of the 
model.  Alternatively, this discrepancy may reflect that these learning dynamics genuinely do not 
manifest behaviorally in selective stop tasks. This raises two possibilities: the mechanisms 
supporting selective stopping may not be directed at particular responses, and instead have a 
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simultaneously suppressive effect on learning about response commission from alternative 
responses; or that subjects may eventually express these learning dynamics in a way that 
eliminates and in fact reverses the interference commonly observed in selective stopping.  In 
either case, the current results offer a clear computational challenge to extant theories of 
selective stopping and highlight a concrete direction for future work. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
The domain of response inhibition is exceedingly complex.  This complexity arises 
partially from theoretical confusions regarding what processes actually support response 
inhibition, and theoretical ambiguities as to how widely these processes might apply.  At the 
same time, this complexity is also intrinsic to cognitive neuroscience: any cognitive phenomenon 
will likely reflect the interactive contributions of many neural mechanisms, relatively few of 
which can be uniquely ascribed to any specific function at the cognitive level of analysis. 
This complexity can be tamed with an integrative approach, of the kind taken here.  
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the computational underpinnings of response inhibition as 
they are currently understood, highlighting ambiguities in what processes comprise the 
“stopping” function implemented in abstract race models, diffusion models and Bayesian 
decision making models of the canonical Stop task. A context-monitoring hypothesis was 
proposed, in which the processes supporting the detection of behaviorally-relevant but infrequent 
stimuli might underlie the effortful and controlled ability of the Stop task.  It was argued that 
context-monitoring might explain the similarities observed across the Stop task and other tasks 
(principally so-called “oddball” tasks) that do not appear to require motoric stopping per se, not 
only in terms of hemodynamic and electroencephalographic phenomena, but also those arising 
from frontal lobe pathology as well as pharmacological manipulations. 
Chapter 2 presented an assessment of this hypothesis.  Neuroimaging data revealed that 
the same region of the brain implicated in response inhibition (the rVLPFC), and often assumed 
to be specific to motoric stopping demands, was also recruited during a task that did not demand 
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any motoric stopping.  This region showed prominent sustained activity across tasks, as though 
involved in a tonic monitoring process.  Multivariate patterns in this area were more consistent 
across tasks, and across individuals, when demands on motoric stopping differed but demands on 
context-monitoring were most pronounced.  An event-related potential previously thought to be 
characteristic of motoric stopping demands was likewise similarly expressed across tasks.  
Patterns of mental effort, as assessed through pupillometry, demonstrated that stopping an 
unwanted behavior was associated with less effort than monitoring for rare but behaviorally-
relevant stimuli that failed to appear, and far less than that required for overtly responding to 
such stimuli.  Behavioral analyses indicated that some form of motoric stopping was engaged 
even in this latter case – even though such stopping ran contrary to subject’s goals in the task –  
suggesting that stopping might occur relatively automatically. A reanalysis of all data from this 
Chapter indicated that the presence of this stopping across tasks could not explain their 
hemodynamic or electroencephalographic commonalities. 
Chapter 3 presented a computational implementation of the context-monitoring 
hypothesis, using a domain-general connectionist framework that has successfully captured 
numerous phenomena from other domains of cognitive control.  The model also successfully 
captured behavioral, neuroimaging and pharmacological phenomena from the Stop task.  
Analysis of the model’s behavior indicated that this success was driven by the development of a 
monitoring-like function from a more basic prefrontally-based mechanism for active 
maintenance.  In no case did the models develop a privileged set of prefrontal units that were 
dedicated for motoric stopping, consistent with the hypothesis developed in Chapter 1 and 
assessed in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4 turned to another domain in which motoric stopping processes are thought to 
be under strategic cognitive control: when only one of multiple concurrent actions must be 
stopped.  By these “strategic control” accounts, cognitive control processes can support the use 
of a slower but more response-specific pathway for motoric stopping when that is advantageous.  
However, a developmental approach yielded a double dissociation in the speed and specificity of 
stopping, whereby foreknowledge affected children only in terms of SSRT (and did so in the 
opposite way expected from published work) but only affected interference in adults.  These data 
challenge strategic control accounts of selective response inhibition by indicating that 
phenomena from the selective stop task cannot be unambiguously taken as an indication of the 
controlled use of this slower but more response-specific pathway. 
A computational model was used to explore the dynamics of selective stop task in 
Chapter 5, and revealed an unexpected pattern that was not previously predicted by either 
account.  In particular, the design of the selective stop task is such that the stopping of one 
response (or merely the provision of probabilistic foreknowledge to that effect) can lead to a 
facilitation of the alternative response.  While the model rapidly learned to take advantage of this 
characteristic of the task, adult subjects failed to do so.  This discrepancy challenges both 
strategic control and context-monitoring accounts of response inhibition.  It motivates specific 
future modeling work (in particular, the use of more ecologically-valid training schemes) but 
also the focused empirical assessments of a prediction from an elaborated version of the strategic 
control account of selective stopping.  According to this elaborated account, subjects may fail to 
learn from approach-related information during the performance of selective stop tasks, owing to 
a rather global inhibition of the direct pathway through the basal ganglia.  
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 Through a convergent use of computational, behavioral, electroencephalographic, 
pupillometric, and hemodynamic methods, the current work reduces much of the complexity in 
the cognitive neuroscience of response inhibition.  Specifically, it suggests that the role of 
prefrontal cortex in response inhibition is to monitor the environmental context in support of 
contextually-infrequent behaviorally-relevant stimuli, and that a rather global and automatic 
form of motoric stopping may be engaged when the prefrontal cortex is thereby activated.  This 
perspective accords with revisions to recent taxonomies of executive function (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007) and can be computationally understood as a specific instantiation of the 
capacities for goal maintenance and top-down biasing enabled by the prefrontal cortex at large.  
Context-monitoring may also explain much of the shared variance across tasks regardless of their 
demands on motoric stopping.  The tension between this context-monitoring perspective and 
those invoking strategically-controlled stopping with foreknowledge is ameliorated by our 
demonstration that the evidence taken to support such strategic control can be developmentally 
dissociated, contrary to strategic-control accounts.   This developmental dissociation in fact has 
parallels in developmental, aging, and neuropsychological work with tasks involving rare 
behaviorally-relevant stimuli that do not demand motoric stopping, suggesting that these 
dissociations may not be specific to strategic demands on stopping, but reflect some more 
general dynamics in context-monitoring. 
Of course much complexity remains, owing in part to clear limitations of the current 
work.  First, a viable computational account of the dynamics of selective stopping is still 
outstanding.  Second, it is unclear how context-monitoring processes may develop over time, 
given the counterintuitive effects from the developmental literature on tasks requiring the 
detection of rare but behaviorally-relevant stimuli (whereby early frontal event-related potentials 
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show a trend towards reversal as a function of stimulus predictability).  Third, it remains to be 
demonstrated that deficits in the processes supporting detection of rare and behaviorally-relevant 
stimuli can consistently and parametrically explain deficits in response inhibition; such a 
demonstration requires the use of transcranial magnetic stimulation, psychopathologically 
disordered populations, or the assessment of those with frontal lobe injury, none of which was 
undertaken here.  Indeed, such work would allow for more causal inferences which, owing to the 
largely correlational nature of the enclosed work, are currently speculative.  Finally, the current 
work is firmly based in the laboratory; it is always possible that more ecologically valid studies 
(and models) will show patterns that contravene the current account, and reintroduce more 
complexity than was tamed here. 
Despite these limitations, these findings have a number of larger implications.  A large 
set of implications pertains to the basic cognitive neuroscience of frontal lobe function.  A 
review of this wider literature, and the specific insights offered by the context-monitoring 
hypothesis are provided below.  The second major class of implications pertains to the results of 
frontal lobe damage and psychopathologies like stuttering behavior, which can often be better 
characterized as failures of monitoring than of controlled stopping.  The final set of implications 
pertain to the targeted intervention and remediation of inhibitory deficits, which can be fruitfully 
informed by context-monitoring accounts. 
 
Implications of Context Monitoring: Broader Domains 
 
The context-monitoring hypothesis of rVLPFC function offers an alternative and 
plausible account for data that might otherwise be attributed to response inhibition.  However, 
146 
 
the rVLPFC is involved in many tasks.  Below, we speculate on the potential roles of this brain 
region in monitoring the environment, in monitoring language processing, and in monitoring of 
memory. 
Monitoring of the Environment  
 Monitoring the environment is not only important for detecting task-relevant and 
infrequent stimuli as in oddball and stop signal tasks.  As reviewed below, the rVLPFC may play 
a larger role in determining our awareness of events in the environment, as they unfold across 
time (as revealed by task block effects and studies of the attentional blink), as they inform future 
behavior (as in task-switching paradigms), and as they pertain to affective states (as in studies of 
affective labeling and of pain). 
 Task Block effects.  In a meta-analysis of blocked fMRI experiments, the rVLPFC was 
found to activate transiently in block transitions (Konishi, Donaldson, & Buckner, 2001).  
rVLPFC regions are recruited at these points of task-relevant contextual change.  Critically, the 
rVLPFC was activated both during transitions from task to fixation blocks and for the reverse 
transition, whereas previous controlled stopping accounts of the rVLPFC might have predicted 
response inhibition for only the former.  
 Attentional Blink.  In rapid serial visual presentation, the detection of the first of two 
briefly presented targets will often preclude the detection of the second, if distractors intervene 
and the inter-target interval is between 200 and 600ms (the so-called “attentional blink”).  This 
paradigm is associated with activation of lateral prefrontal regions including the right inferior 
frontal gyrus (Marois, Chun, & Gore, 2000), and damage to the right prefrontal cortex causes a 
prolonged attentional blink (Masud Husain, Shapiro, Martin, & Kennard, 1997). The duration of 
this attentional blink can be predicted based on ERPs recorded over the right prefrontal cortex: 
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Those with attenuated attentional blinks demonstrate an earlier posterior P3 to the second target, 
as well as a reduced right prefrontal, P3-like component to the distractors relative to the first 
target (Martens, Munneke, Smid, & Johnson, 2006), both effects possibly indicating more 
efficient extraction of the targets by those with smaller attentional blinks.     
 These data are inconsistent with that expected from a controlled stopping account: If 
rVLPFC were required for inhibiting distractors, one would expect more involvement of the 
rVLPFC to distractors than targets, and that the magnitude of this difference should be larger 
among those with an attenuated attentional blink.  Instead, this evidence is consistent with a role 
of the rVLPFC in monitoring for and detecting the targets, made contextually infrequent by the 
distractors, such that stronger engagement of the rVLPFC reflects more effective detection and 
interpretation of the targets when they appear.   
 Task-switching.  The rVLPFC is one of only two prefrontal regions that are more active 
for unpredictable than predictable switches between tasks, particularly when the onset of trials is 
also unpredictable (Dreher, Koechlin, Ali, & Grafman, 2002).  From an effortful and controlled 
stopping account, one might assume that the rVLPFC was inhibiting the undesired task set, and 
that this capacity must be recruited more strongly when one is uncertain of both which task set 
must be inhibited and when that should occur.  However, even when subjects are aware both of 
which task set must be inhibited and when that needs to occur, the rVLPFC is more active when 
subjects must infer the next task’s identity, relative to when they are explicitly informed of it 
(Forstmann, Brass, Koch & Von Cramon, 2004).  Instead, the role of the rVLPFC in task-
switching is more consistent with monitoring for and detecting contextual change – a capacity 
that is less needed when those contextual changes are explicitly-cued. 
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 Pain.  For most of us, pain is an infrequent experience; depending on its intensity, pain 
may also be behaviorally-relevant.  Acute pain stimulation leads to rVLPFC activity (Brooks, 
Nurmikko, Bimson, Singh, & Roberts, 2002; Peyron et al., 1999), consistent with “a right-
lateralized attentional system to alert an organism to an infrequent, but behaviorally relevant, 
stimulus such as pain” (Symonds, Gordon, Bixby, & Mande, 2006).  Other work indicates this 
region may be more strongly recruited under conditions of high pain, or when the intensity of 
pain is explicitly task-relevant (Kong et al., 2006).  Furthermore, scalp-recorded “pain evoked 
potentials” elicit a component with extensive similarities to the p300 oddball response 
(Zaslansky, Sprecher, Tenke, Hemli, & Yarnitsky, 1996).  In all cases, it seems that monitoring 
functions may underlie the recruitment of the rVLPFC during the largely infrequent but 
behaviorally-relevant state of pain. 
 Affective Labeling. Some studies have reported rVLPFC activity when labeling the 
affective valence of pictures (Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000), and one reported a 
negative correlation with amygdala response (Lieberman et al., 2007).  An interpretation based 
on the association of the rVLPFC with inhibition might suggest that this region actively inhibits 
the amygdala, notwithstanding previous evidence showing positive correlations between 
amygdala and rVLPFC activity (Greenberg et al., 2005).  Nonetheless, a familiar problem 
confronts the inhibitory account: the study demonstrating a negative correlation between 
rVLPFC and amygdala activity failed to match positively- and negatively-valenced images in 
stimulus probability, unlike the relevant dimensions for other conditions (which were matched in 
stimulus probability).  According to the context monitoring hypothesis, then, rVLPFC activity 
should uniquely differentiate this condition from others – due to its task-relevant and 
contextually-infrequent stimuli, as was indeed observed.  Similar confounds appear in other work 
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on affective labeling, such that the rVLPFC shows greater responsiveness for those stimuli that 
are less frequent (AA faces were infrequent in the verbal encoding condition of (Lieberman, 
Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005) or for tasks that are contextually infrequent by 
virtue of block order (Hariri et al., 2000). 
Monitoring of Language Processes 
 Although left-hemispheric regions of the prefrontal cortex are more commonly associated 
with language processing, the rVLPFC appears to have some role in the processing of language.  
For example, and as reviewed below, the role of the rVLPFC in stem-completion paradigms may 
be due to the processing of contextually-infrequent words.  A second linguistic role for the 
rVLPFC is revealed by current research on discourse processing. 
Stem Completion. Typical word-stem completion paradigms contrast those stems with 
many permissible completions (e.g., STA___) and those with few permissible completions (e.g., 
PSA__ ).  In general, left inferior prefrontal regions are more strongly recruited to stems with 
many completions, as though these regions are important for selecting among these competitors 
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1999).  On the other hand, rVLPFC has shown the opposite pattern – of 
increased recruitment to stems with few possible completions – when those completions are 
lower in average frequency (Desmond, Gabrieli, & Glover, 1998).  This inverse pattern of 
sensitivity in the rVLPFC may indicate that it has less to do with selection among or suppression 
of competitors (for which more activity would be expected in the many completions condition) 
than with monitoring the process of stem retrieval for a permissible answer, which is particularly 
important when those permissible answers are low-frequency items.   
Discourse Processing.  A number of studies have focused on the role of the rVLPFC in 
the processing of complex semantic relationships; the consistent thread in these studies is that 
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contextual frequency is a major determinant of rVLPFC involvement in language processing.  
For example, while both the left and right VLPFC were sensitive to the presence of semantic 
anomalies, only the rVLPFC shows an attenuation of that response when the local context made 
those semantic anomalies more acceptable (Menenti, Petersson, Scheeringa, & Hagoort, 2008).  
The rVLPFC response to semantic anomalies may be increased following metaphorical 
statements (Stringaris et al., 2006), consistent with early work in neuropsychology emphasizing 
the role of the right hemisphere in the processing of figurative or abstract language.   
More recent work indicates that the involvement of the rVLPFC in metaphor processing 
may be limited to novel or unusual metaphors (Lee & Dapretto, 2006; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & 
Jung-Beeman, 2007).  While the linguistic functions of the rVLPFC are not well understood, 
contextual modulations and frequency are clearly important features in determining the degree of 
rVLPFC involvement, consistent with a role for this region in the monitoring of context and 
contextual change. 
Monitoring of Memory 
 As reviewed above, the rVLPFC may be important for the processing of contextually-
infrequent but task-relevant stimuli in the environment, and even in some linguistic contexts.  
However, its role may not be limited to exogenous attention, as previously supposed (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002).  To the contrary, evidence from memory paradigms reveal that the rVLPFC 
may be involved in monitoring memory processes.  Here we will focus on tip-of-the-tongue and 
prospective memory phenomena as example domains. 
Tip of the tongue phenomena.  A number of studies indicate the importance of the 
rVLPFC in item (Nyberg et al., 1996), source (Kim et al., 2009), and autobiographical memory 
(Greenberg et al., 2005).  While “retrieval monitoring” is sometimes offered as an explanation of 
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these effects, and while such accounts are not necessarily inconsistent with the context-
monitoring hypothesis, other work casts doubt on the retrieval monitoring hypothesis with 
respect to the rVLPFC: it is not always involved in successful remembering (Henson et al., 2000; 
Henson et al., 1999; Kikyo, Ohki, & Miyashita, 2002).  Instead, it may be more strongly 
recruited in feeling-of-knowing or tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states, in which subjects are not able 
to retrieve a memory but have the subjective impression that they will (Kikyo et al., 2002; Maril, 
Wagner, & Schacter, 2001).  TOT states are difficult to induce, typically occurring only on a 
small subset of trials (10-20%) even with experimental designs optimized to produce them and 
subjects trained to report them.  Thus, TOT states constitute a contextually-infrequent but task-
relevant experience in any memory task, and should therefore evoke rVLPFC activity 
independent of any retrieval-specific role the rVLPFC may have in monitoring.  . 
Prospective Memory.  Prospective memory – “remembering to remember” – shares many 
similarities with task-switching; accordingly, fMRI studies reveal that prospective memory 
recruits a neural network very similar to that observed in studies of task-switching (Simons, 
Schlövinck, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006).  Dominant theoretical accounts of prospective 
memory posit that subjects engage in a strategic monitoring of the environment for prospective 
memory cues (Burgess, Quayle, & Frith, 2001; Smith, 2003).  Indeed, activity in the rVLPFC is 
observed during the identification of prospective memory cues, and also shows elevated activity 
during blocks where cue identification is particularly difficult (Simons et al., 2006), consistent 
with a role for this region in monitoring the environment.  Furthermore, no differential activity in 
the rVLPFC is observed when prospective memory processes are contrasted with an oddball task 
(Jeremy R. Reynolds, West, & Braver, 2008), suggesting that the functional role of the rVLPFC 
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in prospective memory may be limited to processing the infrequent but task-relevant stimuli 
present in both paradigms. 
 
Implications of Context-monitoring: Frontal Lobe Damage and Psychopathology 
  
The second major set of implications arising from the context-monitoring hypothesis 
pertain to not only to the putatively-inhibitory deficits arising from damage to the rVLPFC, but 
also to cases where inhibition does not appear to explain the effects of rVLPFC damage.  
Context-monitoring also strongly informs the characterization of psychopathologies that are 
sometimes thought to be associated with deficits in response inhibition, including Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and stuttering.  The insights provided by the context-
monitoring hypothesis in each of these cases is discussed in turn, below. 
Inhibitory Deficits due to rVLPFC Damage.  Evidence from brain damaged patients 
indicates that lesions to the rVLPFC may be associated with deficits in task switching (Aron, 
Monsell et al., 2004; Stuss & Alexander, 2007).  The precise pattern of these deficits is strongly 
indicative of failures in monitoring for contextual change.  Right lateral prefrontal patients fail to 
benefit not only from larger preparation time for task switches (Stuss & Alexander, 2007).  but 
may more generally fail to check for the occurrence of stimuli, and thus fail to increase response 
readiness over time (Stuss et al., 2005; Vallesi, unpublished PhD Dissertation).  The role of 
rVLPFC in context-monitoring strongly converges with these findings and offers a unified way 
of characterizing these effects of damage to right lateral prefrontal cortex. 
This framework also provides a new perspective on detailed patterns of performance that 
have been previously interpreted to reflect response inhibition deficits.  For example, focal 
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rVLPFC damage can lead to poor target detection, such that even when the location of an 
upcoming target is cued before trial onset, this location is not effectively monitored following the 
onset of any stimulus (Michael et al., 2006).  The context-monitoring hypothesis suggests this 
patient’s difficulty reflects a deficit in monitoring contextually-appropriate locations in the 
service of behaviorally-relevant stimulus detection. 
Spatial Neglect. While spatial neglect is traditionally associated with damage to the right 
parietal lobe, spatial neglect also occurs following damage to the rVLPFC (Husain & Kennard, 
1996; Husain et al., 1997).  It appears that deficits in phasic alerting underlie some forms of 
spatial neglect: in these cases, damage-induced spatial bias is abolished when patients are warned 
in advance about impending trials (Robertson, Mattingley, Rorden, & Driver, 1998).  Frontal 
spatial neglect is also associated with abnormal P3 oddball effects (for a review, see Deouell, 
Hämäläinen, & Bentin, 2000).  This effect can be understood if spatial neglect arising from 
rVLPFC damage reflects a deficit in monitoring the environment for behaviorally-relevant 
information. 
Stuttering.  Stuttering is often associated with over-activation of the rVLPFC (Fox et al., 
1996), which has been interpreted in terms of “an overactive stopping process which may 
inappropriately brake speech output” (Xue, Aron, & Poldrack, 2008).  However, stutterers also 
show abnormal behavioral and ERP profiles in classic oddball paradigms (Hampton & 
Weberfox, 2008; Morgan, Cranford, & Burk, 1997), indicating the deficit may not be unique to 
stopping demands.  rVLPFC activation is also negatively correlated with speech dysfluencies 
(Preibisch et al., 2003), and it remains more highly activated in those who stutter than controls 
following unaided recovery (Kell, Kriegstein, Neumann, & Giraud, 2007), contrary to the 
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proposal that an overactive “stopping” process is responsible for stuttering and reflected in 
rVLPFC activity. 
 An alternative account posits that an abnormal monitoring process is chronically engaged 
in checking phonology for errors among those who stutter (Vasic & Wijnen, 2005).  In addition 
to correctly predicting a number of behavioral findings, this monitoring theory suggests that 
therapies like delayed auditory feedback and frequency altered feedback may actually work as 
“alerting” cues that serve to orient attention away from phonology, similar to noise-induced 
fluency (Postma & Kolk, 1992).  Those with less severe stuttering may even adopt a 
compensatory strategy of self-orienting away from phonology in linguistic contexts, leading to 
greater activity in the rVLPFC (Preibisch et al., 2003). 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  While ADHD is often understood as a 
deficit in response inhibition – such that hyperactivity and inappropriate shifts of attention both 
reflect problems with the act of stopping those unwanted behaviors – the data do not support a 
deficit that is stopping-specific (Vaurio, Simmonds & Mostofsky, 2009).  In particular, meta-
analysis reveals that ADHD is more strongly associated with reaction time variability overall 
than with deficits in SSRT, as might arise from deficits in the ability to effectively monitor the 
environment for behaviorally-relevant information.  It is possible that ADHD is actually most 
directly associated with an uncoupling of behavioral-relevance from monitoring processes, such 
that many items in the environment – regardless of their behavioral-relevance – are deemed 
worthy of attention. 
 
Implications of Context-Monitoring: Targeted Interventions 
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The context-monitoring hypothesis not only provides insights regarding the basic 
cognitive neuroscience of frontal lobe function and dysfunction, but also motivates more targeted 
interventions.  Interventions for frontal lobe insult or pathology often focus on the training of 
response inhibition when they might more fruitfully target context monitoring.   
One method by which this might occur is alerting-based training.  In this domain, 
subjects are trained to more closely monitor their environment for behaviorally-relevant stimuli, 
which require response commission.  Such training has lasting effects in the rVLPFC (Thimm, 
Fink, Küst, Karbe, & Sturm, 2006), and the prognosis for recovery in frontal spatial neglect can 
be predicted on the basis of preserved alerting function (Robertson et al., 1998).  These data thus 
suggest that, to the extent the rVLPFC is subserving a common context-monitoring function 
across tests of response inhibition and indeed many domains of cognitive functioning, alerting-
based training might be a particularly fruitful direction for applied work. 
Meditation training may be another method by which effective interventions could occur, 
because it may influence monitoring processes and rVLPFC in a way that generalizes beyond the 
meditative experience itself (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008).  For example, meditation 
training reduces the attentional blink (Slagter et al., 2007), a phenomenon which may rely 
crucially on rVLPFC monitoring functions in particular (as described above).  Meditation 
training also improves subjects’ ability to maintain vigilance in the absence of a warning about 
an upcoming target stimulus (Jha, Krompinger & Baime, 2007). Meditation experience 
producing changes in rVLPFC cortical thickness (Lazar, et al., 2005).  The act of meditating 
occurs alongside increased recruitment of the rVLPFC, and subjective reports on the depth of the 
achieved meditative state are positively correlated with rVLPFC activation (Lutz, Brefczynski-
Lewis, Johnston & Davidson, 2008), perhaps suggesting that the act of meditating exercises the 
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cognitive functions subserved by this region.  Together, this evidence implies that meditation 
training might be an important dimension for interventions in populations with deficits in 
response inhibition as a function of meditation’s effects on monitoring processes; indeed, 
meditation training has already shown some promise as an intervention technique for ADHD 
(Baijal & Gupta, 2008).  More traditional cognitive interventions have so far been met with 
limited success (Alderson et al., 2008). 
 
Final Remarks 
  
A reframing of the cognitive control demands of response inhibition as context 
monitoring requires an overhaul of the interpretation and understanding of many associated 
cognitive phenomena, deficits from frontal injury, and psychopathology.  There are several 
limitations to the current work, both with respect to the substrates that might support more 
selective forms of stopping, and the developmental trajectory of these abilities.  Nonetheless, 
context-monitoring usefully informs basic theorizing about the functions of the frontal lobes, and 
the rVLPFC in particular, across a wide number of domains, including those that involve the 
monitoring of the environment, of language, and of memory.  The context-monitoring hypothesis 
may further motivate specific cognitive interventions for frontal lobe dysfunctions and 
pathologies characterized by deficits in response inhibition, including alerting and meditation 
training.   
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Supporting Methods:  Instructions to Subjects 
 
Instructions to subjects were essentially identical across all experiments.  For the Double Go 
Task in Experiment 1, subjects were told, “In this task you will respond TWICE to arrows that 
are subsequently covered up by a square. AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, press the z button to 
left arrows, and the m button to right arrows.  If a square appears, press the same button again. 
Always anticipate the appearance of the square by PREPARING to press the button twice.   You 
MUST respond to squares very quickly - if you're too slow, the square will turn red, and the trial 
will be marked as incorrect. Keep your fingers on the keys throughout all the tasks.  If you have 
any questions please ask them now.”  The instructions for the Double Go Task differed in 
Experiment 2 in that subject were told to expect frequent “blink breaks,” but should attempt to 
blink as little as possible throughout the rest of the task.  The instructions for the Double Go 
Task also differed in Experiment 3, in that a MR-compatible button box was used for 
responding; thus “z button” was replaced with “leftmost button” and “m button” was replaced 
with “rightmost button” in the instructions.  Instructions for Experiment 2 and 3 were otherwise 
identical to those in Experiment 1. The stop task instructions were as follows in Experiment 1, 
with changes throughout subsequent experiments that were analogous to those just described for 
the Double Go Task: “Now you will perform the opposite task.  Your task is to respond to the 
arrows UNLESS the square appears, but you should not wait for the square. We are interested 
both in how fast you can respond and how well you can stop - both are equally important. Keep 
your fingers on the buttons so that you can respond to the arrows as soon as they appear.  If you 
see the square, try to STOP yourself from responding.  This will sometimes be physically 
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impossible, but try your best.  If you fail to stop, the square will turn red.  If you have any 
questions please ask them now.” 
 We note that while subjects were not told to prepare to stop on all trials within the Stop 
task (consistent with the standard instructions for that task), subjects were told to prepare to 
respond twice on all trials within the Double Go task.  This particular procedure was adopted 
based on results from extensive piloting of the Double Go task, which indicated that subjects 
were unlikely to proactively prepare their responses without such instructions (as reflected in 
unacceptably long RTs on Signal trials, and a large number of omission errors).  This stands in 
stark contrast to results from the Stop task, which indicate that subjects engage proactive control 
even in the absence of instructions to do so [1-5].  This difference in instructions could thus be 
reasonably expected to bring the strategies of the two tasks into alignment.  Nonetheless, the role 
of instructions and strategic responding are important directions for future work, given that 
departures from standard instructions for the Stop task (although such departures did not occur 
here) are known to influence performance [6]. 
 
Supporting Methods: Behavioral Task Design 
 
As mentioned in the main text, a fixed task order was adopted for four reasons.  First, had tasks 
been administered in the opposite order, subjects might have associated the infrequent stimulus 
with the act of stopping in the Stop Task and then potentially recruited stopping processes during 
the Double Go Task to overcome this prepotent association.  Second, the current task order may 
maximize our ability to detect effortful response inhibition processes, because the act of 
responding should be more prepotent following the Double Go Task.  Third, previous work using 
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a counterbalanced design demonstrated that the univariate hemodynamics of the rVLPFC are 
similar during stopping and monitoring tasks [7]; because we observed this similarity as well as 
similarities in multivariate hemodynamics, electrophysiology, pupillometry, and behavior, use of 
a fixed task order is unlikely to have influenced the results reported here.  Fourth, although not as 
standard in purely experimental work, the use of fixed task orders is a central tenet of individual 
differences studies [8-10], because counterbalancing can introduce substantial noise into 
individual difference correlations.  Thus the use of a fixed task order allows us to substantially 
expand upon previous work by providing increased sensitivity to individual differences 
influencing both stopping and monitoring processes. 
Concerns about the impact of task order on our effects are largely addressed by a very recent 
study which has used intermixed or counterbalanced designs to examine the similarity between a 
Double Go or Single Go task and the Stop task. Owing to their intermixed designs, these studies 
are clearly not subject to order effects, and yet reveal results that are conceptually identical to our 
own [11-12].  In particular, the latter of these studies utilizes the same Double Go task we use 
here, and finds increased activation to Double GoSignal trials than to StopSignal trials, which is 
entirely consistent with our group-level fMRI results.  Thus it seems that any order effects would 
not change our conceptual conclusions or bear on these group analyses of our manuscript.  
Pupillometry and event-related potentials have not been previously investigated on Double Go 
trials intermixed with Stop Signal trials; our experiments are the first to use these methods within 
this task.  Thus any arguments about order effects on pupillometry or event-related potentials are 
necessarily speculative.  However, one might expect intermixed designs to also yield: 1) an 
increased "Stop P3" on Double Go Signal trials, to the extent that the associated increased 
hemodynamic response in rVLPFC is linked to the P3 [13], and in turn, 2) an increased pupillary 
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response on Double Go Signal trials, to the extent that the P3 and pupillary response are both 
driven by the LC/norepi system [14-15]. 
 Also as mentioned in the main text, there were minor variations across experiments in the 
precise design of stimuli, inter-trial intervals, and other characteristics; the visual differences are 
illustrated in Supporting Fig. 1, and other differences are described in Supporting Table 1. 
 
Supporting Methods: fMRI Acquisition and Regression Model 
 
Functional data were collected in a two runs of 216 EPI volumes, each consisting of 32 4 mm 
thick slices (gap=0 mm, field-of-view (FOV)=220 mm, in-plane matrix= 64 x 64, in-plane 
resolution= 3.44 x 3.44 mm2), angled parallel to the AC-PC line. Prior to the functional runs, 
high-resolution T1-weighted 3D IR-SPGR full head anatomical images were acquired along the 
coronal plane (TR=9 ms, TE=2 ms, flip angle=10º, inversion time=500 ms; 220 mm FOV, 256 x 
256 matrix, 0.87 mm x 0.87 mm in-plane resolution, 124 slices, 1.7-mm slice thickness). The 
scanner was equipped with a standard head coil and participant’s heads were secured with 
moldable pillows to minimize head motion. Stimuli were displayed through fiber-optic goggles 
and participants responding by pressing one of two buttons on a fiber-optic button box. 
Customized square waveforms were generated for each participant and run.  Separate waveforms 
were generated for No Signal trials with left and right pointing arrows, for Signal trials in which 
the subject had been correct and incorrect, and for task blocks.  In addition, we generated several 
control waveforms to control for nuisance variables; this included parametric waveforms 
generated for the number of TRs since the last signal trial and for the interstimulus delay with 
which each signal was presented, as well square waveforms for cues indicating the onset and 
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offset of task blocks.  Finally, a waveform was generated specifying the onset and duration of 
task blocks.  These waveforms were convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic response 
function (HRF). For each participant, we used FILM (FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model) to 
estimate the hemodynamic parameters for the different explanatory variables (EVs; e.g. one for 
each of the separate waveforms) and generate statistical contrast maps of interest (e.g. a contrast 
between Signal and No Signal trials), with separate models fit to each task.  As with the ERP and 
pupillometry analyses, this procedure ensures the task-evoked hemodynamic response is 
calculated relative to within-task baselines, thereby controlling for non-specific task differences 
such as scanner drift or fatigue. 
 
Supporting Results: univariate fMRI analyses 
 
In addition to the contrasts reported in the main text, we also contrasted Double GoNo-Signal and 
StopNo-Signal directly, to confirm that any differences between those trial types would not 
contaminate the contrast of (Double GoSignal  -Double GoNo-Signal) vs. (StopSignal  - StopNo-Signal).  
No significant differences were observed between Double GoNo-Signal and StopNo-Signal trials. 
 
Supporting Results: fMRI Pattern Classification analyses 
 
Z-transformed beta-weights from the estimation routines implemented by FSL were provided to 
the network as inputs, with one input unit per voxel.  Each unit in this input layer projected to a 
distinct set of 30 units designed to encode real valued inputs as a distributed pattern (a ScalarVal 
layer in Emergent).  Thus, unit #1 would code for the value -4.5, unit #30 would code for the 
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value 4.5, and other units interpolate between those values.  These patterns were smoothed 
across adjacent units with a Gaussian smoothing kernel of σ = .105.  For example, this 
smoothing allows unit #1 to code for the value -4.5 but also -4.4 and -4.3, with less activation 
resulting from values that diverged more from the unit’s preferred value.  Next, each of these 
ScalarVal units were fully connected with random weights to all output units, of which there 
were 18 for classifying individuals (1 per subject; Supporting Fig. 2A) or 2 for classifying trial 
types (Signal trials & No-Signal trials; Supporting Fig.2B). 
As mentioned in the main text, separate networks were then trained for each ROI (and therefore 
differed in terms of the number of input units), and for identifying which individuals generated 
the data vs. what trial type the data was estimated from (and therefore differed in terms of the 
number of output units) but all other aspects of the network architecture were the same.  
Specifically, all ScalarVal layers contained 30 times the number of input units for that network, 
and all network connection weights were adjusted via Hebbian and contrastive Hebbian learning 
rules, with the same mixtures (khebb = .01) and learning rates (0.05).  The equation for the 
Hebbian weight change is:  
 ∆!!""𝑤!" = 𝑥!!𝑦!!   − 𝑦!!𝑤!" = 𝑦!!(𝑥!! − 𝑤!")    (2) 
 
and for contrastive Hebbian learning:  
 ∆!""𝑤!" = 𝑥!!𝑦!! − (𝑥!!𝑦!!)     (3) 
 
which is subject to a soft-weight bounding to keep within the 0 − 1 range:  
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 ∆!"#$$𝑤!" = ∆!"" +    1− 𝑤!" +    ∆!"" − 𝑤!"    (4) 
 
The two terms are then combined additively with a normalized mixing constant khebb:  
 ∆𝑤!" =∈ [𝑘!!"" ∆!!"" + 1− 𝑘!!"" ∆!"#$$ ]    (5) 
  
 For classifying individuals, we trained a set of 40 networks (10 each for BA44, 45, 47 
and 4) to activate one of 18 output units corresponding directly to which of our 18 subjects 
generated the z-transformed beta weight input values from the contrast Signal > Null in the 
Double Go Task.  We trained a separate set of 40 networks to do the same for the contrast No-
Signal > Null in the Double Go Task.  For classifying trial types, we trained a set of 180 
networks (10 for each subject) to classify which trial type the z-transformed beta weight input 
values came from in the Double Go Task: either Signal>Null or No-Signal>Null, using two 
output units corresponding directly to these two contrasts.  For classifying trial types, a separate 
set of 180 networks was trained for each ROI (44, 45, 47 and 4).  Once all networks had 
performed correctly on 4 successive epochs of testing, the learning rate was turned to zero and 
networks were presented with data from the corresponding individuals, ROIs, and contrasts in 
the Stop task.  Networks were scored as performing at chance on any trial where they activated 
all output units equally, or as performing correctly if the correct output unit was the most active.  
These performance scores were then averaged to yield the data presented in main text Fig. 4. 
 These analyses require that networks generalize not only across tasks but also across 
runs, because the tasks were collected in separate runs.  Although we excluded subjects for 
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excessive motion, some motion artifacts likely contribute to the below-perfect generalization that 
we observed across tasks. 
It is also possible to train the same networks to discriminate the tasks given a particular ROI and 
contrast, but that discrimination could be explained as a function of the noise that is not specific 
to our tasks, but rather specific to the separate runs in which the tasks were collected.  To 
demonstrate this, we trained separate sets of 10 networks to discriminate tasks based on 
activation in each ROI for each individual on odd-numbered trials, and tested them on even-
numbered trials, for three separate contrasts: Signal>Null, No-Signal>Null, and Nuisance>Null, 
where nuisance trials were those where subjects saw the word “RELAX” for 2 seconds.  We 
found that discrimination of tasks/runs (since these are confounded in our data) across these 2160 
networks (10 runs of each network x 18 subjects x 4 ROIs x 3 contrasts) was reliably above 
chance even for the contrast Nuisance>Null (with mean accuracy of 65%), indicating that run-
specific rather than task-specific variance is contributing to the classifier’s accuracy.  A separate 
batch of networks was trained to distinguish the tasks based on activity in bilateral primary 
visual cortex (BA17), which proved to be the best ROI for distinguishing the tasks on average 
(F(1,17)=8.462, p=.01) and on the Signal > Null contrast in particular Supporting(F(1,17)=17.42, 
p=.001;  Supporting Figure 3).  Thus, the tasks/runs can be discriminated based on nuisance 
trials; furthermore, BA17 is the most successful at discriminating tasks in general and on the 
critical Signal > Null contrast in particular.  These results indicate that unambiguous inferences 
about multivariate patterns that discriminate stopping and context monitoring processes cannot 
be made when infrequent Go and Stop trials are collected in separate runs.  Intermixing those 
trial types into the same run is likely to introduce other problems, such as the strategic 
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prioritization of stopping demands[16], which is one reason we did not adopt this design 
ourselves. 
 
 
Supporting Results: ERP Analyses 
 
As described in the main text, frontal correlations increased more than occipital correlations 
following the onset of the signal, relative to changes in correlations that otherwise happen at the 
same time (i.e., during No Signal trials).  Main text Fig. 3C depicts the most focused contrast, 
which is this three-way interaction of Trial Type (Signal vs. No-Signal) x Montage (frontal vs. 
occipital) x Time (before vs. after signal onset) (F(1,98)=12.59, p=.001).  This three-way 
interaction is significant both with and without baseline correction of the ERPs, indicating that 
individual differences in baselines are not driving the effect, and that the influence of any non-
specific task effect (e.g., fatigue) on these ERPs is minimal. 
Also as described in the main text, stimuli that demand stopping typically elicit a positive-going 
potential (i.e., the Stop P3) that is frontally enhanced relative to the potentials on trials that 
require response commission[17-22].  This “anteriorization” effect is so robust across response 
inhibition paradigms, including the Stop and Go/NoGo Tasks, that some have argued such 
anteriorization directly indexes response suppression[23].  Thus, one strong prediction of 
stopping accounts is that the distribution of the P3 elicited by StopSignal trials should be more 
anterior than the P3 elicited by Double GoSignal trials.  However, and in direct contradiction to 
this prediction, the P3 elicited on StopSignal trials was enhanced relative to Double GoSignal trials 
only at more posterior electrodes, a significantly different pattern than observed over more 
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anterior electrodes (Cz&Pz vs. Fz: F(1,34)=17.81, p<.0005, Supporting Fig. S4; see also 
Supporting Fig. S5).  As such, our results actually demonstrate “centralization” of the P3 on 
StopSignal trials – suggesting that the anteriorization effect typically observed in the 
electrophysiology of stopping should not be taken to directly index response inhibition, but 
rather a more general monitoring process shared across the “signal” trials of our tasks. 
The centralized distribution more often characterizes another component typically elicited by 
stopping tasks: an ERP with a slightly earlier and negative-going central potential known as the 
N2.  This ERP, unlike the Stop P3, has already been previously shown to be functionally non-
specific to response inhibition, but is instead thought to reflect the detection of response 
conflict[24-27].  For this reason, as well as the fact that source localization demonstrates the N2 
has a source in the anterior cingulate – not the rVLPFC [28-29] – the N2 is not of primary 
interest here.  Nonetheless, we note that the N2 was marginally enhanced in the Stop task at 
central (Cz) electrodes (F(1,34)=4.6, p<.05).  In this case, the enhanced N2 may reflect the 
additional response conflict in the Stop task (where planned responses may have to be 
unpredictably cancelled) relative to the Double Go Task (where planned responses are always 
committed).  
As described in the main text, the scalp distributions of the two tasks’ ERPs were strikingly 
similar in terms of individual differences (main text Fig. 4).  This similarity is clearly visible 
even in the group average, such that even relatively subtle features of the group average ERPs 
are matched across both time and space (Supporting Fig. 5).  The “centralization” of the P3 
during the Stop task, relative to the Double Go Task, is also visible in these group averages – 
specifically at 300ms after signal onset (highlighted regions of Supporting Fig. 5). 
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Supporting Methods: Behavioral Analysis (identical across all experiments) 
 
Double Go Task. Because response slowing was observed in the Double Go Task, this slowing 
could confound obvious measures of the efficiency of context-monitoring.  For example, reaction 
times to the infrequent stimulus might be used as a proxy measure of context-monitoring, such 
that larger reaction times are interpreted to reflect less efficient detection of the signal.  However, 
these reaction times could in fact be large for a subject who very efficiently detects the signal but 
is also unusually slowed by it2.   As mentioned in the main text, we adopted a model-based 
approach to confront this confound.  This model is first introduced conceptually with respect to 
its core predictions; the underlying mathematics are described next; analyses of the resulting 
parameter estimates and verifications of the model’s core predictions are described last. 
Conceptually the model is analogous to the race model used to analyze data from the Stop task 
(Supporting Fig. 6A&B).  According to these models, responses cannot be affected until the 
signal has been detected.  Thus, the time of signal detection (TOSD) in the Double Go Task can 
be understood as the amount of time that must elapse once a signal is presented until responses 
are affected by slowing.  The first parameter to be estimated, therefore, is whether any given trial 
is “slowed” or “unslowed”; once this has been determined for each trial, we then estimate for 
each subject the time that must elapse after signal presentation until responses are categorized as 
                                                
2 In fact, efficient detection of the signal may lead to more observed slowing precisely because signals will be 
detected in time to slow responses.  This issue confounds model-free estimates of response slowing in tasks with 
infrequent stimuli that do not demand stopping . 
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“slowed.”  The first core prediction of the model is that this measure should positively correlate 
with SSRT because both measures contain variance related to the efficiency of signal detection. 
However, these measures may also share variance related to the efficiency of a putative 
inhibitory or motoric stopping process – a process that gives rise to slowing in the Double Go 
Task, and to stopping in the Stop task.  The efficiency of this putative inhibitory process can be 
independently estimated in the Double Go Task in terms of the amount of slowing experienced 
by subjects – informally, we are asking “when subjects are slowed, how slowed are they?”  This 
duration of slowing can be estimated as the difference between Double GoSignal trials categorized 
as “slowed” and corresponding reaction times on Double GoNo-Signal trials.  We hypothesize that 
subjects who are more slowed by the signal will not tend to show higher SSRT (i.e., a positive 
correlation), because we predict that SSRT primarily reflects context-monitoring processes.  It is 
possible that subjects that who are more slowed by the signal will in fact have a stronger 
inhibitory process (i.e., STN-mediated inhibition is more difficult to overcome), and therefore 
the duration of slowing may negatively correlate with SSRT.    
The model’s third core prediction is that the positive correlation between TOSD and SSRT 
should remain when controlling for DoS, because both TOSD and SSRT primarily measure 
context-monitoring, and do not substantially measure any putative inhibitory processes.  
Verifying all three core predictions requires estimating the full model, but the model’s basic 
assumptions can be preliminarily validated using a more straightforward prediction.  Responses 
should be less slowed in the Double Go Task when signals are presented late (because the signals 
will not be detected in time to slow responses).  This prediction was confirmed in our data 
(Supporting Figure 6C and main text Fig. 6B). 
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Having verified this preliminary prediction, we move to estimating the full Double Go Task 
model.  As described above, this requires categorizing each trial as slowed or unslowed.  To 
estimate which trials undergo slowing, we adopted a nonparametric technique based on rank 
order.  In particular, we subtracted from each signal trial RT the observation with corresponding 
percent rank in the no signal trial RT distribution.  To the extent that the two distributions are 
equivalent, these residuals should be centered on zero.  As mentioned in the main text, and 
consistent with our model, many residuals were centered on zero but there was also a 
pronounced positive skew to the distribution of these residuals, indicative of slowing for some 
trials.  In contrast to the positive skew typically observed in RTs, this skew was sufficiently 
strong to be essentially unaffected by logarithmic or square-root transformation. 
Our mixture modeling approach decomposed the distribution into two underlying distributions: a 
Gaussian distribution with a mean of zero (corresponding to unslowed RTs), and a Gamma 
distribution (corresponding to the slowed RTs).  Our choice of the Gamma distribution for 
slowed RTs was motivated by the fact that the two parameters determining the shape of the 
Gamma (scale and rate) can generate positively skewed pseudo-normal distributions (which 
would appear to match the observed distribution of skewed residuals) but can also generate 
exponential distributions, sometimes used to model queue and waiting times – seemingly a good 
candidate for the functional form of response slowing.  The two free parameters to the Gamma 
and the one free parameter to the Gaussian yielded a better overall fit than a single Gaussian 
(Supporting Table 2).   
Individual RTs were categorized as belonging to the slowed distribution if there was even weak 
evidence in favor of the RT belonging to that distribution (as quantified by a difference in BIC of 
≥ 2.35); otherwise RTs were assigned to the unslowed distribution.  We adopted this weak 
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standard of evidence for classification to ensure that any observation that might have undergone 
slowing would be classified as such.  Other standards of evidence lead to similar results as those 
presented here, but do not as cleanly separate the slowed and unslowed trials (c.f. main text Fig. 
6D, where unslowed Double GoSignal trials show a nonsignificant difference from corresponding 
Double GoNo-Signal trials.). 
Consistent with the Double Go Task model’s first core prediction, SSRT and TOSD were 
positively correlated when collapsing across all three experiments (R=.418, p<.0005) and in each 
experiment individually (Supporting Table 3).  This positive correlation indicates that SSRT 
largely reflects the efficiency of context monitoring, as reflected in the time of signal detection. 
We also did not observe a positive correlation between SSRT and TOSD, consistent with the 
Double Go Task model’s second core prediction.  In fact, SSRT and slowing duration were 
negatively correlated when collapsing across all three experiments (R=-.188, p<.05), indicating 
that those with stronger inhibition (i.e., more slowing) show better performance in the Stop task 
(i.e., smaller SSRTs).  This is also consistent with our model, although this relationship is fairly 
weak, and thus does not constitute particularly strong support for it. 
Finally, we tested the model’s third core prediction by performing a partial correlation of TOSD 
and SSRT, controlling for the duration of slowing.  The robust positive correlation between 
SSRT and TOSD remained (R=.41, p<.0005), indicating that any variance related to inhibitory 
processes is not strongly measured by either SSRT or TOSD, relative to the variance in context-
monitoring captured by these measures.  In other words, the individual differences variance in 
motoric stopping/slowing processes captured by DoS does not overlap with the individual 
differences variance that is shared by SSRT and TOSD, indicating that the commonality of 
TOSD and SSRT does not reflect a common motoric stopping process.  This conclusion is 
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concordant with a subsequent re-analysis of our data, presented below, which demonstrates that 
the overlapping task variance in univariate and multivariate hemodynamics, event-related 
potentials, and the relative patterns of mental effort do not substantially change when only those 
Double Go task trials categorized as “unslowed” are analyzed. 
 
Supporting Methods: Analyses of only unslowed Double GoSignal trials 
 
 To further test our hypothesis that the commonalities of the Double Go and Stop tasks do 
not reflect a common process of motoric stopping or motor plan replacement, we re-analyzed the 
fMRI, ERP, and pupillometric data including only those trials that were categorized as 
“unslowed.” 
 For fMRI, this entailed the respecification of the design matrix for each individual 
subject. Trials categorized as “slowed” were separately modeled with a new boxcar regressor, 
and convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic response function (just like our other 
regressors).  These same trials were then omitted from all other regressors (except for the 
sustained regressor) to avoid issues related to colinearity.  This technique allows the 
hemodynamic response to slowed trials to be separately estimated, and therefore not contaminate 
the contrasts of transient hemodynamic activity across tasks, nor to contaminate the estimates of 
percent signal change for the sustained hemodynamic activity across task blocks.  This re-
analysis revealed similar patterns as we had observed across all Double GoSignal trials: univariate 
transient hemodynamics were still observed throughout the rVLPFC on unslowed Double 
GoSignal trials, and these effects were still significantly larger than those observed on StopSignal 
trials (Supporting Table 4, row 1).  This result indicates that the increased hemodynamic 
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response to Double GoSignal trials is not driven by the motoric slowing that is captured by 
“slowed” trials within the Double Go task.    
Likewise, this analysis also replicated our previous finding of sustained activity across all 
trials in the Double Go task (Supporting Table 4, row 2).  This finding again indicates that 
context-monitoring processes, and not motoric stopping or slowing processes, contribute to the 
sustained activity that is recruited across all trials within the Double Go task. 
 For the ERP data, this re-analysis entailed re-segmenting the original timeseries of each 
recording session so that trials categorized as “slowed” could be given their own category, and 
then excluded from subsequent analysis steps.  Otherwise, all ERP analysis procedures were then 
performed as in the primary analysis, including 40Hz filtering, bad channel replacement, average 
referencing and polar average reference correction, stimulus locking, baseline correction, 
montage averaging, and ERP correlations.  This re-analysis once again replicated our primary 
analyses, such that the so-called “Stop P3” was in fact significantly enhanced on unslowed 
Double GoSignal trials relative to StopSignal trials (Supporting Table 4, row 5), indicating that this 
ERP does not reflect stopping-specific processes.  Indeed, all recorded ERPs were still strongly 
correlated across tasks, indicating that this similarity at the group level was paralleled by 
similarities in ERPs at the level of individual subjects, even when all of the “slowed” Double 
GoSignal trials were excluded from analysis (Supporting Table 4, row 6).  Finally, these 
correlations were again disproportionately increased over frontal electrodes (relative to occipital 
ones) in the period following signal onset (Supporting Table 4, row 7).  By fully replicating our 
original result when slowed Double GoSignal trials were excluded, this pattern indicates that the 
increased cross-task similarity in frontal ERPs that is yielded by Signal presentation is not simply 
driven by the motoric slowing that occurred within the Double Go task.   For the pupillometric 
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data, this re-analysis entailed again resegmenting the original timeseries recording, and omitting 
the “slowed” Double GoSignal trials from all subsequent analysis steps (which were otherwise 
identical to those for the primary analysis).  Once again, we were able to replicate our original 
findings after excluding those Double GoSignal trials that had been categorized as slowed, such 
that pupil diameter was still largest on Double-GoSignal trials than on any other trial type, 
including StopSignal trials (Supporting Table 4, row 8).  In fact, these patterns were slightly 
enhanced, indicating that the increased mental effort on Signal trials of the Double Go task is not 
merely driven by any additional effort required for motoric slowing, which itself appears to be 
negligible. 
 
Supporting Discussion 
 
Although the fixed task order used here might be expected to yield greater fatigue in the 
Stop task, fatigue cannot viably explain at least five prominent features of our results.  First, 
fatigue would predict a reduction in pupil diameter during the Stop task, but instead a larger 
pupil diameter was observed on StopNoSignaltrials than Double GoNoSignal trials.  Second, fatigue 
would predict a global reduction in ERPs in the Stop task, but central and posterior ERPs were 
enhanced in that task.  Third, fatigue would predict global reductions in activation during the 
Stop task, but areas thought to have domain-general attentional roles showed highly-similar 
profiles across tasks (e.g., TPJ).  Fourth, within-task baselines are used in pupillometry, ERP, 
and fMRI analysis precisely to control for run-specific effects like fatigue – thus any global 
differences between tasks (owing to fatigue or more innocuous factors, like scanner drift) are 
subtractively eliminated in the analyses reported here.  Fifth, fatigue would predict that SSRT 
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should be increased in our sample relative to experiments that administer a stop task first, but the 
range of SSRT observed here was well within normal.We have argued that our ERP and fMRI 
analyses demonstrating the shared prefrontal substrates of the tasks does not reflect the slowing 
or stopping process engaged by the Double Go Task.  Instead, we suggest that the slowing effect 
may instead be better understood as an indirect and peripheral consequence of more general 
attentional processes.  For example, cardiac slowing is also observed during tasks involving 
preparation of a speeded response[30].  Our observation of response slowing and this previous 
observation of cardiac slowing alike are highly unlikely to reflect a controlled, effortful, or 
prefrontally-based stopping process.  Although subcortical nuclei such as the subthalamic 
nucleus might be considered more likely to perform these stopping-specific functions, we 
caution that the subthalamic nucleus is operative in many tasks, not just those requiring an act of 
stopping.  In fact, its activity positively correlates with response force[31], suggesting it may also 
not have a stopping-specific function.  Indeed, others have recently shown a role for the STN in 
detecting behaviorally relevant stimuli, findings that support a re-evaluation of STN function that 
is analogous to the current re-evaluation of rVLPFC function[32]. 
 While we have argued that context-monitoring, not stopping, is the cognitively-controlled 
component to response inhibition tasks, we do not have a position on whether one or both of 
these processes may be accessible to consciousness.  The relationship between consciousness 
and cognitive control is controversial, with some recent work indicating that rVLPFC can be 
activated by subthreshold infrequent stimuli that require stopping[33-34].  These results might be 
taken to contradict accounts that either context-monitoring or stopping is cognitively controlled – 
at least, under the untested assumption that controlled processes are always consciously 
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accessible.  We suggest this assumption warrants empirical test, and is therefore a promising 
direction for future work. 
We also note that cognitive control is not defined by temporal order (if monitoring must occur 
prior to stopping, this does not imply that monitoring is cognitively controlled) nor solely by 
prefrontal recruitment (striatum may have cognitive control functions, and the rVLPFC in 
particular has been previously argued to not subserve cognitive control[35]).  Instead, assessing 
cognitive control requires more comprehensive analysis, of the kind we provide here. 
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Supporting Table 1 
 
Experiment 
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
# of trials (trials per block) 400 (100) 970 (46.19) 486 (60.75) 
Luminance-matched signal 
and no signal trials No Yes Yes 
Feedback 
Sham for Double 
Go Task, veridical 
for Stop task 
Veridical for both Veridical for both 
 
 
Supporting Table 2. 
Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
BIC 
Μ σ k ϴ 
Gaussian/Gamma Mixture -  
(fixed to 0) 22.99 4.65 16.45 39654.22 
Gaussian 15.15 33.41 - - 40421.96 
 
 
Supporting Table 3 
Measure Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
SSRTAV(sd) 216ms (33) 206ms (45) 232ms (40) 
TOSD(sd) 246ms (60) 203ms (66) 200ms (41) 
Duration of Slowing (sd) 60ms (25) 72ms (21) 56ms (14) 
Pearson R: 
TOSD vs SSRTAV 
.38 (p<.0005) .46 (p=.002) .61 (p=.006) 
Pearson R: 
Slowing Duration vs SSRTAV 
-.18 (p>.1) -.246 (p>.1) .43 (p=.1)* 
Double Go TaskRTSignal(sd) 387ms (45) 363ms (54) 361ms (41) 
Double Go TaskRTNo Signal(sd) 371ms (35) 343ms (36) 349ms (34) 
Stop TaskRTSignal(sd) 379ms (36) 353ms (40) 366ms (40) 
Stop Task RTNo Signal(sd) 426ms (74) 381ms (50) 383ms (59) 
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* - a single outlier contributed strongly to this positive trend.  Exclusion of that subject led to a 
highly non-significant correlation (p > .49) while not substantially affecting the TOSD vs 
SSRTavcorrelation (which actually became more significant, with the p value reduced to .001) 
 
Supporting Table 4 
Critical Tests  
Involving Double GoSignal 
trials 
 
Analysis of All Correct 
Trials (As described in main 
text) 
 
Re-analysis after Excluding 
Trials Categorized as 
“Slowed” 
Univariate fMRI; Transient 
Recruitment across ROIs: 
Contrasts of Percent Signal 
Change  
(Double Go Task > Stop Task) 
 
STN: t(17)=5.49, p<.0001 
BA 44: t(17)=5.08, p<.0001 
BA 45: t(17)=2.83, p=.012 
BA 47: t(17)=2.5, p=.023 
Interaction with TPJ: 
F(1,17)=31.57, p<.0001 
 
STN: t(17)=4.18, p=.001 
BA 44: t(17)=4.11, p=.001 
BA 45: t(17)=2.75, p=.014 
BA 47: t(17)=3.38, p=.004 
Interaction with TPJ:  
F(1,17)=14.82, p=.001 
Univariate fMRI:  
Mean Percent Signal Change 
for Sustained rVLPFC 
Activity Within Double Go 
Task  
(and t-statistics) 
BA 44: M= .139 
 t(17)=2.76, p=.01 
BA 45: M=.284 
 t(17)=4.51, p<.001 
BA 47: M=.211 
t(17)=3.37, p<.005 
 
BA 44: M=.144  
t(17)=2.91, p=.01 
BA 45: M= .319  
t(17)=4.95, p<.001 
BA 47: M=.234 
t(17)=3.66, p=.002 
 
fMRI MVPA;  Classification 
of Individual Subjects:  
Contrasts of Performance on 
Signal vs. No Signal trials 
BA44: t(9)=13.5, p<.0001;  
BA45: t(9)=11.39, p<.0001;  
BA47: t(9)=12.35, p<.001 
Interaction with M1: 
F(1,9)=85.12, p<.0001 
 
BA44: t(9)=11.84, p<.0001;  
BA45: t(9)=14.10, p<.0001;  
BA47: t(9)=8.29, p<.001 
Interaction with M1: 
F(1,9)=200.132, p<.0001 
 
fMRI MVPA;  Classification 
of Trial Types:  
Interactions of D-Prime across 
ROIs 
Interaction of rVLPFC’s BA’s 
(44, 45 and 47) with M1: 
F(1,17)=13.14, p<.005 
 
Interaction of rVLPFC’s BA’s 
(44, 45 and 47) with M1: 
F(1,17)=9.17, p<.01 
 
ERPs: Stop P3 Amplitude 
Comparison Across Tasks t(35)=2.92, p<.03 
 
t(35)=2.19 p<.04 
 
ERPs: Correlation of Scalp 
Voltages Across Tasks 
Following Signal Onset 
Pearson R:  
Median: .815 
Range: .429-.890 
 
Pearson R: 
Median: .805 
Range: .462-.871 
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ERPs: Change in Correlation 
After Signal Onset – 
Interaction with Montage 
Interaction of Frontal vs. 
Occipital Electrodes:  
F(1,98)=12.59, p=.001 
 
Interaction of Frontal vs. 
Occipital Electrodes: 
F(1,98)=46.79, p<.0005 
 
Pupillometry: Comparison of 
average pupil diameter across 
trial types 
StopSignal<Double GoSignal 
 t(85)=13.67, p<.001 
StopSignal<Double GoSignal 
 t(85)=13.02, p<.001 
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SUPPORTING FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
Supporting Fig. 1.  Stimuli used in the three experiments.  (A) Experiment 1 included null trials 
consisting only of a fixation ring, constituting 33% of the total number of trials.  Of the 
remaining trials, 75% were No-Signal trials – i.e., 2AFC trials in which either a left-pointing or 
right-pointing arrow was presented.  25% were Signal trials, in which a white box followed the 
onset of the 2AFC stimulus.  (B) Experiments 2 & 3 used this slightly different set of stimuli, in 
which the arrows were replaced with left- or right-pointing triangles, and the number of 
illuminated pixels was matched between the triangles and squares.    
 
Supporting Fig. 2.  MVPA methods.  (A).  For classifying subjects, neural networks received 
inputs consisting of 1 unit per voxel in a given ROI, where the activity of those units corresponds 
to the z-transformed and trimmed parameter estimates from the unsmoothed BOLD data.  This 
input layer projects to a hidden “Scalar Val” layer, which transforms each input unit’s activity 
into a distributed pattern across 30 dedicated units.  Finally, this hidden layer is fully connected 
with an output layer consisting of 18 units, one corresponding directly to each of our subjects.  
(B).  For classifying trial types, we used the same architecture as in A except that only 2 output 
units were used, corresponding directly to each of the trial type contrasts.  In addition, separate 
networks were trained for each subject. 
 
Supporting Fig. 3.  Tasks can be discriminated in all ROIs, including V1.  Although tasks were 
best classified on the basis of the Signal > Null contrast (white bars), this is unlikely to reflect 
stopping-specific processes, since activity patterns in V1 allowed the best classification on this 
contrast.  Indeed, V1 showed the best classification of tasks across all ROIs, when averaging 
across contrasts.  Because our tasks were collected in separate runs, this good classification 
performance is likely to reflect run-specific variance, rather than task-specific variance.  This 
conclusion is further supported by above-chance discrimination of tasks on the basis of nuisance 
trials, during which both stimuli and responses were precisely matched across tasks/runs. 
 
Supporting Fig. 4.The typical pattern of “P3 anteriorization” in tasks that demand stopping  was 
reversed in our tasks, such that Double GoSignal trials elicited a larger P3 than the StopSignal trials 
at the site where the Stop P3 is typically maximal (A).  In contrast, the opposite was true of more 
posterior electrodes (B & C), indicating that anteriorization effects cannot not be taken to index 
explicit motoric stopping demands. 
 
Supporting Fig. 5.The group-average scalp distribution of ERPs elicited by StopSignal and Double 
GoSignal trials were markedly similar, consistent with the strong relationship of these ERPs at the 
level of individual differences.  In particular, the anteriorization of the P3 ERP elicited by 
Double GoSignal trials, relative to that elicited by StopSignal trials, is visible in the highlighted 
portion of each figure.  Each contour represents a change of .79µV; red is positive. 
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Supporting Fig. 6. Process-models of our tasks.  (A).  The race model is used to analyze behavior 
in the Stop task, such that the amount of warning necessary to stop (Stop Signal Reaction Time, 
or SSRT) can be extracted as the nth percentile of the StopNo-Signal distribution, where n 
corresponds to the percent of unsuccessfully stopped responses at a particular signal delay.  (B) 
A conceptually similar model is used to analyze behavior in the Double Go Task, but allows the 
extraction of two underlying parameters.  The duration of slowing can be estimated as the 
difference between slowed 1st responses on Double GoSignaltrials and responses of the same 
percent rank on Double GoNo-Signal trials.  The time of signal detection can be estimated as the 
amount of time that must elapse following a signal before responses are slowed.  (C)  The 
process model of the Double Go Task predicts that slowing should be larger when signals are 
presented earlier; this prediction was confirmed. 
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